Building on a work of Ben-Sasson, Chiesa, Green, Tromer and Virza [BCGTV15], we construct a multi-party protocol for generating the CRS of the Pinocchio zk-SNARK [PHGR16], such that as long as at least one participating party is not malicious, no party can later construct fraudulent proofs except with negligible probability. The protocol also provides a strong zero-knowledge guarantee even in the case that all participants are malicious. This method has been used in practice to generate the required CRS for the Zcash cryptocurrency blockchain.
Category / Keywords: SNARKs, zero-knowledge, cryptocurrencies, multi-party computation Date: received 21 Jun 2017, last revised 25 Jun 2017 Contact author: ariel at z cash Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20170625:085943 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2017/602 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion