Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/828

Faster Key Recovery Attack on Round-Reduced PRINCE

Shahram Rasoolzadeh and Håvard Raddum

Abstract: We introduce a new technique for doing the key recovery part of an integral or higher order differential attack. This technique speeds up the key recovery phase significantly and can be applied to any block cipher with S-boxes. We show several properties of this technique, then apply it to PRINCE and report on the improvements in complexity from earlier integral and higher order differential attacks on this cipher. Our attacks on 4 and 6 rounds were the fastest and the winner of PRINCE Challenge's last round in the category of chosen plaintext attack.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / PRINCE, Lightweight, Block cipher, Key recovery attack, Integral, Higher-order differential.

Original Publication (in the same form): The Int'l Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography for Security & Privacy (LightSec 2016)

Date: received 26 Aug 2016

Contact author: shahram at simula no

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160830:211003 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/828

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