Paper 2017/1082
Instruction Duplication: Leaky and Not Too Fault-Tolerant!
Lucian Cojocar, Kostas Papagiannopoulos, and Niek Timmers
Abstract
Fault injection attacks alter the intended behavior of micro- controllers, compromising their security. These attacks can be mitigated using software countermeasures. A widely-used software-based solution to deflect fault attacks is instruction duplication and n-plication. We explore two main limitations with these approaches: first, we examine the effect of instruction duplication under fault attacks, demonstrating that as fault tolerance mechanism, code duplication does not provide a strong protection in practice. Second, we show that instruction duplication increases side-channel leakage of sensitive code regions using a multivariate exploitation technique both in theory and in practice.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CARDIS 2017
- Keywords
- side channel analysisfault injectionduplicationinfection
- Contact author(s)
- kostaspap88 @ gmail com
- History
- 2017-11-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/1082
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1082,
author = {Lucian Cojocar and Kostas Papagiannopoulos and Niek Timmers},
title = {Instruction Duplication: Leaky and Not Too Fault-Tolerant!},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1082},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1082}
}
