Paper 2016/828
Faster Key Recovery Attack on Round-Reduced PRINCE
Shahram Rasoolzadeh and Håvard Raddum
Abstract
We introduce a new technique for doing the key recovery part of an integral or higher order differential attack. This technique speeds up the key recovery phase significantly and can be applied to any block cipher with S-boxes. We show several properties of this technique, then apply it to PRINCE and report on the improvements in complexity from earlier integral and higher order differential attacks on this cipher. Our attacks on 4 and 6 rounds were the fastest and the winner of PRINCE Challenge's last round in the category of chosen plaintext attack.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. The Int'l Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography for Security & Privacy (LightSec 2016)
- Keywords
- PRINCELightweightBlock cipherKey recovery attackIntegralHigher-order differential.
- Contact author(s)
- shahram @ simula no
- History
- 2016-08-30: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/828
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/828,
author = {Shahram Rasoolzadeh and Håvard Raddum},
title = {Faster Key Recovery Attack on Round-Reduced {PRINCE}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/828},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/828}
}
