Paper 2017/418
Strong Authenticated Key Exchange with Auxiliary Inputs
Rongmao Chen, Yi Mu, Guomin Yang, Willy Susilo, and Fuchun Guo
Abstract
Leakage attacks, including various kinds of side-channel attacks, allow an attacker to learn partial information about the internal secrets such as the secret key and the randomness of a cryptographic system. Designing a strong, meaningful, yet achievable security notion to capture practical leakage attacks is one of the primary goals of leakage-resilient cryptography.
In this work, we revisit the modelling and design of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols with leakage resilience. We show that the prior works on this topic are inadequate in capturing realistic leakage attacks. To close this research gap, we propose a new security notion named \textit{leakage-resilient eCK model w.r.t. auxiliary inputs} (
Note: Some statements are revised for better readability.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10623-016-0295-3
- Keywords
- Authenticated Key Exchange
- Contact author(s)
- rc517 @ uowmail edu au
- History
- 2017-06-26: last of 2 revisions
- 2017-05-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/418
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/418, author = {Rongmao Chen and Yi Mu and Guomin Yang and Willy Susilo and Fuchun Guo}, title = {Strong Authenticated Key Exchange with Auxiliary Inputs}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/418}, year = {2017}, doi = {10.1007/s10623-016-0295-3}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/418} }