Paper 2016/800

Almost-Optimally Fair Multiparty Coin-Tossing with Nearly Three-Quarters Malicious

Bar Alon and Eran Omri

Abstract

An α-fair coin-tossing protocol allows a set of mutually distrustful parties to generate a uniform bit, such that no efficient adversary can bias the output bit by more than α. Cleve [STOC 1986] has shown that if half of the parties can be corrupted, then, no r-round coin-tossing protocol is o(1/r)-fair. For over two decades the best known m-party protocols, tolerating up to corrupted parties, were only -fair. In a surprising result, Moran, Naor, and Segev [TCC 2009] constructed an -round two-party -fair coin-tossing protocol, i.e., an optimally fair protocol. Beimel, Omri, and Orlov [Crypto 2010] extended the results of Moran et al.~to the {\em multiparty setting} where strictly fewer than 2/3 of the parties are corrupted. They constructed a -fair -round -party protocol, tolerating up to corrupted parties. Recently, in a breakthrough result, Haitner and Tsfadia [STOC 2014] constructed an -fair (almost optimal) three-party coin-tossing protocol. Their work brings forth a combination of novel techniques for coping with the difficulties of constructing fair coin-tossing protocols. Still, the best coin-tossing protocols for the case where more than 2/3 of the parties may be corrupted (and even when , where ) were -fair. We construct an -fair -party coin-tossing protocol, tolerating up to corrupted parties, whenever is constant and .

Note: A few minor changes were made.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2016
Keywords
Keywords: coin-tossingcoin-flippingprotocolsfairnessfair computationdishonest majority
Contact author(s)
omrier @ gmail com
History
2016-08-24: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/800
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/800,
      author = {Bar Alon and Eran Omri},
      title = {Almost-Optimally Fair Multiparty Coin-Tossing with Nearly Three-Quarters Malicious},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/800},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/800}
}
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