Collusion-resistant Broadcast Encryption with Tight Reductions and Beyond

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Abstract

The issue of tight security for identity-based encryption schemes (IBE) in bilinear groups has been widely investigated and a lot of optimal properties have been achieved. Recently, a tightly secure IBE scheme in bilinear groups under the multi-challenge setting has been achieved by Chen et al. (to appear in PKC 2017), and their scheme even achieves constant-size public parameters and is adaptively secure. However, we note that the issue of tight security for broadcast encryption schemes (BE) in bilinear groups has received less attention so far. Actually current broadcast encryption systems of bilinear groups are either not tightly secure or based on non-static assumptions.

In this work we mainly focus on the issue of tight security for standard broadcast encryption schemes. We construct the first tightly secure broadcast encryption scheme from static assumptions (i.e., decisional subgroup assumptions) in the selective security model by utilizing improved techniques derived from the Déjà Q framework (Eurocrypt 2014, TCC-A 2016). The proof of our construction will lead to only $O(\log n)$ or $O(\log \lambda)$ security loss, where $n$ is the number of users in the system and $\lambda$ is the security parameter.

Following this result, we present a tightly secure non-zero inner product encryption scheme (NIPE) from decisional subgroup assumptions in the selective security model. This NIPE scheme has the same parameter sizes as our BE scheme and there is only $O(\log n)$ or $O(\log \lambda)$ security loss as well, where $n$ is the dimension of the inner product space and $\lambda$ is the security parameter.

Finally, we further present a tightly secure functional commitment scheme (FC) for linear functions, which was introduced by Libert et al. (ICALP 16). In contrast with their scheme, which also suffers $O(n)$ security loss during the reduction, there is only $O(\log n)$ or $O(\log \lambda)$ security loss in our FC scheme.

1 Introduction

The notion of broadcast encryption was first introduced by Fiat and Naor [FN94]. A broadcast encryption (BE) system consists of $n$ users, and it allows the broadcaster sending encrypted contents to a set of qualified users $S \subseteq \{1, \cdots, n\}$ dynamically such that the set of users in $S$ can decrypt the broadcast with their own secret key, but users outside of the set $S$ cannot decrypt the broadcast even if they all collude and pool their secret keys.

There are many ways to define the security of a broadcast encryption scheme. The most desirable broadcast encryption scheme need to satisfy the notion called adaptive security, in which the adversary can adaptively corrupt users, learning their secret keys, and then he chooses an arbitrary uncorrupted "challenge" set $S^*$ of users that he wants to attack in order to learn some information about the plaintext broadcast.

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1We utilize the syntax of broadcast encryption schemes under the key-encapsulation setting in this work and it is easy to be transformed into one under the standard setting.
The adversary may continue corrupting users so long as he does not corrupt any of the intended recipients of the broadcast. We also consider a weaker security notion called selective security, where the adversary may still choose the challenge set $S^*$ arbitrarily, but must choose it before corrupting any users and before even seeing the public parameters of the scheme.

However, in this work we mainly focus on the issue of security reduction and security loss in the broadcast encryption system from static assumptions in bilinear groups. Consider a broadcast encryption scheme with a security reduction showing that attacking the scheme in time $T$ with success probability $\epsilon$ implies breaking some computationally hard problem in time roughly $T$ with success probability $\epsilon/L$. We call $L$ as the security loss and a tight reduction is one where $L$ is only related to the security parameter $\lambda$ and more optimal (i.e., $L$ is a constant). Namely we are interested in constructions based on static assumptions such as decisional subgroup assumptions that do not rely on random oracles.

Tight reductions are not just theoretical issues for broadcast encryption, rather than are of importance in practice. If the security loss $L$ increases, we must in turn increase the size of the underlying groups in order to compensate for it. This will significantly effect the running time and the performance of the broadcast encryption system. Therefore, in this work we ask:

Can we construct a tightly secure broadcast encryption scheme from static assumptions in bilinear groups with efficient system parameters?

We answer this affirmatively. Moreover, we remark that our BE scheme simultaneously achieves optimal parameters (e.g., constant-size ciphertext overhead, and constant-size private keys). Basing on this result and the techniques utilized, we further design a tightly secure non-zero inner product encryption scheme and a tightly secure functional commitment scheme for linear functions based on techniques used in our design of broadcast encryption scheme. We remark that these schemes enjoy the similar structure as the broadcast encryption scheme proposed by Boneh, Gentry and Waters [BGW05]. Therefore, our results can be alternatively stated as constructing tightly secure BGW-like schemes from static assumptions in bilinear groups.

2 Our Contributions

In this paper, we made the following contributions.

1. We provide the first tightly secure broadcast encryption scheme, to the best of our knowledge, that achieves constant-size ciphertext overhead, constant-size private keys and linear-size public parameters under static assumptions in the selective security model. In our scheme the security loss is only $O(\log n)$ or $O(\log \lambda)$ where $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ is the number of users in the broadcast encryption system and $\lambda$ is the security parameter.

2. In addition, inspired by the observation that our broadcast encryption scheme is essentially obtained by tweaking the BGW broadcast encryption scheme [BGW05], we apply the techniques utilized to BGW-like broadcast encryption schemes such as the non-zero inner product encryption scheme proposed by Chen et al.[CLR16] and the functional commitment scheme proposed by Libert et al.[LRY16]. Therefore, we obtain the following two results.

- We provide a tightly secure non-zero inner product encryption scheme (NIPE) from decisional subgroup assumptions in the selective security model. This NIPE scheme has the same parameter sizes as our BE scheme and there is only $O(\log n)$ or $O(\log \lambda)$ security loss as well, where $n$ is the dimension of the inner product space and $\lambda$ is the security parameter. In contrast, the NIPE scheme proposed by Chen et al. [CLR16] suffers $O(n)$ security loss during the reduction.
• We further provide a tightly secure functional commitment scheme (FC) for linear functions from
decisional subgroup assumptions. It suffers only $O(\log n)$ or $O(\log \lambda)$ security loss rather than
$O(n)$ security loss in the work of Libert et al., where $n$ is the dimension of the domain of linear
functions and $\lambda$ is the security parameter.  

3 Outline of Our Constructions and Proofs

To construct a tightly secure broadcast encryption scheme from static assumptions in bilinear groups,
it is natural to improve the tightness of a broadcast encryption scheme which can already be reduced to
static assumptions in bilinear groups. Therefore, we propose a variant of Wee’s broadcast encryption scheme
[Wee16] which (1) suffers only constantly tight reduction and (2) enjoys all advantages from Wee’s broadcast
encryption scheme.

Before describing how to construct our tightly secure broadcast encryption scheme, we first give an
overview of Wee’s broadcast encryption scheme [Wee16].

Wee’s Broadcast Encryption [Wee16]. Given the composite-order bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (N = p_1 p_2 p_3, G, G_T, e)$
Wee constructed the broadcast encryption [Wee16] by embedding the dual system methodology [Wat09] and
Déjà Q framework [CM14]. From a high-level perspective, the parameters in Wee’s broadcast encryption
scheme (under the key-encapsulation setting) can be described as follows

$$\begin{align*}
\text{mpk} & : (g, g^\alpha, \{g_j\}_{j \in [n]}, u_1, \cdots, \ u_n, u_{n+2}, \cdots, u_{2n}, e(g, u_{n+1}), H) \\
\text{sk}_i & : u^{n-i+1} R_{3,i} \quad i = 1, \cdots, n \\
\text{ct} & : \left( g^s, g^{(\beta + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^k) s} \right) \\
\text{key} & : \text{H}(e(g, u^{n+1})^s)
\end{align*}$$

where $(g, u) \leftarrow G_{p_1}$, $\alpha, \beta, s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ and $R_{4,i} \leftarrow G_{p_4}$ are elements sampled uniformly at random, $S$ is the
challenge set and $H$ is a pairwise-independent hash function. Here we consider $G_{p_1}$ as the normal space, $G_{p_2}$
as the semi-functional space and $G_{p_3}$ is randomness space.

To establish security, Wee introduced the semi-functional space $G_{p_2}$ to the $2n$ terms $u^\alpha, u^{\alpha^2}, \cdots, u^{\alpha^{2n}}$
and use the entropy derived from $u^{\alpha^{n+1}}$ to hide the message $m$ through a function $F_{2n}(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2n} r_j \alpha^j$
where the input $k$ is in the interval $[1, 2n]$ and $r_1, \cdots, r_{2n}, \alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_{2n} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ are sampled uniformly at random. Finally, we could replace the function $F_{2n}(\cdot)$ with a truly random function $\text{RF}(\cdot)$. To avoid leaking
$\alpha \mod p_2$ in the ciphertext in order to carry out the transformation to the secret keys, we need to eliminate
all occurrences of $\alpha$ in the polynomial $\beta + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^k$ which shows up in the ciphertext. Due to this restriction,
we need to generate $\beta$ by first randomly selecting another value $\tilde{\beta}$ such that $\beta = \beta + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^k$
and then rewrite the ciphertext, symmetric key, and secret keys as

$$\begin{align*}
\text{ct} &= \left( g^s, g^{\tilde{\beta} s} \right) \quad (1) \\
\text{key} &= \text{H}(e(g, u_{n+1})^s) \quad (2) \\
\text{sk}_i &= u^{\alpha^{n-i+1} \tilde{\beta} - \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^{n+1+k-1} R_{3,i}}, \quad \forall i \in [n] \quad (3)
\end{align*}$$

such that the monomials in $\alpha$ only show up on the same side of the pairing in both the ciphertext and the
secret keys in the exponents of $u$.

Remark. We remark that even though this step allows us to eliminate the occurrences of $\alpha$ in the ciphertext,

\footnote{We remark that this functional commitment also implies many other kinds of commitment schemes and cryptographic
accumulators for large universes. We refer the reader to the work of Libert et al. [LRY16].}
it also sacrifices the possibility to achieve adaptive security or semi-static security. Because the challenger must know the challenge set $S$ in order to generate $\beta$, such that $\beta = \beta + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^k$. Therefore, the adversary must commit to a challenge set at the very beginning of the selective security game. Thus, to solve this problem we must change the structure of the scheme to avoid this restriction while preserving existing properties. We leave it as an open problem.

**Our Approach.** Following the construction and proof strategy of Wee’s broadcast encryption scheme utilized in tight reductions, we construct our tightly secure broadcast encryption scheme. Firstly we observe that Wee transformed all involved secret keys from $u^k g_{F0(k)} R_{3,k}$ into $u^k g_{F2n(k)} R_{3,k}$ through the following $2n$ steps sequentially

$$F_1 \rightarrow F_2 \rightarrow F_3 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow F_{2n}$$

In the $i$th step one unite of entropy $r_i$ and $\alpha_i$ was extracted from $u$ and $\alpha$ (i.e., the normal space) and injected back into the function $F_{i-1}$ in the semi-functional space. We remark that this is the main reason why Wee’s broadcast encryption scheme suffers $O(n)$ security reduction loss, which is not tight. Therefore, in order to make the reduction much more tighter, our idea is to embed an additional space to significantly reduce the number of steps to transform each $u^k g_{F0(k)} R_{3,k}$ into $u^k g_{F2n(k)} R_{3,k}$ and hence to accelerate this sequence of transformations. More specifically, we extract entropy from each $F_i$ itself, instead of from the normal space $G_{p_1}$, and then inject them back into $F_i$. This idea is inspired from the observation that $F_i$ already has $i$ units of entropy (i.e., $r_1, \cdots, r_i, \alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_i$), and the structure of $F_i$ allows us to reach $F_{2i}$ directly which will include $2i$ units of entropy. Since we cannot inject the entropy extracted from each $F_i$ back into the normal space, we introduce an additional space called the storage space to temporarily store the entropy extracted from $F_i$. The storage space will allow us to inject all entropy stored back into the semi-functional space. Therefore, to fulfill our intuition we should construct a broadcast encryption scheme in bilinear groups of order $N = p_1 p_2 p_3 p_4$, where subgroups $G_{p_1}$, $G_{p_2}$, $G_{p_3}$ and $G_{p_4}$ act as the normal space, the semi-functional space, the storage space and the randomness space respectively.

Assume that we have rewritten the ciphertext overhead and the symmetric key as equation (1), (2) and (3), except that we use the subgroup $G_{p_4}$ to randomize secret keys instead of using the subgroup $G_{p_3}$. More specifically, the public parameters, secret keys, ciphertext overhead and the symmetric key are in the form as follows:

$$\text{mpk} : \langle g, g^\beta, \{g_j\}_{j \in [n]}, u_1, \cdots, u_n, u_{n+2}, \cdots, u_{2n}, e(g, u_{n+1}), H \rangle$$

$$\text{sk}_i = u^{\alpha_{i+1}} R_{4,i}, \quad \forall i \in [n]$$

$$\text{ct} = \left( g^s, g^{\tilde{\beta} i} \right)$$

$$\text{key} : H(e(g, u^{n+1})^s)$$

Let us see how to apply the method described above into Wee’s broadcast encryption scheme. Firstly we still need the function $F_{2n}(k) = \sum_{i=1}^{2n} r_j \alpha_j^i \in Z_{p_2}$, where $r_1, \cdots, r_{2n}, \alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_{2n} \in Z_{p_2}$. Recall that this function has been applied in Wee’s broadcast encryption, and he constructed $F_{2n}(\cdot)$ from the entropy in the normal space following the roadmap

$$F_1 \rightarrow F_2 \rightarrow F_3 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow F_{2n}$$

We note that there is also only one unity of entropy that can be injected into the semi-functional space each time. Therefore, in order to achieve tight reduction, we try to inject more entropy each time - extract entropy from $F_2(i \leq \lfloor \log n + 1 \rfloor)$ itself and then inject them back into $F_{2i+1}$. Therefore, we only need $\lfloor \log n + 1 \rfloor$ steps towards $F_{2n}(\cdot)$. To introduce the storage space, we need another (similar) function $\tilde{F}_{2^n}(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^n} \tilde{r}_j \tilde{\alpha}_j^k \in Z_{p_3}$, where $\tilde{r}_1, \cdots, \tilde{r}_{2^n}, \tilde{\alpha}_1, \cdots, \tilde{\alpha}_{2^n} \in Z_{p_3}$. We could first extract one unity entropy from $u$ and $\alpha$ in the normal space and puts them into the semi-functional space. It is used to define the function $\tilde{F}_{2^n}(\cdot)$. Then we can execute the setups described above with the help of the storage space. More specifically, we
change the distribution of the set of parameters \(\{u_k\}_{k \in [2n]}\) with the help of the semi-functional space \(G_{p_2}\) and the storage space \(G_{p_3}\). We first introduce the semi-functional space to transform each \(u_k = u^k F_2(k)\) into the form of \(u^k g_2^k R_{4,k}\) and then introduce the storage space via transforming each \(u^k g_2^k F_2(k)\) into the form \(u^k g_2^k F_3^k(k) R_{4,k}\). To flip all stored entropy back to the old one, we finally transform \(u_k = u^k g_2^k F_2'(k) R_{4,k}\) into the form of \(u_k = u^k g_2^k F_2''(k) R_{4,k}\), where \(F_2''(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^k} r_j, \alpha_j^k + r_j, \alpha_j^k\) is another new function required in the reduction and \(r_1, \cdots, r_2^k, \alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_2^k, \hat{r}_2, \cdots, \hat{r}_2, \hat{\alpha}_1, \cdots, \hat{\alpha}_2^k \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}\) are sampled uniformly at random.

**Our NIPE Scheme and FC Scheme.** The construction of our NIPE scheme and our FC scheme are essentially the same as the broadcast encryption scheme proposed described above since they enjoy the (almost) same structure, except that our schemes are working in the bilinear group \(G\) of order \(N = p_1p_2p_3\). Essentially our NIPE scheme and our FC scheme are both constructed by applying the method described above to the NIPE scheme proposed by Chen et al. [CLR16] and to the FC scheme proposed by Libert et al. [LRY16], respectively. More specifically, the public parameters, master secret key, secret key, ciphertext and symmetric key in our NIPE scheme are in the form as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{mpk} : & \quad (g, g^\beta, \{g_j\}_{j \in [n]}, u_1, \cdots, u_n, u_{n+2}, \cdots, u_{2n}, H) \\
\text{msk} : & \quad (u, \alpha, \beta, R_4) \\
\text{sk}_{\tilde{g}} : & \quad \left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} u^{\alpha_i} y_i^i\right)^\beta \cdot R_4' \\
\text{ct} : & \quad \left( g^s, g^{\beta + \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i} \right) \\
\text{key} : & \quad H(e(g, u^{n+1})^s)
\end{align*}
\]

where \((g, u, \alpha, s) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} G_{p_1}^2 \times \mathbb{Z}_N^2, R_4, R_4' \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}, \tilde{x} = (x_1, \cdots, x_n), \tilde{y} = (y_1, \cdots, y_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n\) and \(H\) is a pairwise-independent hash function.

Furthermore, in our FC scheme, the commitment key, trapdoor key, commitment and the witness for the linear function are in the form as follows

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{mpk} : & \quad (g, \{g_j\}_{j \in [n]}, u_1, \cdots, u_n, u_{n+2}, \cdots, u_{2n}, R_4) \\
\text{tk} : & \quad u_{n+1} \\
\text{C} : & \quad g^{\beta + \sum_{i=1}^{n} m_j} \alpha_j \\
\text{W} & \quad = \prod_{i=1}^{n} W_i \\
W_i & \quad = u_{n-i+1}^{\beta} \cdot \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^{n} u_{m_j}^{n+1-j-i} \quad \forall i \in [n]
\end{align*}
\]

where \((g, u, \alpha, \beta) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} G_{p_1}^2 \times \mathbb{Z}_N^2, R_4 \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}, \tilde{m} = (m_1, \cdots, m_n)\) is the message vector, and \(y\) is the result of linear function evaluating over the message vector \(\tilde{m}\).

Again, we remark that the above three schemes enjoy (almost) the same structure. Therefore, to establish tight reductions of our NIFE scheme and FC scheme, we essentially follow the same strategy as the proof of our broadcast encryption scheme. Namely, we introduce the three kinds of function families \(\{F_2(\cdot)\}_{i=0}^{\log n+1}\), \(\{\tilde{F}_2(\cdot)\}_{i=0}^{\log n+1}\) and \(\{\hat{F}_2(\cdot)\}_{i=0}^{\log n+1}\) defined as above to modify the distribution of \(\{u_k\}_{k \in [2n]}\) with the help of the semi-functional space \(G_{p_2}\) and the storage space \(G_{p_3}\). We refer the reader to the formal description and proof in the section 9 and the section 10.
4 Related Work

Tight security in identity-based encryption system\cite{CW13, GDCC16, CGW16} and in digital signature schemes\cite{Hof16a, Hof16b, BL16} has been widely investigated. However, we noted that tight security in broadcast encryption system has received less attention so far. Actually current broadcast encryption systems from bilinear groups are either not tightly secure or based on non-static assumptions.

Boneh, Gentry, and Waters \cite{BGW05} give the first broadcast encryption scheme from bilinear maps under the selective security model (i.e., their construction does not capture the power of fully collusion resistant under adaptive attacks). This scheme has constant-size ciphertexts and constant-size secret keys (in terms of the number of users $n$), and a public key that is linear in $n$. However, their construction is based on $q$-type assumption, even though their reduction is tight.

Some other schemes with constant-size ciphertexts based on bilinear maps\cite{DPP07, GW09} have been proven adaptively secure and/or are identity based, with the public parameters in all of these schemes is at least linear in the maximum number of recipients. However, their constructions are also based on $q$-type assumptions even though their schemes achieve tight security reductions. Recently Wee proposed a new broadcast encryption scheme \cite{Wee16} under static assumptions (i.e., subgroup assumptions) using techniques derived from Déjà Q framework \cite{CM14}. Furthermore, Wee’s scheme has the same parameter sizes as BGW scheme. Nevertheless, we note that the reduction of Wee’s scheme is not tight. More specifically, their construction suffers a $O(n)$ security loss during the reduction, where $n$ is the number of users in the broadcast encryption system.

Following the framework used in Wee’s broadcast encryption scheme, Libert et al. \cite{LRY16} applied the same framework to construct functional commitment schemes for linear functions and Chen et al. \cite{CLR16} also utilized this framework to construct NIPE schemes with short ciphertexts and short private keys. However, since they both applied Wee’s framework, their scheme both suffer a $O(n)$ security loss as well, where $n$ is the dimension of inner product space and the dimension of the domain of linear functions, and hence they are not tight.

5 Concurrent and Independent Works

This work was done independently of the work of Chase, Maller and Meiklejohn \cite{CMM16} and the work of Chen, Gong and Weng \cite{CGW16}, which utilized similar techniques as ours. Actually our goal was to construct BGW-like schemes (i.e., broadcast encryption schemes, non-zero inner product encryption schemes, and functional commitment schemes for linear functions) with tighter reductions.

In contrast, Chase et al. \cite{CMM16} focused on a more general goal. That is, tightly translating $q$-type assumption to static one. Also Chen et al. \cite{CGW16} focused on applying the techniques to construct identity-based encryption schemes with tighter reductions. We remark that both this work and the work of Chen et al. were submitted to PKC 2017. However, the work of Chen et al. was accepted but ours was rejected. In fact, a draft of this work (in particular, the part of tightly secure broadcast encryption schemes) was presented to the Cryptography Reading Group (https://staff.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/ smchow/crg/) of Chinese University of Hong Kong on May 6th, 2016, which is even before the submission deadline of Asiacrypt 2016. We note that Chase et al. mentioned their techniques could be used in building tightly-secure BGW broadcast encryption schemes but they didn’t mention its applications in constructing tightly-secure identity-based encryption schemes. Therefore, we think this is the main reason why our work was rejected.

While our goals are different and the work of Chase et al. didn’t mention the applications of the techniques described above in constructing non-zero inner product encryption schemes and functional commitment schemes for linear functions, we believe it is still meaningful to present how to build concrete BGW-like schemes with tighter reductions in this work.
6 Paper Organization

In the section 7, we introduce preliminaries to be used in this work. In the section 8, we provide the description of our BE scheme and its security analysis. We provide the description of our NIPE scheme and our FC scheme and their security analysis respectively in the section 9 and the section 10.

7 Preliminaries

We denote by $s \leftarrow S$ the fact that $s$ is picked uniformly at random from a finite set $S$. By PPT, we denote a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. We use $1^\lambda$ as the security parameter in unary throughout the context. We use $[n]$ to denote the set $\{1, \cdots, n\}$.

7.1 Composite-Order Bilinear Groups and Cryptographic Assumptions

We instantiate our system in composite-order bilinear groups. A generator $G$ takes as input a security parameter $\lambda$ and outputs a description $\mathcal{G} := (N, G, G_T, e)$, where $N$ is product of distinct primes of $\Theta(\lambda)$ bits, $G$ and $G_T$ are cyclic groups of order $N$, and $e : G \times G \to G_T$ is a non-degenerate bilinear map. We require that the group operations in $G$ and $G_T$ as well the bilinear map $e$ are computable in deterministic polynomial time. We consider bilinear groups whose orders $N$ are products of four distinct primes $p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4$ such that $N = p_1 p_2 p_3 p_4$. We can write $G = G_{p_1} G_{p_2} G_{p_3} G_{p_4}$ or $G = G_{p_1 p_2 p_3 p_4}$, where $G_{p_1}$, $G_{p_2}$, $G_{p_3}$ and $G_{p_4}$ are subgroups of $G$ of order $p_1, p_2, p_3$ and $p_4$ respectively. In addition, we use $G_{p_i}^*$ to denote $G_{p_i}\setminus\{1\}$. We will often write $g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4$ to denote random generators for the subgroups $G_{p_1}, G_{p_2}, G_{p_3}, G_{p_4}$ respectively.

Cryptographic Assumptions. Our construction relies on the following four decisional subgroup assumptions. We define the following four advantage functions.

- **Assumption 1 (DS1)** For any PPT adversary $A$ the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter $\lambda$.
  \[
  \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{DS1}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[A(\mathcal{G}, g_1, g_4, T_0) = 1] - \Pr[A(\mathcal{G}, g_1, g_4, T_1)]| \quad (p_1 \to p_1 p_2 p_3)
  \]
  where $\mathcal{G} \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\lambda)$, $g_1 \leftarrow G_{p_1}$, $g_4 \leftarrow G_{p_4}$,
  \[T_0 \leftarrow G_{p_1}, T_1 \leftarrow G_{p_1 p_2 p_3}\]

- **Assumption 2 (DS2)** For any PPT adversary $A$ the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter $\lambda$.
  \[
  \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{DS2}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[A(\mathcal{G}, g_1, g_4, X_1 X_2 X_3, T_0) = 1] - \Pr[A(\mathcal{G}, g_1, g_4, X_1 X_2 X_3, T_1)]| \quad (p_1 \to p_1 p_2)
  \]
  where $\mathcal{G} \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\lambda)$, $g_1 \leftarrow G_{p_1}$, $g_4 \leftarrow G_{p_4}^*$, $X_1 X_2 X_3 \leftarrow G_{p_1 p_2 p_3}$,
  \[T_0 \leftarrow G_{p_1}, T_1 \leftarrow G_{p_1 p_2}\]

- **Assumption 3 (DS3)** For any PPT adversary $A$ the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter $\lambda$.
  \[
  \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{DS3}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[A(\mathcal{G}, g_1, g_4, X_1 X_2 X_3, T_0) = 1] - \Pr[A(\mathcal{G}, g_1, g_4, X_1 X_2 X_3, T_1)]| \quad (p_2 \to p_2 p_3)
  \]
where $G \leftarrow G(1^\lambda)$, $g_1 \leftarrow G_{p_1}$, $g_4 \leftarrow G_{p_4}$, $X_1X_2X_3 \leftarrow G_{p_1p_2p_3}$,

$$T_0 \leftarrow G_{p_2}, T_1 \leftarrow G_{p_2p_3}$$

• **Assumption 4 (DS4)** For any PPT adversary $A$ the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter $\lambda$.

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{DS4}}_A(\lambda) = \left| \Pr[A(G, g_1, g_4, X_1X_2X_3, Y_2Y_4, T_0) = 1] - \Pr[A(G, g_1, g_4, X_1X_2X_3, Y_2Y_4, T_1)] \right| \quad (p_2p_4 \rightarrow p_3p_4)$$

where $G \leftarrow G(1^\lambda)$, $g_1 \leftarrow G_{p_1}$, $g_4 \leftarrow G_{p_4}$, $X_1X_2X_3 \leftarrow G_{p_1p_2p_3}$, $Y_2Y_4 \leftarrow G_{p_2p_4}$,

$$T_0 \leftarrow G_{p_2p_4}, T_1 \leftarrow G_{p_3p_4}$$

### 7.2 Broadcast Encryption

A broadcast encryption scheme consists of three algorithms $(\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:

• **Setup($1^\lambda$, $1^n$) $\rightarrow$ (mpk, (sk$_1$, $\ldots$, sk$_n$)).** The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter $\lambda$ in unary and $n$, which is a polynomial in $\lambda$, in unary specifying the number of users. It outputs the public parameter mpk, and secret keys sk$_1$, $\ldots$, sk$_n$.

• **Enc(mpk, $S$) $\rightarrow$ (ct, key).** The encryption algorithm takes as input mpk and a subset $S \subseteq [n]$. It outputs a ciphertext overhead ct and a symmetric key key $\in \{0,1\}^\lambda$. Note that given ct the set $S$ is public.

• **Dec(mpk, sk$_i$, ct) $\rightarrow$ key.** The decryption algorithm gets as input mpk, a decryption key sk$_i$ corresponding to identity $i \in [n]$ and ct. It outputs a symmetric key key if the identity $i$ is in the set $S$.

**Correctness.** We require that for all $S \subseteq [n]$ and all $i \in [n]$ for which $i \in S$,

$$\Pr[(ct, key) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(mpk, S); \text{Dec}(mpk, sk_i, ct) = key] = 1$$

where the probability is taken over $(mpk, (sk_1, \ldots, sk_n)) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ and the random coins used in Enc.

**Selective Security Definition.** A broadcast encryption scheme is **selectively secure** if for all PPT adversaries $A$, the following advantage function is a negligible function in the security parameter $\lambda$.

$$\text{Adv}^\text{SE-BE}^\text{BE}_A(\lambda) := \Pr \begin{bmatrix}
S^* \leftarrow A(1^\lambda);
(mpk, (sk_1, \ldots, sk_n)) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda);
b = b', c \leftarrow \{0,1\}; key_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda;
(ct^*, key_0) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(mpk, S^*);
b' \leftarrow A(ct^*, key_0, \{sk_i : i \notin S^*\})
\end{bmatrix} \left| \frac{1}{2} \right.$$

where the probability is defined over random coins used by Setup and Enc, and the adversary $A$ as well as the random bit $b$.

### 7.3 Non-Zero Inner Product Encryption (NIPE)

We give the definition of non-zero inner product encryption scheme in this section. For convenience we give the definition in the key encapsulation setting.
Let $V$ denote an inner product space of dimension $n$. A non-zero inner product encryption (NIPE) scheme for inner products over the space $V$ is defined by four probabilistic algorithms ($\text{Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec}$).

- **Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n$):** takes as input a security parameter $\lambda$ in unary and the dimension of $V$ in unary. It outputs the public parameters $\text{mpk}$ and the master secret key $\text{msk}$.

- **KeyGen($\text{msk}, \vec{y}$):** takes as input the master secret key $\text{msk}$ and a vector $\vec{y}$ in the space $V$. It outputs a secret key $\text{sk}_\vec{y}$ for the vector $\vec{y}$.

- **Enc($\text{mpk}, \vec{x}$):** takes as input an attribute vector $\vec{x} \in V$ and the public parameters $\text{mpk}$. It outputs a ciphertext $\text{ct}$ and a symmetric key $\text{key} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$. The symmetric key $\text{key}$ is used to encrypt any message through any symmetric key encryption scheme.

- **Dec($\text{mpk}, \text{ct}, \text{sk}_\vec{y}$):** If $\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y} \rangle \neq 0$, this algorithm returns the symmetric key $\text{key}$. Otherwise it outputs $\perp$.

**Correctness.** A NIPE scheme is correct if for all vectors $\vec{x}, \vec{y} \in V$ satisfying $\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y} \rangle \neq 0$, any key pair $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$, $\text{sk}_\vec{y} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \vec{y})$ and any $(\text{ct}, \text{key}) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \vec{x})$, we have $\Pr[\text{key} = \text{Dec}(\text{mpk}, \text{ct}, \text{sk}_\vec{y})] = 1$.

**Selective Security of NIPE.** A non-zero inner product encryption scheme is **selectively secure** if for all PPT adversaries $A$, the following advantage function is a negligible function in the security parameter $\lambda$.

$$\text{Adv}^\text{S-NIPE}_A(\lambda) := \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} \vec{x}_* \leftarrow A(1^\lambda, 1^n); \\ b = b' : (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda); \\ \vec{y}' \leftarrow A(\text{KeyGen}(\cdot), \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, b, \cdot))(1^\lambda, 1^n, \text{mpk}) \end{array} \right] - \frac{1}{2}$$

where the oracles $\text{KeyGen}(\cdot)$ and $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, b, \cdot)$ are defined as follows.

1. **KeyGen($\cdot$):** On input a vector $\vec{y} \in V$, the oracle returns $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \vec{y})$.

2. **Enc($\text{mpk}, b, \cdot$):** On input the committed vector $\vec{x}_*$, it computes $(\text{ct}_*, \text{key}_*') \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \vec{x}_*)$ and then samples a symmetric key $\text{key}_* \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$ uniformly at random. It returns $(\text{ct}_*, \text{key}_*)$. If the input vector is not the committed vector, it aborts and output $\perp$.

the probability of the security game is defined over random coins used by $\text{Setup}$ and oracles $\text{KeyGen}$ and $\text{Enc}$, and the adversary $A$ as well as the random bit $b$.

### 7.4 Functional Commitments for Linear Functions

**Definition 7.1 (Functional Commitments).** A functional commitments scheme (FC) for the linear function $(D, n, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle)$, where $D$ is the domain for the linear functions $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle : D^n \times D^n \rightarrow D$ defined by $\langle \vec{x}, \vec{m} \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i m_i$ for $\vec{x}, \vec{m} \in D^n$ with $\vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n), \vec{m} = (m_1, \ldots, m_n)$, is a tuple of four polynomial time algorithms ($\text{Setup, Commit, Open, Vrf}$).

- **Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n$) → ($\text{ck}, \text{tk}$):** takes as input a security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ in unary, a desired message length $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. It outputs a commitment key $\text{ck}$ and a trapdoor key $\text{tk}$.

- **Commit($\text{ct}, \vec{m}$) → ($\mathcal{C}, \text{aux}$):** takes as input the commitment key $\text{ck}$, a message vector $\vec{m} \in D^n$ and outputs a commitment $\mathcal{C}$ for the message $\vec{m}$ and $\text{aux}$, which is the auxiliary information.

- **Open($\text{ck}, \mathcal{C}, \text{aux}, \vec{m}$) → $W_y$:** takes as input the commitment key $\text{ck}$, a commitment $\mathcal{C}$ corresponding to the message $\vec{m}$, auxiliary information $\text{aux}$ and a vector $\vec{x} \in D^n$. It outputs a witness $W_y$ for $y = \langle \vec{x}, \vec{m} \rangle$. Namely, $W_y$ is a witness for the fact that the linear function defined by $\vec{x}$ when evaluated on $\vec{m}$ gives $y$. 

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• \( \text{Vrf}(ck, C, W_y, \vec{x}, y) \to 0/1 \): takes as input the commitment key \( ck \), a commitment \( C \), a witness \( W_y \), a vector \( \vec{x} \in \mathcal{D}^n \) and \( y \in \mathcal{D} \). It outputs 1 if \( W_y \) is a witness for \( C \) being a commitment for some \( \vec{m} \in \mathcal{D}^n \) such that \( \langle \vec{x}, \vec{m} \rangle = y \) and outputs 0 otherwise.

**Correctness.** We require that for every \( (ck, tk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n, 1^n) \), for all \( \vec{m}, \vec{x} \in \mathcal{D}^n \), if \( (C, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(ck, \vec{m}) \) and \( W_y \leftarrow \text{Open}(ck, C, \text{aux}, \vec{x}) \), then \( \text{Vrf}(ck, C, W_y, \vec{x}, y) = 1 \) with probability 1.

**Security.** The security requirements of functional commitments are formalized as follows.

**Definition 7.2** (Perfectly Hiding). A commitment scheme is perfectly hiding if for a commitment key \( ck \) generated by an honest setup, for all \( \vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1 \in \mathcal{D}^n \) with \( \vec{m}_0 \neq \vec{m}_1 \), the two distributions \{\( ck, \text{Commit}(ck, \vec{m}_0) \}\} and \{\( ck, \text{Commit}(ck, \vec{m}_1) \}\} are identical given that the random coins of \( \text{Commit} \) are chosen according to the uniform distribution from the respective domain.

The binding property captures the requirement that the adversary, without the knowledge of the trapdoor key \( tk \), cannot generate a commitment \( C \) and accept the witnesses for two distinct values \( y, y' \).

**Definition 7.3** (Function Binding). A functional commitment scheme \( FC = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Vrf}) \) for \( (\mathcal{D}, n, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle) \) is computationally binding if for any PPT adversary \( A \) winning the following experiment with negligible advantage.

1. The challenger generates \( (ck, tk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n, 1^n) \) and gives \( ck \) to the adversary \( A \).

2. The adversary \( A \) outputs a commitment \( C \), a vector \( \vec{x} \in \mathcal{D}^n \), two values \( y, y' \in \mathcal{D} \) and two witnesses \( W_y, W_{y'} \). We say that the adversary \( A \) wins the game if the following conditions hold
   - \( y \neq y' \).
   - \( \text{Vrf}(ck, C, W_y, \vec{x}, y) = \text{Vrf}(ck, C, W_{y'}, \vec{x}, y') = 1 \).

### 7.5 Core Lemma

We review the core lemma utilized by Wee in a slightly different form as follows in order to adapt to our construction of broadcast encryption.

**Lemma 7.1** ([CM14, Wee16]). Fix a prime \( p \). For any (possibly unbounded) adversary \( A \) making at most \( q \) queries, we have

\[
\left| \Pr[A^{F_q}(1^q) = 1] - \Pr[A^{RF_q}(1^q) = 1] \right| \leq \frac{\sqrt{q}}{p}
\]

where we define oracles as follows

- \( F_q \): The oracle behaves as a function mapping from \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_p \). It is initialized by picking the parameters \( r_1, \ldots, r_q, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_q \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \). On input \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_p \), it outputs

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{q} r_i \alpha_i^x \in \mathbb{Z}_p
\]

Every query is answered using the same parameters \( r_1, \ldots, r_q, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_q \) we picked at the very beginning.

- \( RF(\cdot) \): This oracle behaves as a truly random function \( RF : \mathbb{Z}_p \to \mathbb{Z}_p \). On input \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_p \), it returns \( RF(x) \) if it has been defined, otherwise it returns \( y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) and defines \( RF(x) = y \).
8 Tightly Secure Broadcast Encryption Scheme

In this section we give our construction of tightly secure broadcast encryption and its security analysis.

8.1 Construction

Our broadcast encryption scheme \( (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) is described as follows.

- **Setup\(1^\lambda, 1^n\):** Compute \( G = (N, G, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\lambda) \). Sample
  \[(\alpha, \beta, g, u) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N^2 \times G_{p_1}^2 \text{ and } R_{4,k} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}, k = 1, \cdots, 2n \]
  and then compute
  \[u_k = u^{\alpha_k} R_{4,k}, k = 1, \cdots, 2n\]

Pick a pairwise hash function \( H : G_T \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \). It outputs the public parameters
\[
\text{mpk} = ((g, g^\beta, e(g, u_{n+1}), H), g_0^\alpha, \cdots, g_1^n, u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_n, u_{n+2}, \cdots, u_{2n})
\]
and secret keys \( sk_i = u^{\alpha_{n-i+1}} R_{4,i} \) for \( i \in [n] \), where \( R_{4,i} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4} \) for each \( i \in [n] \).

- **Enc(mpk, \( S \subseteq [n] \)):** Sample \( s \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N \). It computes
  \[\text{ct} = (\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1) = (g^s, g^{(\beta + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha_k)s})\]
  and
  \[\text{key} = H(e(g, u^{\alpha_{n+1}}))\]
  where \( \text{ct}_1 \) is computed as \( (g^\beta \cdot \prod_{k \in S} g_k)^s \) and the symmetric key \( \text{key} \) is computed as \( H(e(g_1, u_n)^s) \).

The algorithm finally outputs \( (\text{ct}, \text{key}) \).

- **Dec(mpk, sk_i, ct = (ct_0, ct_1)):** It outputs
  \[\frac{e(\text{ct}_1, u_{n-i+1})}{e(\text{ct}_0, \text{sk}_i \prod_{k \in S, k \neq i} u_{n+1+k-i})} \]

**Correctness.** It is easy to show the correctness of our scheme through the following equations.

\[
\frac{e(\text{ct}_1, u_{n-i+1})}{e(\text{ct}_0, \text{sk}_i \prod_{k \in S, k \neq i} u_{n+1+k-i})} = \frac{e(g^{(\beta + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha_k)s}, u_{n-i+1})}{e(g^s, u^{\alpha_{n-i-1} + \sum_{k \in S, k \neq i} u_{n+1+k-i}})}
\]
\[
= \frac{e(g^{(\beta + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha_k)s}, u_{n-i+1})}{e(g^s, u^{\alpha_{n-i+1} + \sum_{k \in S, k \neq i} \alpha_{n+i+k-i}})}
\]
\[
= e(g, u^{\alpha_{n+1}})^s
\]
\[
= \text{key}
\]
8.2 Security Analysis

Theorem 8.1. For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists an algorithm $B = \{B_1, B_2, B_3, B_4\}$ whose running times are essentially the same as that of $A$, such that

$$Adv_A^{BE}(\lambda) \leq Adv_{B_1}^{DS1} + Adv_{B_2}^{DS2}(\lambda) + O(\log \lambda) \cdot (Adv_{B_3}^{DS}(\lambda) + Adv_{B_4}^{DS}(\lambda)) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$$

Proof. Firstly we define the advantage function of any PPT adversary $A$ in hybrid $Hyb_{x,y,z}$ as

$$Adv_{A}^{Hyb_{x,y,z}}(\lambda) = \Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}$$

We prove the theorem using the following hybrid arguments.

$Hyb_0$: is the real experiment as defined in the selective security model.

$Hyb_1$: This is the same as $Hyb_0$, except that the system generates the random parameter $\tilde{\beta}$ such that $\beta = \tilde{\beta} - \sum_{k \in S^t} \alpha^k$. More concretely, in this hybrid, all randomness and outputs secret keys $\sk_i = u_{\tilde{\beta} - i - 1} \cdot (\prod_{k \in S^t, k \neq i} u_{n+1+k-i})^{-1} \cdot R_{4,i}$ using the parameter $\tilde{\beta}$ and $(u_1, \ldots, u_n, u_{n+2}, \ldots, u_{2n})$. Since $Hyb_0$ and $Hyb_1$ are identically distributed, we have $Adv_{A}^{Hyb_0} = Adv_{A}^{Hyb_1}$.

$Hyb_2$: This is the same as $Hyb_1$, except that we change the distribution of $(ct^*, key_0')$. Namely

$$(ct^*, key_0') = (\langle T^s, (T^s)^{\tilde{\beta}}, H(e(T^s, u_{n+1})) \rangle)$$

where $T$ is sampled from $G_{p_1p_2p_3}$.

Lemma 8.1. Under the decisional subgroup assumption DS1, we have

$$\left|Adv_{A}^{Hyb_1}(\lambda) - Adv_{A}^{Hyb_2}(\lambda)\right| \leq Adv_{B_1}^{DS1}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$$

Proof. Given $(G, g \in G_{p_1}, g_4 \in G_{p_4}, T)$ where either $T \leftarrow G_{p_1}$ or $T \leftarrow G_{p_1p_2p_3}$, the algorithm $B_1$ works as follows.

- **Commitment Phase:** The adversary $A$ commits to a challenge set $S^t \subseteq [n]$.

- **Setup Phase:** Pick parameters $(\alpha, \tilde{\beta}, u) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N^2 \times G_{p_1}$, $\beta = \tilde{\beta} - \sum_{k \in S^t} \alpha^k$. Select the hash function $H$, all randomness $R_{4,k} \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_4}$ for $k = 1, \ldots, 2n$ and $R_{4,i} \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_4}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$. It outputs the public parameters

$$mpk = ((g, g^{\beta}, e(g, u_{n+1}), H), g_1^n \cdot g_2^n \cdot g_3^n, u_1, \ldots, u_n, u_{n+2}, \ldots, u_{2n})$$

and outputs secret keys $\sk_1, \ldots, \sk_n$. Note that we compute the set of secret keys $\{\sk_i : i \notin S^t\}$, in which $\sk_i$ is computed as $u_{\tilde{\beta} - i - 1} \cdot (\prod_{k \in S^t, k \neq i} u_{n+1+k-i})^{-1} \cdot R_{4,i}$. Otherwise the secret key $\sk_i$ is computed normally as $u^{\alpha^n + i} R_{4,i}$.

- **Challenge Phase:** Sample the random value $s' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N$, and compute the ciphertext header $ct^* = (ct^*_0 = T^s, ct^*_1 = (T^{s'})^{\tilde{\beta}})$ and the symmetric key $key_0' = H(e(T^{s'}, u_{n+1}))$. The reduction $B_1$ picks random $key_1' \xleftarrow{\{0, 1\}^\lambda}$ and return $(ct^*, key_1')$, where $b$ is a random coin.

- **Guess:** The reduction $B_1$ returns 1 if $b = b'$. Otherwise it returns 0.
Observe that when \( T \leftarrow G_{p_1} \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i} \); when \( T \leftarrow G_{p_1 p_2 p_3} \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_2 \). This proves the lemma. The additional probability error \( 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)} \) is caused by trivial subgroup components in \( T \). Because we actually take \( T \) as a generator, our simulation will deviate from both or one of the games if there exists any trivial subgroup component in it.

\[ \text{Hyb}_{3,i} : \text{for } 0 \leq i \leq \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil, \text{ we change the distribution of } u_1, \ldots, u_{2n}, \text{ from } w^k R_{4,k} \text{ to } u^\alpha g_j^{\sum_{j=1}^{r} \alpha_j^{k}} R_{4,k}, \text{ where } r_j, \alpha_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N, j \in [2^n] \text{ and } g_2 \leftarrow G_{p_2}. \]

**Lemma 8.2.** Under the decisional subgroup assumption DS2, we have

\[
\left| \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_{3,0}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_{2}}(\lambda) \right| \leq \text{Adv}_{B_2}^{\text{DS2}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}
\]

**Proof.** Given \((G, g) \in G_{p_1}, g_4 \in G_{p_4}, X_1 X_2 X_3 \in G_{p_1 p_2 p_3}, T)\), where either \( T = u \leftarrow G_{p_1} \) or \( T = u g_2^r \leftarrow G_{p_1 p_2} \). The algorithm \( B_2 \) works as follows.

- **Commitment Phase:** The adversary \( A \) commits to a challenge set \( S^* \subseteq [n] \).
- **Setup Phase:** Sample parameters \((\alpha, \tilde{\beta}, u) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_2^2 \times G_{p_1} \) and \( \beta = \tilde{\beta} - \sum_{k \in S^*} \alpha^k \). Select a hash function \( H \) and sample randomness from the group \( G_{p_4} \). That is \( R_{4,k} \leftarrow G_{p_4} \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, 2n \) and \( R_{4,k} \) \( \leftarrow G_{p_4} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \). Compute each \( u_k \) as \( T^\alpha R_{4,k} \) for \( k \in [2^n] \). Proceed as \( \text{Hyb}_2 \) to compute the public parameters \( \text{mpk} \) and \( \{\text{sk}_i : i \notin S^*\} \).
- **Challenge Phase:** Sample a random value \( s^r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \), it uses \( X_1 X_2 X_3 \) as provided and \( u_{n+1} \) as computed above to compute

\[
ct^* = ((X_1 X_2 X_3)^{s^r}, ((X_1 X_2 X_3)^{s^r})^{\tilde{\beta}}, \text{key}^*_0 = H(e((X_1 X_2 X_3)^{s^r}, u_{n+1}))
\]

- **Guess:** The reduction \( B_2 \) returns 1 if \( b = b^r \). Otherwise it returns 0.

Observe that if \( T = u \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_2 \); when \( T = u g_2^r \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,0} \). This proves the lemma. Note that the additional probability error \( 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)} \) is caused by trivial subgroup components in \( T \). Because we actually take \( T \) as a generator, our simulation will deviate from both or one of the games if there exists any trivial subgroup component in it.

In order to prove \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i} \) is computationally indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i+1} \) for all \( i \in [1, \ldots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \), we construct the following two sub-hybrid arguments.

- **Hyb_{3,i+1}:** is equivalent to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i} \), except that we change the distribution of \( u_1, \ldots, u_{2n} \) as

\[
u_k = u^\alpha g_2^{\sum_{j=1}^{r_j} \alpha_j^{k}} g_3^{\sum_{j=1}^{r_j} \alpha_j^{k}} R_{4,k}, \quad k = 1, \ldots, 2n
\]

- **Hyb_{3,i+2}:** is equivalent to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i+1} \), except that we change the distribution of \( u_1, \ldots, u_{2n} \) as

\[
u_k = u^\alpha g_2^{\sum_{j=1}^{r_j} \alpha_j^{k}} g_3^{\sum_{j=1}^{r_j} \alpha_j^{k}} R_{4,k}, \quad k = 1, \ldots, 2n
\]

**Lemma 8.3.** Under the decisional subgroup assumption DS3, for each \( i \in [1, \ldots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \), we have

\[
\left| \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_{3,i}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_{3,i+1}}(\lambda) \right| \leq \text{Adv}_{B_3}^{\text{DS3}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}
\]

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Proof. Given parameters \( (G, g \in G_{p_1}, g_4 \in G_{p_4}, X_1X_2X_3 \in G_{p_1p_2p_3}, T) \) where either \( T = g_2 \leftarrow G_{p_2} \) or \( T = g_2g_3 \leftarrow G_{p_2p_3} \). The algorithm \( B_3 \) works as follows.

- **Commitment Phase**: The adversary \( A \) commits to a challenge set \( S^* \subseteq \{n\} \).

- **Setup Phase**: Pick parameters \((\alpha, \beta, u) \xleftarrow{\$} Z_N^2 \times G_{p_4}, \beta = \tilde{\beta} - \sum_{k \in S^*} \alpha^k \). Select the hash function \( H \) and all randomness to be used \( R_{4,k} \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_4} \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, 2n \) and \( R_{4,i} \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_4} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \). Sample \( \alpha'_1, \ldots, \alpha'_2, r'_1, \ldots, r'_2, i \xleftarrow{\$} Z_N \). Compute each \( uk \) as \( u^{\alpha^k} \cdot \sum_{j=1}^{T} r_j \alpha_j^k \cdot R_{4,k} \). Finally it proceeds as \( \text{Hyb}_2 \) using \( \alpha, u_1, \ldots, u_{2n} \) as computed above to compute the public parameters \( mpk \) and \( \{sk_i : i \notin S^*\} \).

- **Challenge Phase**: Sample the random value \( s' \xleftarrow{\$} Z_N \) and compute \( ct_0^* = (X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}, ct_1^* = (X_1X_2X_3)^{s'\tilde{\beta}} \) and the symmetric key \( \text{key}_{0}^* = H(e((X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}, u_{n+1})) \). The reduction \( B_3 \) then picks \( \text{key}_1^* \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\lambda \) and returns \( (ct^* = (ct_0^*, ct_1^*), \text{key}_{0}^*) \) where \( b \) is the random coin flipped by the challenger.

- **Guess**: The reduction \( B_3 \) outputs 1 if \( b = b' \). Otherwise it returns 0.

When \( T = g_2 \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i} \); when \( T = g_2g_3 \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i+1} \), where for all \( j \in [2^i] \) we have \( \alpha_j = \alpha_j' \mod p_2, r_j = r_j' \mod p_2, \beta_j = \beta_j' \mod p_3 \) and \( \tilde{\beta}_j = \tilde{\beta}_j' \mod p_3 \). This proves the lemma. Note that the additional probability error \( 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)} \) is caused by trivial subgroup components in \( T \). Because we actually take \( T \) as a generator, our simulation will deviate from both or one of the games if there exists any trivial subgroup component in it.

**Lemma 8.4.** Under the decisional subgroup assumption \( DS^4 \), for each \( i \in [1, \ldots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \), we have

\[
|\text{Adv}_A^{\text{Hyb}_{3,i+1}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{\text{Hyb}_{3,i+2}}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_B^{DS^4}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}
\]

Proof. Given the instance \( (G, g \in G_{p_1}, g_4 \in G_{p_4}, X_1X_2X_3 \in G_{p_1p_2p_3}, Y_2Y_4 \in G_{p_2p_4}, T) \) where either \( T = g_2R_4 \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_2p_4} \) or \( T = g_2R_4 \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_3p_4} \), the algorithm \( B_4 \) works as follows.

- **Commitment Phase**: The adversary \( A \) commits to the challenge set \( S^* \subseteq \{n\} \).

- **Setup Phase**: Sample parameters \((\alpha, \beta, u) \xleftarrow{\$} Z_N^2 \times G_{p_4}, \beta = \tilde{\beta} - \sum_{k \in S^*} \alpha^k \). Select the hash function \( H \) and sample all randomness to be used, \( R_{4,k} \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_4} \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, 2n \) and \( R_{4,i} \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_4} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \). Sample \( \alpha'_1, \ldots, \alpha'_2, r'_1, \ldots, r'_2, i \xleftarrow{\$} Z_N \). Compute each \( uk \) as

\[
u_a^k \cdot (Y_2Y_4)_{\sum_{j=1}^{T} r_j} \alpha_j^k \cdot R_{4,k} \]

It proceeds to compute the public parameters \( mpk \) and the set of secret keys \( \{sk_i : i \notin S^*\} \) as in \( \text{Hyb}_2 \).

- **Challenge Phase**: Sample a random value \( s' \xleftarrow{\$} Z_N \) and compute \( ct_0^* = (X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}, ct_1^* = (X_1X_2X_3)^{s'\tilde{\beta}} \) and \( \text{key}_{0}^* = H(e((X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}, u_{n+1})) \), where \( u_{n+1} \) is computed as above. The reduction \( B_4 \) picks \( \text{key}_1^* \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\lambda \) and returns \( (ct^* = (ct_0^*, ct_1^*), \text{key}_{0}^*) \) where \( b \) is a random bit flipped by the challenger.

- **Guess**: The reduction \( B_4 \) returns 1 if \( b = b' \) and returns 0 in the other case.

Observe that if \( T = g_2R_4 \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i+1} \) and if \( T = g_2R_4 \), then the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i+2} \). This finishes the proof. Note that the additive probability error \( 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)} \) is caused by trivial subgroup components in \( T \). Because we actually take \( T \) as a generator, our simulation will deviate from both or one of the games if there exists any trivial subgroup component in it.
Moreover, it is easy to notice that \( \text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_{3.2}}_{A}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_{3.2}}_{A}(\lambda) \) since all \( r_j \) and all \( r'_j \) are i.i.d variables in \( \text{Hyb}_{3.1.2} \), by setting \( \alpha_{2i+j} = \hat{\alpha}_j, r_{2i+j} = \hat{r}_j \), for all \( j \in [2^{i}] \).

\( \text{Hyb}_4 \): is equivalent to \( \text{Hyb}_{3.[\log n+1]} \), except that for each \( k \in [2n] \), each \( u_k \) is in the form

\[
u_k^s g_2^{RF(k)} R_{4,k}
\]

where \( g_2 \leftarrow G_{p_2} \) and RF is a truly random function. In this hybrid argument, the challenger computes the challenge ciphertext \( \text{ct}^* = \left( (X_1 X_2 X_3)^s, (X_1 X_2 X_3)^{s \beta} \right) \) and the symmetric key

\[
\text{key}^*_0 = e((X_1 X_2 X_3)^s, u_{n+1})
= e((X_1 X_2 X_3)^s, u_{n+1}^{RF(n+1)} g_2^{RF(n+1)} R_{4,n+1})
= e((X_1 X_2 X_3)^s, u_{n+1}) \cdot e((X_1 X_2 X_3)^{s \beta}, g_2^{RF(n+1)})
\]

has \( \log p_2 = \Theta(\lambda) \) bits of min-entropy coming from \( RF(n+1) \); this holds as long as the \( G_{p_2} \)-component of \( (X_1 X_2 X_3)^s \) is not 1, which happens with probability \( 1 - 1/p_2 \). Therefore, by the core lemma described as lemma 7.1, we have

\[
\left| \text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_{3.[\log n+1]}}_{A}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_4}_{A}(\lambda) \right| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}
\]

This proves the main theorem.

\[\square\]

9 Our Tightly Secure Non-Zero Inner Product Encryption Scheme

In this section we give the description of our tightly secure NIPE scheme (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec). Recall that our NIPE construction is in the key encapsulation setting as we defined.

9.1 Construction

Our NIPE scheme (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) is described as follows.

- **Setup**\((1^\lambda, 1^n)\): takes as input the security parameter \( \lambda \) and \( n \) as the dimension of the inner product space. Compute \( G(1^\lambda) \) to obtain parameters of bilinear groups \((N = p_1 p_2 p_3 p_4, G, G_T, e)\), where \( p_i > 2^{\ell(\lambda)} \) for each \( i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \) for a suitable polynomial \( \ell : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). We consider inner products defined over \( \mathbb{Z}_N^\lambda \). Choose \((\alpha, \beta, g, u) \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}^\lambda \times \mathbb{Z}_N^\lambda \) and \( R_4 \leftarrow \mathcal{R} G_{p_4} \). Define \( g_j := g^{\alpha^j} \) for each \( j \in [n] \) and \( u_k := u^{\alpha^k} R_{4,k} \), where \( R_{4,k} \leftarrow \mathcal{R} G_{p_4} \), for each \( k \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\} \). It selects a pairwise-independent hash function \( H : G_T \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \). Finally it outputs the public parameters

\[
\text{mpk} := ((G, G_T, e), g, g^{\beta}, \{g_j\}_{j=1}^n, \{u_k\}_{k \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}, H})
\]

and the master secret key as \( \text{msk} = (u, \alpha, \beta, R_4) \).

- **Enc**\((\text{mpk}, \vec{x})\): To generate an encryption under the vector \( \vec{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n \). It samples \( s \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_N \) and define the ciphertext \( \text{ct} = (\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1) \) and a symmetric key key as follows.

\[
\text{ct}_0 = g^s, \quad \text{ct}_1 = g^{s (\beta + \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \alpha^i)}, \quad \text{key} = H(e(g, u_{n+1})^s)
\]

where \( \text{ct}_1 \) is computed as \((g^{\beta} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{x_i})^s \) and the symmetric key key is computed as \( H(e(g_1, u_n)^s) \). The algorithm finally outputs \((\text{ct}, \text{key})\).
• KeyGen(\text{msk}, \vec{y}): The secret key for the vector \( \vec{y} = (y_1, \cdots, y_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n \) is given by
\[
\text{sk}_{\vec{y}} = \left( \prod_{i=1}^{n} u^{\alpha_i y_i} \right)^\beta \cdot R'_4
\]
where \( R'_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4} \) is sampled using \( R_4 \).

• Dec(\text{ct}, \vec{x}, \vec{y}, \text{sk}_{\vec{y}}): Let \( \omega = \langle \vec{x}, \vec{y} \rangle \mod N \). If \( \omega \neq 0 \) the algorithm computes
\[
A_i = \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^{n} u_{n+1+j-i}^{x_i}, \quad \forall i \in [n]
\]
and recover the symmetric key \( \text{key} \) as
\[
H \left( \left( \frac{e(\text{ct}_1, \prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{n-i+1}^{y_i})}{e(\text{ct}_0, \text{sk}_{\vec{y}} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} A_i^{y_i})} \right)^{1/\omega} \right)
\]

**Correctness.** The correctness of our construction can be verified as follows
\[
e(\text{ct}_1, \prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{n-i+1}^{y_i}) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g^{s (\beta + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i x_i)}, u^{\alpha_n^{n+1-i} y_i})
\]
\[
= \prod_{i=1}^{n} g^{\beta} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} g^{x_i} \cdot u^{\alpha_n^{n+1-i} y_i} \cdot s
\]
\[
= \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g, u)^{\alpha_n^{n+1-i} x_i} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g, u^{\alpha_n^{n-i+1} y_i})^{s y_i}
\]
\[
= \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g, u)^{\alpha_n^{n+1-i} x_i} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g, u^{\alpha_n^{n-i+1} y_i})^{s y_i}
\]
\[
= e(g, u)^{\alpha_n^{n+1-s} \langle \vec{x}, \vec{y} \rangle} \cdot e\left( g^{s \prod_{i=1}^{n} u^{\alpha_n^{n-i+1} y_i}}, A_i \right)^{s y_i}
\]
\[
= e(g, u)^{\alpha_n^{n+1-s} \omega} \cdot e\left( \text{ct}_0, \text{sk}_{\vec{y}} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} A_i^{y_i} \right)
\]

From the sequence of equations we have that
\[
\left( \frac{e(\text{ct}_1, \prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{n-i+1}^{y_i})}{e(\text{ct}_0, \text{sk}_{\vec{y}} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} A_i^{y_i})} \right)^{1/\omega} = e(g, u_{n+1})^{s}
\]
9.2 Security Analysis

**Theorem 9.1.** For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists an algorithm $B = \{B_1, B_2, B_3, B_4\}$ whose running times are essentially the same as that of $A$, such that

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{NIPE}}^S(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{B_1}^{DS_1} + \text{Adv}_{B_2}^{DS_2} + O(\log \lambda) \cdot (\text{Adv}_{B_3}^{DS_3}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{B_4}^{DS_4}(\lambda)) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}
$$

**Proof.** To prove the security of our NIPE, we need to define the following three kinds of family of functions to modify the distribution of public parameters.

1. The family of functions $\{F_2^i : [2n] \to \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}\}_{i=0}^{\lceil \log n + 1 \rceil}$ such that for all $k \in [2n]$,

   $$
   F_2^i(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^i} r_j \cdot \alpha_j^k \mod p_2 \text{ for all } i \in [1, \cdots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil], \quad F_0(k) = 0
   $$

   where $r_1, \cdots, r_{2^i}, \alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_{2^i} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}$.

2. The family of functions $\{\hat{F}_2^i : [2n] \to \mathbb{Z}_{p_3}\}_{i=0}^{\lceil \log n + 1 \rceil}$ such that for all $k \in [2n]$,

   $$
   \hat{F}_2^i(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^i} \hat{r}_j \cdot \hat{\alpha}_j^k \mod p_3 \text{ for all } i \in [1, \cdots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil], \quad F_0(k) = 0
   $$

   where $\hat{r}_1, \cdots, \hat{r}_{2^i}, \hat{\alpha}_1, \cdots, \hat{\alpha}_{2^i} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{p_3}$.

3. The family of functions $\{\hat{F}_2^i : [2n] \to \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}\}_{i=0}^{\lceil \log n + 1 \rceil}$ such that for all $k \in [2n]$,

   $$
   \hat{F}_2^i(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^i} r_j \cdot \alpha_j^k + \hat{r}_j \cdot \hat{\alpha}_j^k \mod p_2 \text{ for all } i \in [1, \cdots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil], \quad F_0(k) = 0
   $$

   where $r_1, \cdots, r_{2^i}, \alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_{2^i}, \hat{r}_1, \cdots, \hat{r}_{2^i}, \hat{\alpha}_1, \cdots, \hat{\alpha}_{2^i} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}$.

Respectively we need the three kinds of parameters used in the hybrid arguments in order to modify the distribution of $\{u_k\}_{k \in [2n]}$

1. **Type $i$ parameters** ($0 \leq i \leq \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil$): are parameters where $\{u_k\}_{k \in [2n]}$ have a $G_{p_2}$ component determined by the function $F_2^i(\cdot)$, such that

   $$
   u_k = u^{a_k} \cdot g_2^{F_2^i(k)} \cdot R_{4,k}, \quad \forall k \in [2n]
   $$

2. **Type $i.1$ parameters** ($0 \leq i \leq \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil$): are parameters where $\{u_k\}_{k \in [2n]}$ have both $G_{p_2}$ component and $G_{p_3}$ component, where $G_{p_2}$ component is still determined by the function $F_2^i(\cdot)$ as above, and the $G_{p_3}$ component is determined by another function $\hat{F}_2^i(\cdot)$ such that

   $$
   u_k = u^{a_k} \cdot g_2^{F_2^i(k)} \cdot g_3^{\hat{F}_2^i(k)} \cdot R_{4,k}, \quad \forall k \in [2n]
   $$

3. **Type $i.2$ parameters** ($0 \leq i \leq \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil$): are parameters where $\{u_k\}_{k \in [2n]}$ have a $G_{p_2}$ component
determined by the function $\bar{F}_{2'}(\cdot)$, such that
\[ u_k = u^{\alpha_k} \cdot \bar{g}_{2'}^k \cdot R_{4,k}, \quad \forall k \in [2n] \]

Now we are ready to define hybrid arguments. The proof proceeds through a sequence of hybrids: Hyb$_0$, Hyb$_1$, Hyb$_2$, Hyb$_{3,i}$ for all $i \in [1, \cdots, \log n + 1]$, and Hyb$_4$. We define $\text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_{x,y,z}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ as the advantage function in hybrid Hyb$_{x,y,z}$.

Hyb$_0$: is the real game as the selective security definition of NIPE scheme.

Hyb$_1$: is equivalent to Hyb$_0$, except that in this hybrid the challenger chooses $\bar{\beta} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N$ and sets $\beta = \bar{\beta} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha^i x^*_i$ where $x^* = (x^*_1, \cdots, x^*_n)$. The challenger sets $g^\beta \overset{\$}{=} g^3 \prod_{i=1}^{n} g_{i_{x^*}}$. Thus the ciphertext $ct^* = (ct_0^*, ct_1^*)$ and the symmetric key $key^*_0$ is computed as follows
\[ ct_0^* = g^\beta, \quad ct_1^* = g^{\beta \cdot \bar{\beta}}, \quad key^*_0 = H(e(g^{\beta}, u_{n+1})) \]

It is easy to see that we have $\text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_{x,y,z}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_{0}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$

Hyb$_2$: is equivalent to Hyb$_1$, except that the challenger picks $ct_0$ uniformly at random in the subgroup $G_{p_{1p2p3}}$ instead of from $G_{p_1}$. More specifically, the challenger samples $s \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N$, it computes $ct_0 = (g_1 g_2 g_3)^s$, $ct_1 = (g_1 g_2 g_3)^s \cdot key^*_0$, and $key^*_0 = H(e((g_1 g_2 g_3)^s, u_{n+1}))$.

Lemma 9.1. Under the decisional subgroup assumption DS1, we have
\[ |\text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_{1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{\text{Hyb}_{2}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{DS1}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda) \]

Proof. Given $(\mathcal{G}, g_1, g_4, T)$ where either $T \leftarrow G_{p_1}$ or $T \leftarrow G_{p_{1p2p3}}$, we build a reduction $\mathcal{B}_1$ working as follows.

- **Commitment Phase**: The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ commits to a vector $\bar{x}^* = (x^*_1, \cdots, x^*_n)$.

- **Setup Phase**: Pick parameters $(\alpha, \beta, u) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N^2 \times G_{p_1}$, $\beta = \bar{\beta} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha^i x^*_i$. Select the hash function $H$, all randomness $R_{4,k} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}$ for $k = 1, \cdots, 2n$ and $R_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}$. It outputs the public parameters
\[ \text{mpk} = (\mathcal{G}, g, g^\beta, e(g, u_{n+1}), H, g_1^n, \cdots, g_1^n, u_1, \cdots, u_n, u_{n+2}, \cdots, u_{2n}) \]
and keeps the master secret key $\text{msk} = (u, \alpha, \beta, R_4)$ privately.

- **Key Extraction**: Upon a key query on vector $\bar{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n$, the adversary is given a secret key $sk_{\bar{y}} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} u^y_{n-i+1} \cdot R'_4$ where $R'_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}$ is sampled using $R_4$.

- **Challenge Phase**: Sample the random value $s' \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N$, and compute the ciphertext $ct^* = (ct_0^* = T^{s'}, ct_1^* = (T^{s'})^\beta)$ and the symmetric key $key^*_0 = H(e(T^{s'}, u_{n+1}))$. The reduction $\mathcal{B}_1$ picks random $key^*_1 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and return $(ct^*, key^*_0)$, where $b$ is a random coin.

- **Guess**: The reduction $\mathcal{B}_1$ returns 1 if $b = b'$. Otherwise it returns 0.

Observe that when $T \leftarrow G_{p_1}$, the simulation is identical to Hyb$_1$; when $T \leftarrow G_{p_{1p2p3}}$, the simulation is identical to Hyb$_2$. This proves the lemma. □
Lemma 9.2. Under the decisional subgroup assumption, we first prove that

\[ T = \text{Hyb} \]

This proves the lemma.

Observe that if \( i \) parameters. In order to prove \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i} \) is computationally indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i+1} \), we need two additional sub-hybrids as follows

- \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i,1}(0 \leq i \leq \lfloor \log n + 1 \rfloor) \): is equivalent to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i} \), except that the adversary is given Type \( i \) parameters.
- \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i,2}(0 \leq i \leq \lfloor \log n + 1 \rfloor) \): is equivalent to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i,1} \), except that the adversary is given Type \( i \) parameters.

We first prove that \( \text{Hyb}_2 \) is computationally indistinguishable from \( \text{Hyb}_{3,0} \) under the decisional subgroup assumption \( \text{DS}_2 \).

**Lemma 9.2.** Under the decisional subgroup assumption \( \text{DS}_2 \), we have

\[
\left| \text{Adv}_A^{\text{Hyb}_3}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_A^{\text{Hyb}_2}(\lambda) \right| \leq \text{Adv}_B^{\text{DS}_2}(\lambda)
\]

**Proof.** Given the instance \((G, g \in G_{p_1}, g_4 \in G_{p_4}, X_1X_2X_3 \in G_{p_1p_2p_3}, T)\) where either \( T = u \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_2} \) or \( T = u_g^r \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_1p_2} \). We build a reduction \( B_2 \) simulating the game as follows:

- **Commitment Phase:** The adversary \( A \) commits to a vector \( \bar{x}^* = (x_1^*, \ldots, x_n^*) \in Z_N^*.

- **Setup Phase:** The challenger picks \( (\alpha, \beta, u) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Z_N^2 \times G_{p_1} \), set \( \beta = \beta - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha^i \cdot x_i^* \). The challenger then selects a pairwise-independent hash function \( H \), and sample all randomness \( R_{4,k} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4} \) for \( k \in [2n] \) and \( R_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4} \). Define \( g_j = g^\alpha^j \) for \( j \in [n] \) and compute each \( u_k \) as

\[
u_k = T^\alpha^k \cdot R_{4,k}
\]

for each \( k \in [2n] \). Proceed as \( \text{Hyb}_2 \) to compute the public parameters

\[
\text{mpk} = (G, g, g^\beta, \{g_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \{u_k\}_{k \in [2n]\{n+1\}}, H)
\]

the public parameters \( \text{mpk} \) is sent to the adversary \( A \) and the challenger keeps the master secret key \( \text{msk} = (u, R_4, \alpha, \beta) \) privately.

- **Key Extraction Phase:** Upon query on the vector \( \bar{y} \in Z_N^n \), the adversary is given a secret key for the vector \( \bar{y} \) as

\[
\text{sk}_\bar{y} = (\prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{y_i}^{r_{n-i+1}}) \cdot R'_4
\]

where \( R'_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4} \) is sampled using \( R_4 \).

- **Challenge Phase:** Sample the random value \( s' \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Z_N \), and compute the ciphertext \( c_{t}^* = (ct_0^* = (X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}) \) and the symmetric key \( \text{key}_0^* = H(e((X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}, u_{n+1}) \)). The reduction \( B_2 \) picks random \( \text{key}_1^* \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^\lambda \) and return \( (ct^*, \text{key}_0^*) \), where \( b \) is a random coin.

- **Guess:** The adversary returns a bit \( b' \), the reduction \( B_2 \) returns 1 if \( b = b' \) and 0 otherwise.

Observe that if \( T = u \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_2 \); if \( T = u_g^r \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,0} \). This proves the lemma.
Lemma 9.3. Under the decisional subgroup assumption DS3, we have
\[
\left| \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_{3,i+1}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_{3,i}}(\lambda) \right| \leq \text{Adv}_{B_{3}}^{\text{DS3}}(\lambda)
\]
for all \( i \in [1, \ldots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \).

Proof. Given the instance \((G, g \in G_{p_1}, g_4 \in G_{p_4}, X_1X_2X_3, T)\) where either \( T = g_2 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_2} \) or \( T = g_2g_3 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_2p_3} \). We build a reduction \( B_3 \) working as follows:

- **Commitment Phase**: The adversary \( A \) commits to a vector \( \vec{x} = (x_1^*, \ldots, x_n^*) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n \).
- **Setup Phase**: The challenger picks \((\alpha, \beta, u) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N^2 \times G_{p_1} \), set \( \beta = \beta - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i x_i^* \). The challenger then selects a pairwise-independent hash function \( H \), and sample all randomness \( R_{4,k} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4} \) for \( k \in [2n] \) and \( R_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4} \). Define \( g_j = g^\alpha_j \) for \( j \in [n] \) and compute each \( u_k \) as:

\[
u_k = T^{\sum_{j=1}^{n} r'_j \alpha_j^k} R_{4,k}\]

for each \( k \in [2n] \), where \( r'_1, \ldots, r'_2, \alpha'_1, \ldots, \alpha'_2 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{p_2} \). Proceed as \( \text{Hyb}_2 \) to compute the public parameters

\[
\text{mpk} = (G, g, g^\beta, \{g_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \{u_k\}_{k \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}}, H)
\]

the public parameters \( \text{mpk} \) is sent to the adversary \( A \) and the challenger keeps the master secret key \( \text{msk} = (u, R_4, \alpha, \beta) \) privately.

- **Key Extraction Phase**: Upon query on the vector \( \vec{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n \), the adversary is given a secret key for the vector \( \vec{y} \) as

\[
\text{sk}_{\vec{y}} = \left( \prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{n-i+1}^{y_i} \right) \cdot R_4'
\]

where \( R'_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4} \) is sampled using \( R_4 \).

- **Challenge Phase**: Sample the random value \( s' \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N \), and compute the ciphertext \( \text{ct}^* = (\text{ct}^*_i = (X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}, \text{ct}^*_j = ((X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}, u_{n+1}) \text{)} \) and the symmetric key \( \text{key}^*_0 = H(e((X_1X_2X_3)^{s'}, u_{n+1})) \). The reduction \( B_2 \) picks random \( \text{key}^*_1 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^\lambda \) and return \( (\text{ct}^*, \text{key}^*_0) \), where \( b \) is a random coin.

- **Guess**: The adversary returns a bit \( b' \), the reduction \( B_3 \) returns 1 if \( b = b' \) and 0 otherwise.

Observe that when \( T = g_2 \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,i} \); When \( T = g_2g_3 \), the simulation is identical to \( \text{Hyb}_{3,1} \), where for all \( j \in [2^i] \) we have \( \alpha_j = \alpha'_j \mod p_2 \), \( r_j = r'_j \mod p_2 \), \( \hat{\alpha}_j = \hat{\alpha}'_j \mod p_3 \), and \( \hat{r}_j = \hat{r}'_j \mod p_3 \). This proves the lemma.

Lemma 9.4. Under the decisional subgroup assumption DS4, we have
\[
\left| \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_{3,i+1}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_{3,i+2}}(\lambda) \right| \leq \text{Adv}_{B_{4}}^{\text{DS4}}(\lambda)
\]
for all \( i \in [1, \ldots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \).

Proof. Given the instance \((G, g \in G_{p_1}, g_4 \in G_{p_4}, X_1X_2X_3 \in G_{p_1p_2p_3}, Y_2Y_4 \in G_{p_2p_4}, T)\) where either \( T \in G_{p_2p_4} \) or \( T = G_{p_3p_4} \). We build a reduction \( B_4 \) working as follows.
\textbf{Commitment Phase:} The adversary $A$ commits to a vector $\tilde{x} = (x_1^*, \cdots, x_n^*) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$. \\

\textbf{Setup Phase:} The challenger picks $(\alpha, \beta, u) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N^* \times G_{p_1}$, set $\beta = \beta - \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha^i \cdot x_i^*$. The challenger then selects a pairwise-independent hash function $H$, and sample all randomness $R_{4,k} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}$ for $k \in [2n]$ and $R_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}$. Define $g_j = g^{\alpha^j}$ for $j \in [n]$ and compute each $u_k$ as 

$$u_k = u^{\alpha^k} \cdot (Y_2 Y_4) \sum_{j=1}^n r_j^i \cdot \alpha^j \cdot T \sum_{j=1}^n \tilde{r}_j \cdot \tilde{a}_j \cdot R_{4,k}$$

for each $k \in [2n]$, where $r'_1, \cdots, r'_2, \alpha'_1, \cdots, \alpha'_2, \tilde{r}_1, \cdots, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{a}_1, \cdots, \tilde{a}_2 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}$. Proceed as $Hyb_2$ to compute the public parameters

$$mpk = (G, g, g^\beta, \{g_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \{u_k\}_{k \in [2n] \backslash \{n+1\}}, H)$$

the public parameters $mpk$ is sent to the adversary $A$ and the challenger keeps the master secret key $msk = (u, R_4, \alpha, \beta)$ privately. \\

\textbf{Key Extraction Phase:} Upon query on the vector $\tilde{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, the adversary is given a secret key for the vector $\tilde{y}$ as

$$ sk_{\tilde{y}} = \left( \prod_{i=1}^n u_{n-i+1}^{u_i} \right) \cdot R_4'$$

where $R'_4 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{p_4}$ is sampled using $R_4$. \\

\textbf{Challenge Phase:} Sample the random value $s' \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N$, and compute the ciphertext $ct^* = (ct_0^* = (X_1 X_2 X_3)^s, ct_1^* = ((X_1 X_2 X_3)^s)^\beta)$ and the symmetric key $key_0^* = H(e((X_1 X_2 X_3)^s, u_{n+1}))$. The reduction $B_2$ picks random key $\beta \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ and return $(ct^*, key_0^*)$, where $b$ is a random coin. \\

\textbf{Guess:} The adversary returns a bit $b'$, the reduction $B_4$ returns $1$ if $b = b'$ and $0$ otherwise.

Observe that if $T \in G_{p_3 p_4}$, the simulation is identical to $Hyb_{3,i,1}$ and if $T \in G_{p_2 p_4}$, then the simulation is identical to $Hyb_{3,i,2}$. 

It is easy to notice that $Adv^{Hyb_{3,i,2}}_A(\lambda)$ is identical to $Adv^{Hyb_{3,i,1}}_A(\lambda)$ since all $r_j$ and all $r'_j$ are i.i.d variables in $Hyb_{3,i,2}$, by setting $\alpha_{2^i+\cdot} = \tilde{\alpha}_j$, $r_{2^i+\cdot} = \tilde{r}_j$ for all $j \in [2^i]$. $Hyb_{4}$ is equivalent to $Hyb_{3,\log n+1}$, except that for each $k \in [2n]$, each $u_k$ is in the form

$$u_k = u^{\alpha^k} \cdot g_2^{RF(k)} \cdot R_{4,k}$$

where $g_2 \leftarrow G_{p_2}$ and $RF(\cdot)$ is a truly random function, which determines the $G_{p_2}$ component of each $u_k$. We argue that any legitimate adversary’s view remains statistically close to that of $Hyb_{4,\log n+1}$. To see this, we first notice that the $G_{p_2}$ component of the secret keys contain linear combinations of $RF(k)$ in the exponent excluding $RF(n+1)$. Recall that the adversary can only make private key queries on vectors $\tilde{y}$ under the restriction that $\langle \tilde{y}, \tilde{x} \rangle = 0$. In order to generate a secret key for the vector $\tilde{y}$, the challenger set $\beta = \beta - \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha^i \cdot x_i^*$ to create a $G_{p_1}$ component with the exponent $(\sum_{i=1}^n y_i \cdot \alpha^{i-1}) \cdot (\beta - \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha^i \cdot x_i^*)$. Note that the coefficient of $\alpha^{n+1}$ is the inner product of $\tilde{x}$ and $\tilde{y}$, which is $0$ for all legal private key queries. Hence, each $sk_{\tilde{y}}$ can be computed without using $u_{n+1}$, ensuring that $RF(n+1)$ remains completely independent of
any information revealed to the adversary. As a result, the distribution of

\[\text{key}_0^* = e\left((X_1X_2X_3)^s, u_{n+1}\right)\]
\[= e\left((X_1X_2X_3)^s, u^{\alpha_{n+1}}g_2^\text{RF(n+1)}R_{4,n+1}\right)\]
\[= e\left((X_1X_2X_3)^s, u^{\alpha_{n+1}}\right) \cdot e\left((X_1X_2X_3)^s, g_2^\text{RF(n+1)}\right)\]

is statistically close to the uniform distribution over \(\{0, 1\}^\lambda\) as long as the \(G_{p_2}\) component of \(c_{t_0} = (X_1X_2X_3)^s\) is not 1. This follows from the fact that if \(e\left((X_1X_2X_3)^s, g_2\right) \neq 1_{GT}\), the \(G_{p_2}\) component of \(e\left((X_1X_2X_3)^s, g_2^\text{RF(n+1)}\right)\)

has \(\log p_2 = \Theta(\lambda)\) bits of min-entropy. Since \(H\) is a pairwise-independent hash function, the left-over hash lemma ensures that the distribution of \(\text{key}_0^*\) is within \(2^{-\lambda}\) from the uniform distribution over \(\{0, 1\}^\lambda\). This implies that

\[\left|\text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_3, \left[\log n+1\right]}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_4}(\lambda)\right| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}\]

Now since the random bit \(b \in \{0, 1\}\) is completely hidden, we have \(\text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{Hyb}_4}(\lambda) = 0\). This finishes the proof.

10 Our Functional Commitment Scheme for Linear Functions

In this section we give the description of our tightly secure functional commitment scheme for linear functions.

10.1 Construction

Our functional commitment scheme for linear functions (Setup, Commit, Open, Vrf) is described as follows.

- **Setup(1^\lambda, 1^n)**: It generates the parameters of bilinear group \(G = (N, G, G_T, e)\) by executing the algorithm \(G(1^\lambda)\). The algorithm then samples \((g, u, \alpha) \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_1}^2 \times \mathbb{Z}_N\) and the randomness \(R_4 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_{p_4}\). The algorithm computes \(u_k = u^{\alpha_k}R_{4,k}\) for all \(k \in [2n]\), where \(R_{4,k} \xleftarrow{\$} G_{p_4}\). It outputs the commitment key as

\[\text{ck} = (g, g^\alpha, \ldots, g^{\alpha_n}, u_1, \ldots, u_n, u_{n+2}, \ldots, u_{2n}, R_4)\]

and the trapdoor key as \(tk = u_{n+1}\).

- **Commit(ck, \vec{m})**: On input a message vector \(\vec{m} = (m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n\), it chooses a random value \(\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N\) and computes the commitment \(C = g^{\beta + \sum_{j=1}^n m_j\alpha_j}\). The commitment \(C\) is computed as \(g^\beta \cdot \Pi_{j=1}^n g^m_j\). Finally it outputs the commitment \(C\) and the auxiliary information \(\text{aux} = (m_1, \ldots, m_n, \beta)\).

- **Open(ck, C, \vec{W}, \vec{x}, y)**: Given \(\vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^n\), the auxiliary information \(\text{aux} = (m_1, \ldots, m_n, \beta)\) allows generating a witness for the function \(\langle \vec{m} \cdot \vec{x} \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n m_i \cdot x_i\) by computing

\[W_i = u_{n-i+1}^\beta \cdot \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^n u_{n+1+j-i}^{m_j}, \quad \forall i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\]

and outputting \(W_y = \prod_{i=1}^n W_i^{x_i}\).
Vrf (ck, C, W_y, x, y): Given the commitment C ∈ G and x = (x_1, ⋅⋅⋅, x_n) ∈ Z_N^N. It accepts the witness W_y ∈ G as evidence that C is a commitment to the message m ∈ Z_N^N such that y = (m, x) if and only if it holds that
\[ e(C, \prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{n-i+1}^{x_i}) = e(g, u_{n+1})^y \cdot e(g, W_y) \]
If so, it outputs 1. Otherwise output 0.

Correctness. The correctness of our functional commitment scheme can be verified as follows
\[ e(C, \prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{n-i+1}^{x_i}) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g, u_{n+1})^{m_i \cdot x_i} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g, W_i)^{x_i} = e(g, u_{n+1})^y \cdot e(g, W_y) \]

10.2 Security Analysis

It is clear that the commitment is perfectly hiding. Since the commitment C is in the cyclic subgroup G_{p_1}, and for all message vector m = (m_1, ⋅⋅⋅, m_n) ∈ Z_N^n has a corresponding opening β ∈ Z_N. This even holds for the openings for the subgroup G_{p_2,p_3}, since only the randomness β and p_1 are fixed by m. Here we prove the binding property of our functional commitments.

Theorem 10.1. The functional commitment scheme described in section 10.1 is function binding under the decisional subgroup assumptions DS1, DS2, DS3, DS4.

Proof. We first assume that y' ≠ y mod p_1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. To see why, we recall the binding game, in which in order to break the binding property, the adversary A must come up with a commitment C ∈ G, a vector x = (x_1, ⋅⋅⋅, x_n) ∈ Z_N^N and a pair y, y' ∈ Z_N, y ≠ y' and W_y, W_y' ∈ G such that
\[ e(C, \prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{n-i+1}^{x_i}) = e(g, u_{n+1})^y \cdot e(g, W_y) \quad (4) \]
\[ e(C, \prod_{i=1}^{n} u_{n-i+1}^{x_i}) = e(g, u_{n+1})^{y'} \cdot e(g, W_y') \quad (5) \]
By dividing both sides of the above two equations, we have e(g, u_{n+1})^{y-y'} = e(g, W_y/W_y') ⇔ e(g, u_{n+1}) = e(g, (W_y'/W_y))^{1/(y-y')} = e(g, W).

If gcd(y' - y, N) = 1, then W = (W_y'/W_y)^{1/(y-y')} is of the form u_{n+1}^{-1} \cdot g_{r_2}^2 \cdot g_{r_3}^3 \cdot g_{r_4}^4 for some random r_2 ∈ Z_{p_2}, r_3 ∈ Z_{p_3} and r_4 ∈ Z_{p_4}. In the following context, we denote by \hat{W} = u_{n+1}^{-1} \cdot g_{r_2}^2 \cdot g_{r_4}^4 that can be seen as a semi-functional trapdoor that is equivalent to a product of the normal trapdoor key tk with a G_{p_2} component. \hat{W} can be seen as a shadow semi-functional trapdoor in that it is equivalent to a product of the normal trapdoor key tk with a G_{p_2} component and a G_{p_3} component.

Before we introduce the hybrid arguments used in this proof, we first introduce the following kinds of attacks that will be used.

Type-I Attack: these attacks are those for which (W_y'/W_y)^{1/(y-y')} lives in the subgroup G_{p_1,P_4}.
• **Type-II.i Attack**: these attacks are those such that \( \hat{W} = (W_{y'} / W_{y})^{1/(y - y')} \) has a \( G_{p_2} \) component, in which \( r_2 \neq 0 \), and is thus a semi-functional trapdoor. More concretely, \( r_2 \) is determined by the function family \( \{ F_{2'}(\cdot) \}_{i=0}^{\log n + 1} \) such that for all \( k \in [2n] \)

\[
F_{2'}(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^i} r_j \cdot \alpha_j^k \mod p_2, \quad \forall i \in [1, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \quad F_0(k) = 0
\]

where \( r_1, \ldots, r_2', \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_2' \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{p_2} \) are chosen at random for each \( i \) by the challenger that generates \( ck \) for the adversary.

• **Type-II.i.1 Attack**: these attacks are those such that \( \hat{W} = (W_{y'} / W_{y})^{1/(y - y')} \) has a \( G_{p_2} \) component and an additional \( G_{p_3} \) component, in which \( r_2 \neq 0 \) and \( r_3 \neq 0 \), and is thus a shadow semi-functional trapdoor. Thus \( \hat{W} = u^{\alpha_{n+1}}_1 \cdot g_{2'}^{F_{2'}(n+1)} \cdot g_{3'}^{\hat{F}_{2'}(n+1)} \cdot R_{4'}^{x'} \) for some \( R_{4'} \in G_{p_4} \). More concretely, \( r_2 \) is determined by the function family \( \{ F_{2'}(\cdot) \}_{i=0}^{\log n + 1} \) defined above and \( r_3 \) is determined by the function family \( \{ \hat{F}_{2'}(\cdot) \}_{i=0}^{\log n + 1} \) such that for all \( k \in [2n] \)

\[
\hat{F}_{2'}(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^i} \hat{r}_j \cdot \hat{\alpha}_j^k \mod p_2, \quad \forall i \in [1, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \quad \hat{F}_0(k) = 0
\]

where \( \hat{r}_1, \ldots, \hat{r}_2', \hat{\alpha}_1, \ldots, \hat{\alpha}_2' \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{p_2} \) are chosen at random for each \( i \) by the challenger that generates \( ck \) for the adversary.

• **Type-II.i.2 Attack**: these attacks are those such that \( \hat{W} = (W_{y'} / W_{y})^{1/(y - y')} \) has a \( G_{p_2} \) component, in which \( r_2 \neq 0 \), and is thus a semi-functional trapdoor. More concretely, \( r_2 \) is determined by a new function family \( \{ \hat{F}_{2'}(\cdot) \}_{i=0}^{\log n + 1} \) such that for all \( k \in [2n] \)

\[
\hat{F}_{2'}(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^i} \hat{r}_j \cdot \hat{\alpha}_j^k + \hat{r}_j \cdot \hat{\alpha}_j^k, \quad \forall i \in [1, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \quad \hat{F}_0'(k) = 0
\]

where \( r_1, \ldots, r_2', \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_2', \hat{r}_1, \ldots, \hat{r}_2', \hat{\alpha}_1, \ldots, \hat{\alpha}_2' \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{p_2} \) are chosen at random for each \( i \) by the challenger that generates \( ck \) for the adversary.

Furthermore, we define the following types of parameters to be used in this proof.

• **Type-i Parameters**: are parameters where elements \( u_1, \ldots, u_{2n} \) now have a \( G_{p_2} \) component \( r_2 \) determined by \( \{ F_{2'}(\cdot) \}_{i=0}^{\log n + 1} \). Namely \( u_k = u^{a_k} \cdot g_{2'} \cdot R_{4,k} \) for \( k \in [2n] \). These elements induce a modified joint distribution of \( ck \), which contains the group elements \( \{ u_k \}_{k \in [2n]} \setminus \{ n + 1 \} \) and \( tk = u_{n+1} \).

• **Type-i.1 Parameters**: are parameters where elements \( u_1, \ldots, u_{2n} \) now have an additional \( G_{p_3} \) component \( r_3 \) determined by the function family \( \{ \hat{F}_{2'}(\cdot) \}_{i=0}^{\log n + 1} \). Namely \( u_k = u^{a_k} \cdot g_{2'} \cdot g_{3} \cdot R_{4,k} \) for \( k \in [2n] \). These elements induce a modified joint distribution of \( ck \), which contains the group elements \( \{ u_k \}_{k \in [2n]} \setminus \{ n + 1 \} \) and \( tk = u_{n+1} \).

• **Type-i.2 Parameters**: are parameters where elements \( \{ u_k \}_{k \in [2n]} \) now have \( G_{p_2} \) component \( r_2' \) determined by the function family \( \{ \hat{F}_{2'}(\cdot) \}_{i=0}^{\log n + 1} \). Namely \( u_k = u^{a_k} \cdot g_{2'} \cdot g_{3} \cdot R_{4,k} \) for \( k \in [2n] \). These elements induce a modified joint distribution of \( ck \), which contains the group elements \( \{ u_k \}_{k \in [2n]} \setminus \{ n + 1 \} \) and \( tk = u_{n+1} \).
The sequence of games begins with the real attack game, where the adversary is given a normal $ck$. Then we gradually modify the distribution of $ck$ and prove that, unless either assumption $DS1$, $DS2$, $DS3$ or $DS4$ is false, the adversary $A$ will produce a Type-II.i attack when fed with Type-i parameters. In the last game, $ck$ consists of Type-II.[$\lceil \log n + 1 \rceil$.2 parameters and we argue that the adversary $A$’s advantage in producing Type-II.[$\lceil \log n + 1 \rceil$.2 attack is statistically negligible. Following the work of [LRY16], we denote by $Win_{DS1}$ as the event that the adversary $A$ wins in game $\square$ and $E_{\square}$ as the even that the adversary $A$ mounts a Type-II.i attack (including Type-II.i.1 attack and Type-II.i.2 attack) when $ck$ is generated using Type-i parameters (including Type-i.1 parameters and Type-i.2 parameters), for each $i \in [0, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil]$. For example, we denote by $Win_{DS2,i}$ as the event that the adversary wins in game or hybrid $Hyb_{2,i}$ and $E_{II,i}$ as the event that the adversary mounts a Type-II.i.1 attack when $ck$ is generated using Type-i parameters.

$Hyb_{1}$: In this hybrid the adversary $A$ receives a commitment key $ck$ which is as in the real scheme. The following lemma 10.1 shows that if $DS1$ holds, any PPT adversary $A$ cannot produce anything but a Type-I attack.

**Lemma 10.1.** Under the decisional subgroup assumption $DS1$, we have

$$Pr[Win_{1} \land \neg E_{I}] \leq Adv^{DS1}_{B_{1}}(\lambda)$$

**Proof.** Let $A$ be an adversary that mounts a Type-II attack (for any $k$) when fed with a commitment key $ck$ in the normal form. We will build a reduction $B_{1}$ that takes as input the tuple $(g \in G_{p_{1}}, g_{4} \in G_{p_{4}}, T)$ and finds an element $\gamma$ of $G_{p_{2}p_{4}}$ with a non-trivial $G_{p_{2}}$ component. In turn such an $\gamma \in G_{p_{2}p_{4}}$ allows deciding whether $T \in G_{p_{1}}$ or $T \in G_{p_{2}p_{4}}$, since $e(\gamma, T) = 1_{G_{T}}$ when $T \in G_{p_{1}}$. The reduction $B_{1}$ works as follows.

The reduction $B_{1}$ honestly generates the commitment key $ck$ using its input elements $g \in G_{p_{1}}$ and $g_{4} \in G_{p_{4}}$. The commitment key $ck$ is given to the adversary $A$ and it will submits a commitment $C \in G_{1}$, a pair of linear function results $y, y' \in \mathbb{Z}_{N}$ and two witnesses $W_{y}, W_{y'} \in G_{1}$ such that they satisfy the relation (1) and (2) and the reduction computes $W = (W_{y}/W_{y'})^{1/(y-y')}$. Moreover the reduction $B_{1}$ could divide $u^{\alpha^{i+1}}$ to cancel out the $G_{p_{1}}$ element inside of $W$ by computing $\gamma = W/u^{\alpha^{i+1}}$, which is an element of $G_{p_{2}p_{4}}$ with a non-trivial $G_{p_{2}}$ component. Finally the reduction $B_{1}$ outputs 1 if $e(\gamma, T) = 1_{G_{T}}$ and outputs 0 otherwise.

Now we are left to bound the term $Pr[Win_{1} \land E_{I}]$ since $Pr[Win_{1}] = Pr[Win_{1} \land E_{I}] + Pr[Win_{1} \land \neg E_{I}]$. Now we define the hybrid $Hyb_{2,i}$.

$Hyb_{2,i}$: In this game, for each $0 \leq i \leq \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil$, the commitment key $ck$ and the trapdoor key $tk = u_{n+1}^{i}$ now have a modified distribution obtained by having the challenger generate Type-i parameters before giving $ck$ to the adversary $A$. Thus $\{u_{k}\}_{k \in [2n]}$ now have a $G_{p_{2}}$ component determined by the function family $\{F_{2i}(\cdot)\}_{i=0}^{\lceil \log n + 1 \rceil}$. $u_{k} = u^{\alpha^{k}} F_{2i}(k) R_{1,k}$ for all $k \in [2n]$.

The following lemma 10.2 shows that, under the decisional subgroup assumption $DS2$, the probability that $A$’s attack reveals a semi-functional trapdoor key $tk$ of the same type as $ck$ is about the same in $Hyb_{1}$ and $Hyb_{2,0}$.

**Lemma 10.2.** Under the decisional subgroup assumption $DS2$, we have

$$|Pr[Win_{1} \land E_{I}] - Pr[Win_{2,0} \land E_{II,0}]| \leq Adv^{DS2}_{B_{2}}(\lambda)$$

**Proof.** To prove this, we first assume that there exists an adversary $A$ such that $\epsilon = |Pr[Win_{1} \land E_{I}] - Pr[Win_{II,0} \land E_{II,0}]|$ is non-negligible. We build a reduction $B_{2}$ with advantage no less than $\epsilon$ to break the decisional subgroup assumption $DS2$ successfully.

Given the tuple $(g \in G_{p_{1}}, g_{4} \in G_{p_{4}}, X_{1}X_{2}X_{3} \in G_{p_{1}p_{2}p_{3}}, T)$, the reduction $B_{2}$ uses the adversary $A$ to decide $T \in G_{p_{1}}$ or $T \in G_{p_{2}p_{3}}$. The reduction $B_{2}$ generates the commitment key $ck$ and the trapdoor key $tk$ as...
follows. It picks the random parameter \( \alpha \sim \mathbb{Z}_N \) and defines \( g_j = g^{\alpha_j} \) for each \( j \in [n] \). It chooses \( \alpha_1, r_1 \sim \mathbb{Z}_N \) and computes \( u_k = T^{\alpha k} R_{4,k} \) for each \( k \in [2n] \), where \( R_{4,k} \sim G_{p_4} \), and it chooses a random element \( R_4 \sim G_{p_4} \). Then the commitment key \( ck = (g, \{ g_j \}_{j=1}^n, \{ u_k \}_{k \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}}, R_4) \) is given to the adversary \( A \) while the reduction \( B_2 \) keeps the trapdoor \( tk = u_{n+1} \cdot R_{4,n+1} \) privately. Then \( A \) is expected to output a commitment \( C \in G, y, y' \in \mathbb{Z}_N \) and two witnesses \( W_y, W_y' \in G \) such that \( y \neq y' \) that satisfy the relation (1) and (2). Finally the reduction \( B_2 \) computes \( \hat{W} = (W_y'/W_y)^{1/(y'-y)} \), which must be of the form \( u^{n+1} g_2^r g_4^t \), and checks \( e(X_1 X_2 X_3, \hat{W}/u^{n+1}) = 1_{G_T} \). If it holds, this means that \( \hat{W} \in G_{p_1 p_4} \) and \( T \in G_{p_4} \), it outputs 1. Otherwise \( \hat{W} \in G_{p_1 p_2 p_4} \) and it outputs 0.

Now we are left to prove that \( |Pr[Win_{2,i} \land E_{II,i}] - Pr[Win_{2,i-1} \land E_{II,i-1}]| \) for all \( i \in [1, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \) is negligible. Before we prove this, we introduce the following two sub-hybrid arguments for each \( i \) such that \( \hat{W} \in G_{p_1 p_2 p_4} \) and \( T \in G_{p_4} \).

**Hyb_{2,4,i-1}**: In this game the commitment key \( ck \) and the trapdoor key \( tk = u_{n+1} \) now have a modified distribution obtained by having the challenger generate Type-i.1 parameters before given \( ck \) to the adversary \( A \). Thus the elements \( \{ u_k \}_{k \in [2n]} \) now have an additional \( G_{p_3} \) component determined by the function family \( \{ \hat{F}_2(\cdot)^{1/\log n+1} \}_{r=0} \). That is \( u_k = u^\alpha g_2^r g_3^{-r} R_{4,k} \) for all \( k \in [2n] \).

**Hyb_{2,4,i-2}**: In this game the commitment key \( ck \) and the trapdoor key \( tk = u_{n+1} \) now have a modified distribution obtained by having the challenger generate Type-i.2 parameters before giving \( ck \) to the adversary \( A \). The elements \( \{ u_k \}_{k \in [2n]} \) now have a \( G_{p_3} \) component (but no \( G_{p_3} \) component) determined by the family of functions \( \{ \hat{F}_2(\cdot)^{1/\log n+1} \}_{r=0} \). That is \( u_k = u^\alpha g_2^r g_3^{-r} R_{4,k} \) for each \( k \in [2n] \).

In the following context, the lemma 10.3 shows that for each \( i \in [1, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \), under the decisional subgroup assumption DS3, the probability that \( A \)’s attack reveals a shadow semi-functional trapdoor key \( tk \) of the same type as \( ck \) is about the same in \( Hyb_{2,4,i} \) and \( Hyb_{2,4,i-1} \). The lemma 10.4 shows that for each \( i \in [1, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \), under the decisional subgroup assumption DS4, the probability that \( A \)’s attack reveals a shadow semi-functional trapdoor key \( tk \) of the same type as \( ck \) is about the same in \( Hyb_{2,4,i-1} \) and \( Hyb_{2,4,i-2} \).

**Lemma 10.3.** Under the decisional subgroup assumption DS3, we have

\[
|Pr[Win_{2,i} \land E_{II,i}] - Pr[Win_{2,i-1} \land E_{II,i-1}]| \leq Adu_{DS3}^{\lambda}(\epsilon)
\]

**Proof.** Assume that there exists \( i \in [1, \cdots, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \) and PPT adversaries \( A \) such that \( \epsilon = |Pr[Win_{2,i} \land E_{II,i}] - Pr[Win_{2,i-1} \land E_{II,i-1}]| \) is non-negligible. We build a distinguisher \( B_3 \) with advantage at least \( \epsilon \) against the decisional subgroup assumption DS3.

Given \( (g_1 \in G_{p_1}, g_4 \in G_{p_4}, X_1 X_2 X_3 \in G_{p_1 p_2 p_3}, T) \), the reduction \( B_3 \) uses \( A \) to decide \( T \in G_{p_2} \) or \( T \in G_{p_2 p_3} \). The reduction \( B_3 \) generates the commitment key \( ck \) and the trapdoor key \( tk \) as follows: \( \alpha \sim \mathbb{Z}_N \), \( g_j = g^{\alpha_j} \) for each \( j \in [1, n] \). Choose \( r_1', \ldots, r_4', \ldots, r_4', \ldots \sim \mathbb{Z}_N \) and computes \( u_k = u^\alpha T^{r_2} g_2^{r_2} g_4^{r_4} R_{4,k} \) for each \( k \in [1, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \), \( R_{4,k} \sim G_{p_4} \), \( R_4 \sim G_{p_4} \). Then the commitment key \( ck = (g, \{ g_j \}_{j=1}^n, \{ u_k \}_{k \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}}, R_4) \) is given to the adversary \( A \) while \( B_3 \) keeps the trapdoor key \( tk = u_{n+1} \cdot R_{4,n+1} \) privately. The adversary \( A \) is expected to output the commitment \( C \in G, y, y' \in \mathbb{Z}_N \) and two witnesses \( W_y, W_y' \in G \) such that \( y \neq y' \) and which satisfy the relation. At this point, \( B_3 \) computes \( \hat{W} = (W_y'/W_y)^{1/(y'-y)} \), which must be of the form \( \hat{W} = u^{n+1} g_2^r g_3^t g_4^t \). The reduction check \( e(X_1 X_2 X_3, \hat{W}/u^{n+1}) = 1_{G_T} \). If so, it outputs 1, which means \( T \in G_{p_2} \). Otherwise it outputs 0, which means \( T \in G_{p_2 p_3} \).
Lemma 10.4. Under the decisional subgroup assumption DS4, we have
\[ |\Pr[\text{Win}_{2,i,1} \land E_{I,I,i,1}] - \Pr[\text{Win}_{2,i,2} \land E_{I,I,i,2}]| \leq \text{Adv}_{G_4}^{DS4}(\lambda) \]

Proof. Assume that there exists \( i \in [1, \lceil \log n + 1 \rceil] \) and a PPT adversary \( A \) such that \( \epsilon = |\Pr[\text{Win}_{I,I,i,1} \land E_{I,I,i,1}] - \Pr[\text{Win}_{I,I,i,2} \land E_{I,I,i,2}]| \) is non-negligible, we build a reduction \( B_4 \) with advantage at least \( \epsilon \) against the decisional subgroup assumption DS4.

Given the tuple \((g_1 \in G_{p^2}, g_4 \in G_{p^2}, X_1 X_2 X_3 \in G_{p^2 p^3}, Y_2 Y_4 \in G_{p^2 p^4}, T)\), the reduction \( B_4 \) uses the adversary \( A \) to decide if \( T \in G_{p^2 p^4} \) or \( T \in G_{p^3 p^4} \). The reduction \( B_4 \) generates the commitment key \( ck \) and the trapdoor key \( tk \) as follows: It samples \( \alpha \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Z_N \), define \( g_j = g^{\alpha^j} \) for each \( j \in [n] \). It samples \( \alpha_1', \cdots, \alpha_2', r_1', \cdots, r_2', \hat{\alpha}_1, \cdots, \hat{\alpha}_2, \hat{r}_1, \cdots, \hat{r}_2, \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Z_N \). Compute \( u_k = u^n (Y_2 Y_4)^{\sum_{j=1}^{2} \alpha_j^k} T^\sum_{j=1}^{2} r_j^k \) \( R_{4,k} \). The commitment key \( ck = (g, \{g_j\}_{j=1}^{n}, \{u_k\}_{k \in [2n]}\} \) is given to the adversary \( A \) while the reduction \( B_4 \) keeps the trapdoor key \( tk = u_{n+1} \) privately. Then the adversary \( A \) is expected to output a commitment \( C \in G \), \( y, y' \in Z_N \), \( W_g, W_{g'} \in G \) such that \( y \neq y' \) and which satisfy relations. At this point \( \tilde{W} = (W_{g'}/W_g)^{1/(y-y')} \), which must be of the form \( \tilde{W} = u^{\alpha_1^k} g_2^{r_1^k} g_3^{r_2^k} \). Finally the reduction check \( e(X_1 X_2 X_3, \tilde{W}/u_{n+1}) = 1_{G_2} \). If so, it outputs 1, which means that \( T \in G_{p^2 p^4} \). Otherwise it outputs 0, which means that \( T \in G_{p^3 p^4} \).

It is easy to see that \( \text{Hyb}_{2,i,2} \) is equivalent to \( \text{Hyb}_{2,i+1} \) by setting \( \alpha_{2i+j} = \hat{\alpha}_j \) and \( r_{2i+j} = \hat{r}_j \) for all \( j \in [2^i] \) because all \( r_j \) and all \( r_j' \) are i.i.d variables in \( \text{Hyb}_{2,i,2} \).

We conclude the proof by observe that \( \Pr[\text{Win}_{2,[\log n + 1]} \land E_{I,I,[\log n + 1]}] \leq 1/p_2 \) which is negligible. To see this, it suffices to observe that the function \( F_{2,[\log n + 1]}(\cdot) \) is a random function in the adversary’s view, as shown in the core lemma 7.1. Hence the function evaluation \( F_{2,[\log n + 1]} \) is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over \( Z_{p_2} \). This will lead to a \( 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)} \) security loss due to the left-over hash lemma. This finishes the proof.

Open Problem. Our constructions (both BE scheme and NIPE scheme) achieves tight security but it is only achieved in the selective security model. It would be interesting to strengthen it to semi-static or adaptive security. Furthermore, how to shrink the size of the public parameters and how to find a prime-order BE or NIPE with tight reduction and same parameter sizes are also interesting problems.

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References


