Paper 2016/794
Message-recovery attacks on Feistel-based Format Preserving Encryption
Mihir Bellare, Viet Tung Hoang, and Stefano Tessaro
Abstract
We give attacks on Feistel-based format-preserving encryption (FPE) schemes that succeed in message recovery (not merely distinguishing scheme outputs from random) when the message space is small. For $4$-bit messages, the attacks fully recover the target message using $2^{21}$ examples for the FF3 NIST standard and $2^{25}$ examples for the FF1 NIST standard. The examples include only three messages per tweak, which is what makes the attacks non-trivial even though the total number of examples exceeds the size of the domain. The attacks are rigorously analyzed in a new definitional framework of message-recovery security. The attacks are easily put out of reach by increasing the number of Feistel rounds in the standards.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACM CCS 2016
- DOI
- 10.1145/2976749.2978390
- Keywords
- Format-preserving encryptionattacks
- Contact author(s)
- hviettung @ gmail com
- History
- 2017-05-24: last of 2 revisions
- 2016-08-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/794
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/794,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Viet Tung Hoang and Stefano Tessaro},
title = {Message-recovery attacks on Feistel-based Format Preserving Encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/794},
year = {2016},
doi = {10.1145/2976749.2978390},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/794}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/794}
}
