Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/805

Constant-Round Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation in the RAM Model

Carmit Hazay and Avishay Yanai

Abstract: The random-access memory (RAM) model of computation allows program constant-time memory lookup and is more applicable in practice today, covering many important algorithms. This is in contrast to the classic setting of secure 2-party computation (2PC) that mostly follows the approach for which the desired functionality must be represented as a boolean circuit. In this work we design the first constant round maliciously secure two-party protocol in the RAM model. Our starting point is the garbled RAM construction of Gentry et al. (EUROCRYPT 2014) that readily induces a constant round semi-honest two-party protocol for any RAM program assuming identity-based encryption schemes. We show how to enhance the security of their construction into the malicious setting while facing several challenges that stem due to handling the data memory. Next, we show how to apply our techniques to a more recent garbled RAM construction by Garg et al. (STOC 2015) that is based on one-way functions.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols /

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-TCC-2016

Date: received 22 Aug 2016, last revised 24 Aug 2016

Contact author: ay yanay at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160824:171430 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/805

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