Paper 2017/784
Secure Channels and Termination: The Last Word on TLS
Colin Boyd and Britta Hale
Abstract
Secure channels are one of the most pivotal building blocks of cryptography today. Internet connections, secure messaging, protected IoT data, etc., all rely upon the security of the underlying channel. In this work we define channel protocols, as well as security for channels constructed from stateful length-hiding authenticated encryption (stLHAE) schemes. Furthermore, we initiate the concept of secure termination where, upon receipt of a signifying message, a receiver is guaranteed to have received every message that has been sent, and will ever be sent, on the channel. We apply our results to real-world protocols, linking the channel environment to previous analyses of TLS 1.2, and demonstrating that TLS 1.2 achieves secure termination via fatal alerts and close_notify messages, per the specification of the Alert Protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Latincrypt, 2017
- Keywords
- Secure channelssecure terminationcontrollable channel protocolTransport Layer Security (TLS)
- Contact author(s)
- britta hale @ ntnu no
- History
- 2017-11-06: revised
- 2017-08-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/784
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/784,
author = {Colin Boyd and Britta Hale},
title = {Secure Channels and Termination: The Last Word on {TLS}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/784},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/784}
}
