Quantum Authentication with Key Recycling

Christopher Portmann

Paper 2017/119

Quantum Authentication with Key Recycling

Christopher Portmann

Abstract

We show that a family of quantum authentication protocols introduced in [Barnum et al., FOCS 2002] can be used to construct a secure quantum channel and additionally recycle all of the secret key if the message is successfully authenticated, and recycle part of the key if tampering is detected. We give a full security proof that constructs the secure channel given only insecure noisy channels and a shared secret key. We also prove that the number of recycled key bits is optimal for this family of protocols, i.e., there exists an adversarial strategy to obtain all non-recycled bits. Previous works recycled less key and only gave partial security proofs, since they did not consider all possible distinguishers (environments) that may be used to distinguish the real setting from the ideal secure quantum channel and secret key resource.

Note: Full version of published paper.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published by the IACR in EUROCRYPT 2017
Keywords: Quantum cryptography composable security authentication key recycling
Contact author(s): chportma @ ethz ch
History: 2017-03-29: revised; 2017-02-16: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2017/119
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/119,
      author = {Christopher Portmann},
      title = {Quantum Authentication with Key Recycling},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/119},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/119}
}