Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/468

Why Your Encrypted Database Is Not Secure

Paul Grubbs and Thomas Ristenpart and Vitaly Shmatikov

Abstract: Encrypted databases, a popular approach to protecting data from compromised database management systems (DBMS’s), use abstract threat models that capture neither realistic databases, nor realistic attack scenarios. In particular, the “snapshot attacker” model used to support the security claims for many encrypted databases does not reflect the information about past queries available in any snapshot attack on an actual DBMS. We demonstrate how this gap between theory and reality causes encrypted databases to fail to achieve their “provable security” guarantees.

Category / Keywords: applications / encrypted databases, security definitions

Original Publication (with minor differences): The 16th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS 2017)

Date: received 25 May 2017, last revised 6 Jun 2017

Contact author: pag225 at cornell edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170606:213925 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/468

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