Paper 2017/508

Generalized Distinguishing Attack: A New Cryptanalysis of AES-like Permutations

Victor Cauchois, Clément Gomez, and Reynald Lercier

Abstract

We consider highly structured truncated differential paths to mount rebound attacks on hash functions based on AES-like permutations. We explain how such differential paths can be computed using a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming approach. Together with the SuperSBox description, this allows us to build a rebound attack with a $6$-round inbound phase whereas classical rebound attacks have $4$-round inbound phases. Non-square AES-like permutations seem to be more vulnerable than square ones. We illustrate this new technique by mounting the first distinguishing attack on a $11$-round version of Gr\o{}stl-$512$ internal permutation $P_{1024}$ with $\mathit{O}(2^{72})$ computational complexity and $\mathit{O}(2^{56})$ memory complexity, to be compared with the $\mathit{O}(2^{96})$ required computations of the corresponding generic attack. Previous best results on this permutation reached $$ rounds with a computational complexity of $$, to be compared with $$ required by the corresponding generic attack.