Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/068

Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage

Guy Barwell and Daniel P. Martin and Elisabeth Oswald and Martijn Stam

Abstract: Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertexts (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). This work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based, instantiation of the latter.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / provable security, authenticated encryption, generic composition, leakage resilience, robustness

Date: received 31 Jan 2017, last revised 5 Apr 2017

Contact author: guy barwell+LAE at bristol ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Improved write-up, with minor structural and technical differences.

Version: 20170405:101856 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/068

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