Paper 2017/374
Loop-abort faults on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems
Alexandre Gélin and Benjamin Wesolowski
Abstract
Cryptographic schemes based on supersingular isogenies have become an active area of research in the field of post-quantum cryptography. We investigate the resistance of these cryptosystems to fault injection attacks. It appears that the iterative structure of the secret isogeny computation renders these schemes vulnerable to loop-abort attacks. Loop-abort faults allow to perform a full key recovery, bypassing all the previously introduced validation methods. Therefore implementing additional countermeasures seems unavoidable for applications where physical attacks are relevant.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. PQCrypto 2017
- Keywords
- Supersingular isogeny cryptosystemfault injectionreal-world attackspost-quantum cryptography
- Contact author(s)
-
alexandre gelin @ uvsq fr
benjamin wesolowski @ epfl ch - History
- 2018-06-11: last of 2 revisions
- 2017-05-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/374
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/374,
author = {Alexandre Gélin and Benjamin Wesolowski},
title = {Loop-abort faults on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/374},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/374}
}
