Paper 2017/076
DFA on LS-Designs with a Practical Implementation on SCREAM (extended version)
Benjamin Lac, Anne Canteaut, Jacques Fournier, and Renaud Sirdey
Abstract
LS-Designs are a family of SPN-based block ciphers whose linear layer is based on the so-called interleaved construction. They will be dedicated to low-end devices with high performance and low-resource constraints, objects which need to be resistant to physical attacks. In this paper we describe a complete Differential Fault Analysis against LS-Designs and also on other families of SPN-based block ciphers. First we explain how fault attacks can be used against their implementations depending on fault models. Then, we validate the DFA in a practical example on a hardware implementation of SCREAM running on an FPGA. The faults have been injected using electromagnetic pulses during the execution of SCREAM and the faulty ciphertexts have been used to recover the key’s bits. Finally, we discuss some countermeasures that could be used to thwart such attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- renaud sirdey @ gmail com
- History
- 2017-02-06: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/076
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/076,
author = {Benjamin Lac and Anne Canteaut and Jacques Fournier and Renaud Sirdey},
title = {{DFA} on {LS}-Designs with a Practical Implementation on {SCREAM} (extended version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/076},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/076}
}
