We evaluate our attacks on the Monero blockchain and show that in 87% of cases, the real output being redeemed can be easily identified with certainty. Moreover, we have compelling evidence that two of our attacks also extend to Monero RingCTs — the second generation Monero that even hides the transaction value. Furthermore, we observe that for over 98% of the inputs that we have been able to trace, the real output being redeemed in it is the one that has been on the blockchain for the shortest period of time. This result shows that the mitigation measures currently employed in Monero fall short of preventing temporal analysis.
Motivated by our findings, we also propose a new mitigation strategy against temporal analysis. Our mitigation strategy leverages the real spending habit of Monero users.Category / Keywords: Cryptocurrency, Privacy, Anonymity, Monero, Traceability Date: received 16 Apr 2017 Contact author: amrit at comp nus edu sg Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20170418:214502 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2017/338 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion