Paper 2017/1021
Bricklayer Attack: A Side-Channel Analysis on the ChaCha Quarter Round
Alexandre Adomnicai, Jacques J. A. Fournier, and Laurent Masson
Abstract
ChaCha is a family of stream ciphers that are very efficient on constrainted platforms. In this paper, we present electromagnetic side-channel analyses for two different software implementations of ChaCha20 on a 32-bit architecture: one compiled and another one directly written in assembly. On the device under test, practical experiments show that they have different levels of resistance to side-channel attacks. For the most leakage-resilient implementation, an analysis of the whole quarter round is required. To overcome this complication, we introduce an optimized attack based on a divide-and-conquer strategy named bricklayer attack.
Note: Fix a typo in the proof given in appendix
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. INDOCRYPT 2017
- Keywords
- ChaChaSide-Channel Attacks
- Contact author(s)
- alex adomnicai @ gmail com
- History
- 2019-03-27: last of 2 revisions
- 2017-10-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/1021
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1021,
author = {Alexandre Adomnicai and Jacques J. A. Fournier and Laurent Masson},
title = {Bricklayer Attack: A Side-Channel Analysis on the {ChaCha} Quarter Round},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1021},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1021}
}
