Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/429

Strengthening Access Control Encryption

Christian Badertscher and Christian Matt and Ueli Maurer

Abstract: Access control encryption (ACE) was proposed by Damgård et al. to enable the control of information flow between several parties according to a given policy specifying which parties are, or are not, allowed to communicate. By involving a special party, called the sanitizer, policy-compliant communication is enabled while policy-violating communication is prevented, even if sender and receiver are dishonest. To allow outsourcing of the sanitizer, the secrecy of the message contents and the anonymity of the involved communication partners is guaranteed.

This paper shows that in order to be resilient against realistic attacks, the security definition of ACE must be considerably strengthened in several ways. A new, substantially stronger security definition is proposed, and an ACE scheme is constructed which provably satisfies the strong definition under standard assumptions.

Three aspects in which the security of ACE is strengthened are as follows. First, CCA security (rather than only CPA security) is guaranteed, which is important since senders can be dishonest in the considered setting. Second, the revealing of an (unsanitized) ciphertext (e.g., by a faulty sanitizer) cannot be exploited to communicate more in a policy-violating manner than the information contained in the ciphertext. We illustrate that this is not only a definitional subtlety by showing how in known ACE schemes, a single leaked unsanitized ciphertext allows for an arbitrary amount of policy-violating communication. Third, it is enforced that parties specified to receive a message according to the policy cannot be excluded from receiving it, even by a dishonest sender.

Category / Keywords: Access control encryption, Information flow control, Chosen-ciphertext attacks

Date: received 18 May 2017, last revised 23 May 2017

Contact author: mattc at inf ethz ch

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170523:163103 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/429

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