Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/068

Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage

Guy Barwell and Daniel P. Martin and Elisabeth Oswald and Martijn Stam

Abstract: Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertext (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). Our work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based instantiation of the latter.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / provable security, authenticated encryption, generic composition, leakage resilience, robustness

Date: received 31 Jan 2017

Contact author: guy barwell+nlAE at bristol ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170131:214614 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/068

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