Paper 2017/267
A Masked White-box Cryptographic Implementation for Protecting against Differential Computation Analysis
Seungkwang Lee
Abstract
Recently, gray-box attacks on white-box cryptographic implementations have succeeded. These attacks are more efficient than white-box attacks because they can be performed without detailed knowledge of the target implementation. The success of the gray-box attack is reportedly due to the unbalanced encoding used to generate the white-box lookup table. In this paper, we propose a method to protect the gray-box attack against white-box implementations. The basic idea is to apply the masking technique before encoding intermediate values during the white-box lookup table generation. Because we do not require any random source in runtime, it is possible to perform efficient encryption and decryption using our method. The security and performance analysis shows that the proposed method can be a reliable and efficient countermeasure.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- White-box cryptographypower analysisdifferential computation analysiscountermeasure.
- Contact author(s)
- skwang @ etri re kr
- History
- 2017-12-12: last of 3 revisions
- 2017-03-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/267
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/267,
author = {Seungkwang Lee},
title = {A Masked White-box Cryptographic Implementation for Protecting against Differential Computation Analysis},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/267},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/267}
}
