Paper 2016/849
Asymptotically Tight Bounds for Composing ORAM with PIR
Ittai Abraham, Christopher W. Fletcher, Kartik Nayak, Benny Pinkas, and Ling Ren
Abstract
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a trusted client to outsource storage to an untrusted server while hiding the client's memory access patterns to the server. The last three decades of research on ORAMs have reduced the bandwidth blowup of ORAM schemes from
Note: This extends our original submission with a lower bound on ORAMs using PIR and shows two attacks on C-ORAM/CHf-ORAM.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in PKC 2017
- Keywords
- Oblivious RAMPIRlower bound
- Contact author(s)
- kartik @ cs umd edu
- History
- 2017-01-17: last of 2 revisions
- 2016-09-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/849
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/849, author = {Ittai Abraham and Christopher W. Fletcher and Kartik Nayak and Benny Pinkas and Ling Ren}, title = {Asymptotically Tight Bounds for Composing {ORAM} with {PIR}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/849}, year = {2016}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/849} }