Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/048

ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution

Sinisa Matetic and Mansoor Ahmed and Kari Kostiainen and Aritra Dhar and David Sommer and Arthur Gervais and Ari Juels and Srdjan Capkun

Abstract: Intel SGX isolates the runtime memory of protected applications (enclaves) from the OS and allows enclaves to encrypt and authenticate (seal) data for persistent storage. Sealing prevents an untrusted OS from reading or arbitrarily modifying stored data. However, rollback attacks, where the adversary replays an old seal, remain possible. Data integrity violations through rollback can have severe consequences, especially for enclaves that operate on financial data. The SGX architecture was recently updated to support monotonic counters that may be used for rollback prevention, but we show that these counters have significant performance and security limitations.

In this paper we propose a new approach for rollback protection on SGX. The intuition behind our approach is simple. A single platform cannot efficiently prevent rollback, but in many practical scenarios multiple processors can be enrolled to assist each other. We design and implement a rollback protection system called ROTE that realizes integrity protection as a distributed system among participating enclaves. We construct a model that captures the ability of the adversary to schedule the execution of protected applications, and show that our solution achieves a strong security property that we call all-or-nothing rollback: the only way to violate data integrity is to reset all participating platforms to their initial state. We implement ROTE and demonstrate that such a distributed rollback protection mechanism can be very fast.

Category / Keywords: SGX, Rollback protection, Distributed system, State protection, TEE, Trusted Execution

Date: received 21 Jan 2017, last revised 12 Feb 2017

Contact author: sinisa matetic at inf ethz ch

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Paper update; 12.02.2017

Version: 20170212:130719 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/048

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