Paper 2017/691

Universal Forgery and Key Recovery Attacks: Application to FKS, FKD and Keyak

Fanbao Liu and Fengmei Liu

Abstract

In this paper, we provide a security analysis of the Full-State Keyed Sponge (FKS), Full-State Keyed Duplex (FKD) and Keyak, one of the third-round CAESAR candidates, in the classic setting and the quantum model, respectively. In the classic setting, we present an universal forgery attack that can be implemented in O(2c/2) queries, where c is the capacity. In the quantum model, by utilizing the Simon's algorithm, we propose an efficient universal forgery attack to FKS, FKD and Keyak with complexity of O(c). Moreover, we also propose an efficient key recovery attack that can be implemented in . Such attacks show that FKS, FKD and Keyak is completely broken in the quantum model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
lfbjantie @ 163 com
History
2017-07-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/691
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/691,
      author = {Fanbao Liu and Fengmei Liu},
      title = {Universal Forgery and Key Recovery Attacks: Application to {FKS}, {FKD} and Keyak},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/691},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/691}
}
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