Paper 2017/623
Back to Massey: Impressively fast, scalable and tight security evaluation tools
Marios O. Choudary and P. G. Popescu
Abstract
None of the existing rank estimation algorithms can scale to large cryptographic keys, such as 4096-bit (512 bytes) RSA keys. In this paper, we present the first solution to estimate the guessing entropy of arbitrarily large keys, based on mathematical bounds, resulting in the fastest and most scalable security evaluation tool to date. Our bounds can be computed within a fraction of a second, with no memory overhead, and provide a margin of only a few bits for a full 128-bit AES key.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in CHES 2017
- Keywords
- side-channel attacksguessing entropyboundsscalability
- Contact author(s)
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marios choudary @ cs pub ro
pgpopescu @ yahoo com - History
- 2017-09-26: last of 2 revisions
- 2017-06-27: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/623
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/623,
author = {Marios O. Choudary and P. G. Popescu},
title = {Back to Massey: Impressively fast, scalable and tight security evaluation tools},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/623},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/623}
}
