Paper 2017/757
CAKE: Code-based Algorithm for Key Encapsulation
Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Shay Gueron, Tim Gueneysu, Rafael Misoczki, Edoardo Persichetti, Nicolas Sendrier, and Jean-Pierre Tillich
Abstract
Current widely-used key exchange (KE) mechanisms will be vulnerable to quantum attacks when sufficiently strong quantum computers become available. Therefore, devising quantum-resistant replacements that combine efficiency with solid security guarantees is an important and challenging task. This paper proposes several contributions towards this goal. First, we introduce CAKE, a key encapsulation algorithm based on the QC-MDPC McEliece encryption scheme, with two major improvements: a) the use of ephemeral keys that defeats a recent reaction attack against MDPC decoding of the corresponding encryption scheme and b) a highly efficient key generation procedure for QC-MDPC-based cryptosystems. Then, we present an authenticated key exchange protocol based on CAKE, which is suitable for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) standard. We prove that CAKE is IND-CPA secure, that the protocol is SK-Secure, and suggest practical parameters. Compared to other post-quantum schemes, we believe that CAKE is a promising candidate for post-quantum key exchange standardization.
Note: To appear at IMACC 2017
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- KEMCode-basedMDPC
- Contact author(s)
- rafa misoczki @ gmail com
- History
- 2017-10-23: last of 2 revisions
- 2017-08-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/757
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/757, author = {Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Shay Gueron and Tim Gueneysu and Rafael Misoczki and Edoardo Persichetti and Nicolas Sendrier and Jean-Pierre Tillich}, title = {{CAKE}: Code-based Algorithm for Key Encapsulation}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/757}, year = {2017}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/757} }