Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/095

Attacks on Secure Logging Schemes

Gunnar Hartung

Abstract: We present four attacks on three cryptographic schemes intended for securing log files against illicit retroactive modification. Our first two attacks regard the LogFAS scheme by Yavuz et al. (Financial Cryptography 2012), whereas our third and fourth attacks break the BM- and AR-FssAgg schemes by Ma (AsiaCCS 2008).

All schemes have an accompanying security proof, seemingly contradicting the existence of attacks. We point out flaws in these proofs, resolving the contradiction.

Category / Keywords: applications / Log Files, LogFAS, FssAgg, Digital Signatures, Forward Security, Attack, Cryptanalysis

Original Publication (in the same form): Financial Cryptography 2017

Date: received 7 Feb 2017

Contact author: gunnar hartung at kit edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170213:193126 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/095

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