Privately Matching $k$-mers

Justin Bedő$^1$, Thomas Conway$^2$, Kim Ramchen$^1$, and Vanessa Teague$^1$

$^1$Department of Computing and Information Systems, the University of Melbourne, \{bedoj, kim.ramchen, vjteague\}@unimelb.edu.au

$^2$IBM Research Australia, tconway@au1.ibm.com

Abstract

We construct efficient protocols for several tasks related to private matching of $k$-mers (sets of $k$ length strings). These are based upon the evaluation of functionalities in the levelled homomorphic encryption scheme YASHE which supports addition and multiplication as SIMD operations. We analyse the correctness and security properties of these protocols as well their resource costs in terms of the underlying task parameters.

While personal genome sequencing projects have opened up many exciting possibilities, significant challenges are posed in reconciling the conflicting goals of broad accessibility to diverse genomic data sets and the need for privacy. Dystopic threats from unfettered access to genomic data range from genetic prescreening to government surveillance of dissidents by the amassing of individuals’ genomic profiles in rogue DNA databases [SBLK08]. While legislation is in place to protect against discrimination on genetic grounds for health insurance and employability, for example the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in the United States, in other contexts breaches of privacy are known to occur [HAHT13].

At first glance it may seem that protection of individuals’ genomic data should be similar to that of any other personally identifiable information such as social security and medicare numbers, in reality the former poses many more complex and nuanced challenges that the latter does not. The problem is two-fold: firstly genomic information can find itself exploited in myriad contexts beyond the purpose for which it was originally collected and secondly exposure of genomic information poses a much more enduring risk to the individual than other forms of identifiable material.

Considering the first issue, researchers have consistently demonstrated [SAW13, Mal06] the feasibility of linking real-world identities to the supposedly deidentified profiles present in projects such as the Personal Genome Project [PGP] and HapMap [HP]. While in this case the attacks exploited non-genomic information such as demographic attributes and familial relationships, attacks exploiting the uniqueness of genomic information also exist. Malin and Sweeney [MS00] have showed that phenotypic information (gender, hair colour
etc.) may be extracted from DNA databases such as those publically available on the internet or those compiled for clinical and research purposes, while Gymrek et al. [GMG+13] demonstrated the possibility of recovering surnames by profiling short tandem repeats on the Y chromosome and querying recreational genealogy databases. Furthermore Homer et al. [HSR+08] show how to determine an individual’s presence in a case or control group from aggregate allele frequencies such as those found in Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS). Even publishing aggregate statistics such as \( p \)-values and coefficients of determination can serve to identify DNA markers unique to an individual [WLW+09]. Evidencing the second problem, genomic information via a phenomenon called linkage disequilibrium has been used to infer SNPs\(^1\) of relatives [HAHT13] as well as predict genetic risk for disease even when the genomic region surrounding the associated transcript has been redacted [NYV09].

**Homomorphic Encryption to the Rescue**

Homomorphic encryption is a powerful new tool that promises to eliminate privacy leaks associated with the disclosure and manipulation of individuals’ genomes. The concept resembles that of computing blind-folded by enciphering data while still permitting computational operations. While initial constructions [Gen09] were prohibitively expensive, recently numerous schemes [BGV12, GHS12, LTV12, SS11, FV12, BLLN13] have come to light that promise to enable general purpose computing on encrypted information. A key feature of these schemes has been the adoption of encryption routines that permit a pre-specified number of levels of computation, called *levelled homomorphic encryption*. This design trick avoids *bootstrapping* [Gen09] a procedure which enables “refreshing” of a ciphertext to enable an unlimited number of operations, but is typically too expensive to perform frequently.

Another trend in recent years has been the construction of efficient maps supporting batch encryption of plaintext data with corresponding homomorphic single instruction multiple data (SIMD) operations. The availability of simple generic SIMD routines for computing on encrypted data promises to make homomorphic encryption an integral part of privacy preserving computing, much like the existence of such routines in hardware for parallel computing has already become the mainstay of computer graphics and high performance scientific computing communities.

**Privately Mining Genomes**

While previous works on homomorphic computation for genomic computations have typically focused on the representation of genotype as a list of deltas from a reference genome, such as one found in a variation call format (VCF) file, in this work we adopt a fundamentally different representation. The format we use is that of raw \( k \)-mers of nucleotides, i.e., all DNA subsequences of length \( k \) from a DNA sequence. This representation is particularly useful for representing short reads produced by next generation sequencing technologies and

\(^{1}\)Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms
can capture more complex structural variations than SNPs alone [BGWZ16]. The particular
tasks that we compute privately are discussed in more detail in the contributions section.

Offline/Online Computation

A particularly convenient feature of homomorphic encryption is the ability to enable trusted
computing by untrusted parties. As a particular example, a computationally weak client, such
as a smart phone, can via homomorphic encryption, securely delegate a computation to a public
cloud platform such as Microsoft Azure or Amazon AWS, which by its distributed nature,
may not necessarily be trustworthy. For our purposes, we envisage a client as a patient
who wishes to receive a diagnosis based upon a set of raw $k$-mers of their DNA provided by
a genomic sequencing service. Such a client generates a public key under a homomorphic
encryption scheme and then publishes online encryptions of all $k$-mers under this key to a
diagnostic service (provider), for example a pathology lab or hospital. The provider having
received all necessary input is then able to compute homomorphically offline and return the
result, still in encrypted form, to the patient. The patient uses their secret key to decrypt
the ciphertext, yielding the diagnosis. The provider, on the other hand, learns nothing about
either the diagnosis nor the input used to determine it.

Related Works

Prior work on Private Genomic Computation  Kim et al. [KL15] showed how to
privately compute minor allele frequencies and a chi-squared test on case and control groups
in Genome-Wide Associate Studies. Additionally they showed how to privately compute
the Hamming distance and approximate Edit distance between two encrypted genome
sequences encoded from VCF files. Cheon et al. [CKL15] showed how to compute exact edit
distance on homomorphically encrypted data. Yasuda et al. [YSK13] described a packing
method for efficiently computing multiple Hamming distance values on encrypted data.
Ayday et al. [ARM13] privately computed genetic risk for disease using the Damgård-Jurik
cryptosystem.

Prior work on Homomorphic Evaluation of Circuits  Gentry et al. [GHS12] were
the first to apply homomorphic encryption to evaluating a block cipher. In their original
implementation, they showed that the full AES circuit could be evaluated in a practical
amount of time, while subsequent optimizations have yielded substantially better results.
Since then several works have shown how to evaluate AES and other block ciphers in other
levelled homomorphic encryption schemes. Lepoint et al. [LN14] show to evaluate SIMON-
64/128 using the Fan-Vercauteren [FV12] and YASHE [BLLN13] cryptosystems, as well
as how to choose securely choose parameters for their implementations. Alperin-Sheriff
et al. [AP14] show how to circumvent evaluation of the boot-strapping circuit as a long
branching program, by replacing decryption with a simple arithmetic circuit over a large
modulus $q$. A key feature of their construction is the computation of addition over the cyclic
group $\mathbb{Z}_q$ as multiplication of $q \times q$ permutation matrices. This idea is a core concept in
the efficient homomorphic computation and comparison of Hamming weights in our third protocol.

Our Contributions

We consider several tasks related to private matching of $k$-mers using the levelled homomorphic scheme YASHE. These tasks are as follows:

- **Set Intersection with labelling** Here a patient (client) holds a set of $k$-mers $X$, while the provider (server) holds a set of $k$-mers $Y$. Associated with each $k$-mer in the provider set is a label holding diagnostic information. The problem is for the patient to learn the labels associated with the $k$-mers in the mutual intersection of the two sets.

- **Fuzzy Matching with labelling** The client holds a set of $k$-mers $X$, while the provider holds a set of $k$-mers $Y$. There is a label associated with each $k$-mer in the provider set. The problem is for the patient to learn the labels associated with the $k$-mers in the provider set which are at most some fixed Hamming distance $D$ from those $k$-mers in the patient set.

- **Minimum Matching** The client holds a $k$-mer $x$, while the server holds a set of $k$-mers $Y$. The problem is for the client to learn the $k$-mer in $Y$ with minimum Hamming distance from $x$.

For the first task, we construct simple low-depth circuits based upon adaption of protocols for private set intersection by Freedman et al. [FNP04] and Kissner and Song [KS05] respectively. The latter protocol requires only a sublinear number of client SIMD operations. For the second task we describe a novel circuit computing the underlying functionality based upon an equivalence between Hamming distance and the component-wise sum over the integers of the cyclic shifts of the xor-sum of the inputs. This circuit is low-depth (depth two in fact), and is amenable to homomorphic SIMD operations, requiring only $O(k)$ SIMD sums, differences and multiplications. For the final task we describe an efficient circuit based upon the addition of Hamming weights by permutation matrices and a binary tree search with a custom comparison operation. All of the circuits above are, via homomorphic encryption, ported to the two-party private function evaluation context. The evaluation of the corresponding circuits yields simple and efficient protocols for these functionalities which, with suitable de-randomization techniques [FNP04] can be made secure against malicious adversaries. The use of an arbitrary labelling function for the first two tasks allows significant flexibility in accommodating distinct but related tasks. For example substituting diagnostic labels with actual $k$-mers, yields protocols for private set intersection and private fuzzy matching respectively. We analyse the security and correctness properties as well as the resource consumption of these protocols when evaluated in the levelled homomorphic scheme YASHE [BLLN13].
1 Preliminaries

We first survey the necessary background to work with the levelled homomorphic scheme YASHE [BLLN13] as well as the coding theory background required to understand our second and third protocols on fuzzy matching with labelling and minimum matching.

Cryptography [BLLN13]

Let $R$ be the cyclotomic ring $\mathbb{Z}[X]/(\Phi_d(X))$ for $d$ a positive integer. The degree of $\Phi_d$ is $n = \phi(d)$, where $\phi$ is Euler’s totient function. The elements of $R$ can be uniquely represented by all polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}[X]$ of degree at most $n-1$. An arbitrary element $a \in R$ can be written as $a = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i X^i$ with $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ and we identify $a$ with its vector of coefficients $(a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{n-1})$. Thus $a$ can be viewed as an element of real vector space $\mathbb{R}^n$. The maximum norm on $\mathbb{R}^n$ is used to the measure the size of elements in $R$. The maximum norm of $a$ is defined as $|a|_\infty = \max_i |a_i|$. Let $\chi$ be a probability distribution on $R$. Assume an efficient sampler for elements of $R$ according to $\chi$ and use the notation $a \leftarrow \chi$ to denote that $a \in R$ is sampled from $\chi$. The distribution $\chi$ on $R$ is called $B$-bounded from some $B > 0$ if for all $a \leftarrow \chi$ we have $\|a\|_\infty < B$, i.e., $a$ is $B$-bounded. As an example, let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}, \sigma}$ be the discrete Gaussian over the integers with mean 0 and standard deviation $\sigma$, which assigns a probability proportional $\exp(-\pi |x|^2/\sigma^2)$ to each $x \in \mathbb{Z}$. When $d$ is a power of 2, whence $\Phi_d(X) = X^n + 1$, we can take $\chi$ to be the spherical discrete Gaussian $\chi = \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma}$ where each coefficient of the polynomial is sample according to the one-dimensional distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}, \sigma}$.

In addition to the ring $R$ we require the ring $R_q$ which is simply the set of polynomials $R$ taken modulo $q$. We denote the map that reduces an integer $x$ modulo $q$ and uniquely represents the result by an element in the interval $(-q/2, q/2]$ by $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_q$. We extend this map to polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}[X]$ and thus also to elements of $R$ by applying it to their coefficients separately, i.e., $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_q : R \leftarrow R$, $a = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i X^i \mapsto \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \lfloor a_i \rfloor_q X^i$. Furthermore we extend this notation to vectors of polynomials by applying to the entries of the vectors separately. A polynomial $f \in R$ is invertible modulo $q$ if there exists a polynomial $f^{-1} \in R$ such that $f f^{-1} = 1$, where $\hat{f}(X) = \sum_i a_i X^i$ with $a_0 = 1$ (mod $q$) and $a_j = 0$ (mod $q$) for all $j \neq 0$. In addition to the modulus $q$ that is used to reduce the coefficients of the elements that represent ciphertexts, there is a second modulus $t < q$ that determines the message space $R_t = R/tR$. Let $B_{\text{err}}$ be the bound on the support of the truncated Gaussian, $\chi_{\text{err}}$, from which noise is sampled.

Coding Theory

For two strings $x$ and $y$ over an alphabet $\Sigma$, we denote the Hamming distance of $x$ and $y$ by $\Delta_\Sigma(x, y)$. In the case that $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$, we drop the subscript and simply denote the distance by $\Delta(x, y)$. The Hamming weight of a binary string $x$ is the number of ones in $x$, or equivalently $\Delta(x, 0^n)$, we denote this quantity by $\text{Hamm-weight}(x)$. The Hamming ball of radius $D$ around a string $x$ is defined as $\{y : \Delta_\Sigma(x, y) < D\}$ and is denoted $B_\Sigma(x, D)$. For a set $X$, by abuse of notation we define $B_\Sigma(X, D) = \bigcup_{x \in X} B_\Sigma(x, D)$. 

5
Levelled Homomorphic Encryption

We recall the more practical variant of the levelled homomorphic encryption scheme YASHE \cite{blln13}.

Fix a word size \( w \). Then, an element \( x \in R \) with coefficients in \( (-q/2, q/2) \) can be written as \( \sum_{i=0}^{\ell_{w,q} - 2} [x_i]_w w^i \) where \( [x_i]_w \in (-w/2, w/2) \) and \( \ell_{w,q} = \lceil \log_w(q) \rceil + 2 \). The scheme follows.

- **ParamsGen(\( \lambda \))**: Given the security parameter \( \lambda \), fix a positive integer \( d \) that determines \( R \), moduli \( q \) and \( t \) with \( 1 \leq t < q \), and distributions \( \chi_{\text{key}}, \chi_{\text{err}} \) on \( R \). Output \((d, q, t, \chi_{\text{key}}, \chi_{\text{err}})\).
- **Keygen(\( d, q, t, \chi_{\text{key}}, \chi_{\text{err}} \))**: Sample \( f', q \leftarrow \chi_{\text{key}} \) and let \( f = [tf' + 1]_q \). If \( f \) is not invertible modulo \( q \), choose a new \( f' \). Compute the inverse \( f^{-1} \) in \( f \) modulo \( q \) and set \( h = [tgf^{-1}]_q \). Output \((pk, sk) = (h, f)\).
- **Enc(\( h, m \))**: For message \( m + tR \), sample \( s, e \leftarrow \chi_{\text{err}} \) and output ciphertext \( [q/t][m]_t + e + hs]_q \in R \).
- **Enc^*(\( h, m \))**: For message \( m + tR \), output ciphertext \( [q/t][m]_t \in R \).
- **Dec(\( f^*, c \))**: To decrypt ciphertext \( c \), compute 

  \[ \frac{t}{q} \cdot [f^*c]_q \in R \]

- **Add(c_1, c_2)**: Output \([c_1 + c_2]_q\).
- **Mult(c_1, c_2)**: Output the ciphertext \( \tilde{c}_{\text{mult}} = [(\frac{t}{q}c_1c_2]_q \)

For ciphertexts \( c_1, c_2 \in R \) that encrypt \( m_1, m_2 \in R \), the ciphertext \( \tilde{c}_{\text{mult}} \) during homomorphic multiplication satisfies \( f^2 = \tilde{c}_{\text{mult}} = \Delta[m_1m_2]_t + \tilde{v}_{\text{mult}} \mod q \), this implies that \( \tilde{c}_{\text{mult}} \) is an encryption of \([m_1m_2]_t \) under \( f^2 \).

**Batch representation** In the case that \( q \equiv 1 \pmod t \) and \( t \equiv 1 \pmod {2n} \), for prime \( t \), the Chinese remainder theorem yields 

\[
\frac{\mathbb{Z}_t[X]}{(X^n + 1)} \cong \prod_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\mathbb{Z}_t[X]}{(Q_i(X))} \pmod t
\]

where \( Q_i(X) \) are linear polynomials. This yields an efficient map which takes \( n \) elements from the right hand side and produces a single plaintext polynomial. We denote this map by CRT.

**Selecting Parameters** Let \( \lambda \) be the security parameter. Let \( q \) be the coefficient modulus, i.e., the modulus used to reduce the coefficients of ciphertexts. Let \( \chi_{\text{key}} \) be the uniform distribution of length \( 2n \) strings over \( \{-1, 0, 1\} \) and let \( \chi_{\text{err}} \) be the discrete Gaussian \( \mathcal{D}_{Z, \sigma} \) with maximal deviation from the mean \( B_{\text{err}} \), where \( B_{\text{err}} \geq \sigma \sqrt{\lambda} \). In that case the following bounds hold with \( 1 - \negl(\lambda) \) probability, (see Appendix K \cite{blln13} and the refinements in Appendix A \cite{dglb15}). In all cases let \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) be the inherent noise \cite{blln13, dglb15} associated with input ciphertexts \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) and let \( v \) be the inherent noise associated with the output \( c \) produced by the respective homomorphic operation.
• Encryption: $\|v\|_\infty < 2tn^{1/2}\delta_{err}$
• Addition: $\|v\|_\infty < \|v_1\|_\infty + \|v_2\|_\infty + t$
• Multiplication without relinearization: $\|v\|_\infty < \frac{t^2}{2}n^{3/2}(\|v_1\|_\infty + \|v_2\|_\infty)$
• Addition by plain: $\|v\|_\infty$
• Multiplication by plain: $\sqrt{\deg(p) + 1}\|v\|_\infty\|p\|_\infty$
• Negation: $\|v\|_\infty$

These bounds are used to determine correctness, while semantic security of the scheme follows from the following assumptions [Reg05, LTV12] after taking an appropriately large coefficient modulus $q$, relative to the lattice dimension $n$.

**Definition 1** (Decision-RLWE Assumption). Given security parameter $\lambda$, let $d$ and $q$ be integers depending on $\lambda$, $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(\Phi_d(X))$ and $R_q = R/qR$. Given a distribution $\chi$ over $R_q$ that depends on $\lambda$, the Decision-RLWE$_{d,q,\chi}$ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions. The first distribution consists of pairs $(a,u)$, where $a,u \leftarrow R_q$ are drawn uniformly at random from $R_q$. The second distribution consists of pairs of the form $(a,a \cdot s + e)$. The element $s \leftarrow R_q$ is drawn uniformly at random and is fixed for all samples. For each sample $a \leftarrow R_q$ is drawn uniformly at random and $e \leftarrow \chi$. The Decision-RLWE$_{d,q,\chi}$ assumption is that the Decision-RLWE$_{d,q,\chi}$ problem is hard.

**Definition 2** (Decision-SPR Assumption). For security parameter $\lambda$, let $d$ and $q$ be integers, $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(\Phi_d(X))$, $R_q = R/qR$ and $\chi$ be a distribution over $R_q$, all depending on $\lambda$. Let $t \in R_q^\times$ be invertible in $R_q$, $y_i \in R_q$ and $z_i = -y_it^{-1} \mod q$ for $i \in \{1,2\}$. The Decision-SPR$_{d,q,\chi}$ problem is to distinguish elements of the form $h = a/b$ where $a \leftarrow y_1 + t \cdot \chi_{z_1}, b \leftarrow y_2 + t \cdot \chi_{z_2}$ from uniformly random elements of $R_q$. The Decision-SPR$_{d,q,\chi}$ assumption is that the Decision-SPR$_{d,q,\chi}$ problem is hard.

## 2 Problems

We consider three tasks involving private matching of $k$-mers held by a consumer (client) and $k$-mers held by a provider (server). In all cases, the threat model we consider in the main body of our work is that of static semi-honest adversaries, while modifications to achieve security against malicious adversaries are detailed in the Appendix. We assume that the cardinalities of the client set and server set may be shared and are effectively public information. We use the notation of Hazay and Lindell [HL10] to describe the two-party ideal functionality in each scenario. For our purposes a $k$-mer is a string of length $k$ over the alphabet $\Sigma = \{A,C,G,T\}$.

**Scenario 1** The client holds a set of $k$-mers $X$, while the server holds a set of $k$-mers $Y$. Associated with each $k$-mer in the server set is a label holding diagnostic information, this provided by a labelling function $\ell(\cdot)$. The problem is for the client to learn the labels associated with the $k$-mers in common with the server set. Nothing else should be revealed by the computation, in particular the server set and associated labels not in the intersection...
must remain private. Formally we wish to compute the functionality

\[(X, (Y, \ell(\cdot))) \rightarrow (\ell(y) : y \in X \cap Y, \lambda)\]

**Scenario 2** As in Scenario 1, the client holds a set of \(k\)-mers \(X\), while the server holds a set of \(k\)-mers \(Y\). In this case, however, exact-matching is not practicable, and a tolerance for error must be allowed. We model this as matching those \(k\)-mers in the client set within Hamming distance \(D\) of the server set, over the alphabet \(\Sigma\). As in Scenario 1, there is a set of labels associated with server \(k\)-mers, and the problem is for the client to learn the labels associated with those \(k\)-mers in the server set for which a fuzzy match with the client set exists. As in Scenario 1, the server set and associated labels must remain private. Additionally we assume the threshold distance used may be provider specific and thus should also remain hidden. Formally we wish to compute the functionality

\[(X, (Y, \ell(\cdot), D)) \rightarrow (\ell(y) : y \in B_{\Sigma}(X, D), \lambda)\]

**Scenario 3** In this task, the server holds a set of \(k\)-mers \(Y\), while the client holds a single \(k\)-mer \(x\). The client wishes to compute a match between \(x\) and the server set \(Y\), however as in Scenario 2, exact matching is not possible. Therefore the problem is for the client to compute the \(k\)-mer in \(Y\) with smallest Hamming distance from \(x\). As in Scenarios 1 and 2, the server set must remain private. Formally, we wish to compute the functionality

\[(x, Y) \rightarrow (\arg \min_{y \in Y} \Delta_{\Sigma}(x, y), \lambda)\]

These functionalities are designed for the specific genomics problems described in the introduction, though the use of a generic labelling function in Scenarios 1 and 2 allows significant flexibility in accommodating distinct but related tasks. As an example, if \(\ell(\cdot)\) is taken not to be a function providing diagnostic information, but instead to be the identity function, one may compute functionalities corresponding to private intersection of \(X\) and \(Y\), and the private intersection of \(X\) and Hamming ball around \(Y\) of radius \(D\).

**Representation**

**Two-bit-base** In this representation we use exactly two bits to represent each nucleotide. Therefore each \(k\)-mer is efficiently represented as a 2\(k\)-bit string.

**Indicator variable** In this representation we use indicator variables to represent each nucleotide, yielding four orthogonal bit strings. Therefore each \(k\)-mer is efficiently represented as a 4\(k\)-bit string of Hamming weight \(k\).

The first representation leads to a concise representation of consumer/provider sets as sets of strings in \(\{0, 1\}^{2k}\). The latter is much more convenient for computing Hamming distances, in particular the weight of two xor-ed \(k\)-mers in this representation is exactly twice the corresponding Hamming distance over the alphabet \(\Sigma = \{A, C, G, T\}\).
\[ A = \begin{bmatrix} a_0, & \cdots , & a_0 \\ a_1, & \cdots , & a_1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{|X|-1}, & \cdots , & a_{|X|-1} \end{bmatrix} \quad B = \begin{bmatrix} y_1^0, & \cdots , & y_n^0 \\ y_1^1, & \cdots , & y_n^1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ y_1^{|X|-1}, & \cdots , & y_n^{|X|-1} \end{bmatrix} \]

Figure 1: Matrices \( A \) and \( B \) used to evaluate client polynomial \( P(\cdot) \) on a batch of server plaintexts \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \).

### 3 Set Intersection

In this section, we describe an efficient scheme for set intersection using batched homomorphic cryptography. We first describe a protocol for set membership, before showing how to adapt this protocol to set intersection.

The starting point for our private set intersection protocol is that described in Section 4.1 [FNP04]. In this protocol the client computes a polynomial \( P \) which vanishes on their input set. The coefficients of its polynomial, \((a_0, \ldots, a_{|X|-1})\) are sent in encrypted form to the server. The server then homomorphically computes \( \sum_{i=0}^{|X|-1} Enc(a_i) \times y^i = Enc(P(y)) \). Let \( u \) be a random scalar. Then \( Enc(P(y)) \times u + Enc(y) \) is an encryption of \( y \) if \( y \) is an element of \( X \), otherwise a uniformly distributed element \( y' \) otherwise. Our challenges are two-fold, firstly we need to transform this protocol into one which operates on batches of set elements, and secondly we have to accommodate the transference of labels as described in Scenario 1, Section 2.

The first problem we solve as follows. Given the matrices \( A \) and \( B \) described in Figure 1, the homomorphic row sum of the component wise product \( A \circ B \) results in an encryption of the vector \( P(y_1), \ldots, P(y_n) \) for a chunk of \( n \) elements \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \in Y \). On the other hand, this product is readily computed by SIMD multiplication of the corresponding rows of \( A \) and \( B \) followed by \(|X|\) many SIMD sums. By looping over distinct chunks of \( n \) elements of \( Y \) at a time, we can efficiently determine membership in \( X \) of every element in \( Y \). To solve the second problem, one may conveniently transfer a label \( \ell \) rather than \( k \)-mer \( y \), by computing \( Enc(P(y)) \times u + \ell \), where \( \ell \) is contained in \( 2k \) bits and is therefore more than ample for this problem. The SIMD form of this scales the vector of evaluations \( (P(y_i)) \) with a vector of randomizers followed by a translation by the vector of corresponding labels.

**Protocol Description – Scenario 1**

Using the two-bits-per base representation, we may assume that all \( k \)-mers can be embedded into a plaintext modulus, \( t \), greater than \( 2^{2k} \). All algebraic operations take place modulo \( t \).

The client begins by encoding their set as a polynomial \( P \) of degree \(|X|\) with coefficients \( a_0, \ldots, a_{|X|-1} \). The client then generates a sequence of ciphertexts \( ct_1, \ldots, ct_{|X|} \) where the \( i^{th} \) ciphertext is a batch encryption of \((a_{i-1}, \ldots, a_{i-1})\). These ciphertexts are sent to the server.
The server then splits their private set into a sequence of batches 1,\ldots, I. For the $i^{th}$ batch, $y(i-n)+1, \ldots, y_{in}$, the server generates plaintext polynomials $(p_i^{(j)})_{j \in \|X\|}$ where $p_i^{(j)}$ encodes the sequence $y_{i-n+1}^{j-1}, \ldots, y_{in}^{j-1}$, i.e., $(j-1)^{th}$ powers of k-mers in that batch. It also prepares a label vector $P_i$ corresponding to the labels of k-mers in this batch, as well as a randomizer vector $q_i$.

For each $i$, the server computes $\sum_{j=1}^{\|X\|} ct_i \bowtie p_i^{(j)}$, which due to the SIMD properties of encryption is equivalent to evaluating the client polynomial on this batch of k-mers. This ciphertext is finally blinded with $p_i$ and translated by $q_i$.

### Set Intersection with Labelling I

#### procedure Set-Intersection-I($X, Y, \ell(\cdot)$)

$P_1, P_2 : I \leftarrow \frac{|Y|}{n}, t \leftarrow p_{\geq 2^{2k}}$

**$P_1$**:
- Enumerate $X$ as $\{x_1, \ldots, x_{|X|}\}$
- Construct $P(\cdot) = \sum_{i=0}^{|X|-1} a_i x^i$ such that $P(x_i) = 0$ for $i = 1, \ldots, |X|$.

  for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $|X|$ do
    $ct'_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(a_{i-1}, \ldots, a_{i-1}), pk)$
  end for

  Send $(ct'_1, \ldots, ct'_{|X|})$.

**$P_2$**:
- Enumerate $Y$ as $\{y_1, \ldots, y_{|Y|}\}$

  for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $I$ do
    for $j \leftarrow 1$ to $|X|$ do
      $p_i^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{CRT}(y_{i-n+1}^{j-1}, \ldots, y_{in}^{j-1})$
    end for
    Pick $u_{i1}, \ldots, u_{in} \in_R \mathbb{Z}_t$
    $p_i \leftarrow \text{CRT}(u_{i1}, \ldots, u_{in})$
    $q_i \leftarrow \text{CRT}(\ell(y_{i-1}^{n+1}), \ldots, \ell(y_{in}))$
    $ct_i \leftarrow (\sum_{j=1}^{\|X\|} ct'_i \bowtie p_i^{(j)}) \bowtie p_i + q_i$
  end for

  Send $(ct_1, \ldots, ct_I)$.

end procedure

### Correctness and Security

**Lemma 1.** The protocol Set-Intersection-I correctly computes set intersection with labelling if $8 \cdot |X| \cdot 2^{6k+3} \cdot n^{3/2} \cdot B_{err} < q$ except with $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ probability.
Proof. Let $n_{\text{fresh}}$ be the noise in a fresh ciphertext. We have that $ct_i$ is computed as a sum of $|X|$ terms, each with noise $n_{\text{fresh}} \cdot t \cdot n^{1/2}$, yielding noise $|X| \cdot n_{\text{fresh}} \cdot t \cdot n^{1/2}$. This term then incurs a final multiplicative factor of $t \cdot n^{1/2}$, yielding total noise $4 \cdot |X| \cdot t^3 \cdot n^{3/2} \cdot B_{\text{err}}$. This term is bounded by $\frac{q}{2}$ (minus a small term we may safely ignore), yielding the result.

Lemma 2. The protocol \textit{Set-Intersection-I} achieves security against statically chosen semi-honest adversaries if the Decision-LWE$_{2n,q,\chi}$ and Decision-SPR$_{2n,q,\chi}$ assumptions hold.

Proof. Simulator $S$ proceeds as follows. Generate $|X|$ random ciphertexts and forwards them to $P_2$. On receipt of the ciphertexts by $P_2$, $S$ generates $|Y|$ random ciphertexts and forwards them to $P_1$. By a hybrid argument for any PPT adversary $A$ with advantage $\epsilon$ distinguishing the real protocol from the simulation, we can construct a PPT adversary $A'$ with advantage at least $\epsilon \cdot |X| + |Y|/n$ in breaking either the Decision-LWE$_{2n,q,\chi}$ assumption or the Decision-SPR$_{2n,q,\chi}$ assumption. Since $|X|$ and $|Y|$ are constants, the claim follows.

In Appendix A we describe a private set intersection scheme with quasi-linear complexity based upon the multi-round protocol of Kissner and Song [KS05].

4 Fuzzy Matching

In this section, we describe an efficient scheme for matching the set of $k$-mers submitted by a patient to that of a reference set provided by the lab when exact matching is not possible.

The difficulty in solving this problem is that a naive solution based upon homomorphic evaluation of the binary circuit computing fuzzy matching does not necessarily yield a very efficient solution when translated to homomorphic computation. To see this, observe that computing the Hamming distance between two $4^k$-bit strings requires $O(\log k)$ depth as a binary circuit. Not only does this incur logarithmic overhead in homomorphic operations but the circuit is not very amenable to SIMD arithmetic operations. To solve this problem we consider augmenting a ciphertext corresponding to a set element $x$ with encryptions of every possible cyclic shift of $x$. A similar expansion was previously used [GG05, BMN+09] in the context of cryptographic counters for preferential voting. Given this expanded list, computing the Hamming distance homomorphically is possible using the observation $\sum_{j=1}^{4k} (x^{(j)} \oplus y^{(j)}) = \Delta(x, y)^{4k}$, where $x^{(j)}$ and $y^{(j)}$ correspond to $x$ and $y$ cyclically shifted $j$ positions respectively i.e., the component-wise sum over the integers of all cyclic shifts of $x$ and $y$ xor-ed yields a vector containing $4k$ copies of $\Delta(x, y)$. Recall from Section 2, that $x$ and $y$ are in indicator variable format, thus the binary Hamming distance $\Delta(x, y)$ is twice the corresponding distance over the alphabet $\Sigma = \{A, C, G, T\}$. It follows that $\text{Enc}(\sum_{j=1}^{4k} (x^{(j)} \oplus y^{(j)})) - \text{Enc}(0, 2, \ldots, 2(D-1), 0,\ldots, 0)$ is a ciphertext containing a zero iff $\Delta_\Sigma(x, y) < D$, thus one can transfer a label $\ell_y$ corresponding to $y$ using the “affine” trick on the ciphertext, described in the previous section. By batch encrypting cyclic shifts of elements of $X$ and homomorphically summing against the corresponding cyclic shifts of an element $y$ we get an efficient fuzzy membership protocol for $y$. Iterating over every element in the server set thus yields an efficient fuzzy matching protocol. One wrinkle we
have ignored in this description is what happens when a label \( \ell_y \) does not fit in base field provided by the plaintext modulus, which is typically small and therefore likely inadequate for embedding of meaningful labels. We solve this problem by replacing the comparison vector with \((0, 2, \ldots, 2(D - 1), 0, 2, \ldots)\), i.e., repeating the target distance set sequentially until all slots in the target ciphertext are filled. This enables us to cram \( \frac{n}{D} \) zeroes into the differenced ciphertext, thus with appropriate dissection of labels to fit individual slots – and assuming \( n \) greater than \( k^2 \), one can transfer a label of at least \( k \) bits.

### Protocol Description – Scenario 2

Using indicator variable format, we may assume that all \( k \)-mers are represented by strings of \( 4k \) bits. To compute Hamming weights/distances in this representation we require a plaintext modulus counting even values up to and including \( 2^k \).

The client first splits their \( k \)-mer set into a sequence of batches \( 1, \ldots, I \). Let \( n' = \frac{n}{4k} \). The \( i^{th} \) batch of \( k \)-mers \( x_{(i-1)n'+1}, \ldots, x_{in'} \) is encoded as a ciphertext \( \text{ct}_i^{(1)} \) as well as all the sequences of \( k \)-mers shifted \( j \) positions, \( x_{(i-1)n'+1}^{(j)}, \ldots, x_{in'+1}^{(j)} : j \in [4k] \), which are encoded in \( \text{ct}_i^{(2)}, \ldots, \text{ct}_i^{(4k)} \). These ciphertexts are sent to the server.

For each \( k \)-mer \( y \) in their set, the server will perform the following operations. The server generates palintext polynomials \((p_y^{(j)})_{j \in [4k]}\) encoding the \( j^{th} \) shift of \( y \) duplicated \( n' \) times. The server generates a target vector containing the set of possible Hamming distances \( \{0, 2, \ldots, 2(D - 1)\} \) duplicated to fill up all \( n \) slots in the ciphertext. The server generates label vector \( \ell_y \) and randomizer vector \( p_i \).

For the \( i^{th} \) batch of received ciphertexts, the server computes \( \sum_{j=1}^{4k} (\text{ct}_i^{(j)} - p_y^{(j)})^2 \) this computes a vector containing \( \Delta(x_{(i-1)n'+1}, y)^{4k} \| \ldots \| \Delta(x_{in'+1}, y)^{4k} \). The target vector is subtracted and the result then blinded with \( p_i \) and then as usual, translated by \( p_\ell_y \).

### Fuzzy Matching with Labelling

```plaintext
procedure Fuzzy-Matching(X, Y, \ell(\cdot), D)
    P_2 : Enumerate Y as \( \{y_1, \ldots, y_{|Y|}\} \)
    for i ← 1 to |Y| do
        P_2 : Fuzzy-Membership(X, y_i, \ell(y_i), D)
    end for
end procedure
```

One can transfer a matching \( k \)-mer of \( \theta(k) \) bits directly by replacing the plaintext modulus with a prime greater than \( 2^{\theta(k)/4} \) and taking \( \ell(\cdot) \) to be the identity function.

In addition to transferring matching \( k \)-mers rather than labels, it is also possible to solve the problem when the target distances are taken from an arbitrary set \( S \) rather than a threshold set. The solution is no more expensive than the threshold case and involves
procedure Fuzzy-Membership($X, y, \ell, D \in [k + 1]$)

\[ P_1, P_2 : n' \leftarrow \frac{n}{4k}, I \leftarrow \frac{|X|}{n'}, t \sim 2n \log 2n \]

\[ P_1 : \]

Enumerate $X$ as $\{x_1, \ldots, x_{|X|}\}$

for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $I$ do

for $j \leftarrow 1$ to $4k$ do

$ct_i^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(x_{(i-1)n'+1}^{(j)} \parallel \cdots x_{in'}^{(j)}), pk)$

end for

Send $(ct_i^{(1)}, \ldots, ct_i^{(4k)})$.

end for

\[ P_2 : \]

for $j \leftarrow 1$ to $4k$ do

$ct_y^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{Enc}^*(\text{CRT}(y^{(j)} \parallel \cdots y^{(j)}), pk)$

end for

$ct_{tgt} \leftarrow \text{Enc}^*(\text{CRT}(0, \ldots, 2(D - 1), 0, \ldots, 2(D - 1), \ldots, 0, \ldots, 2(D - 1), 0, 2, \ldots), pk)$

Write $\ell_y = \ell_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel \ell_v$ where $v = \left\lfloor \frac{4k}{D} \right\rfloor$

$ct_{\ell_y} \leftarrow \text{Enc}^*(\text{CRT}(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_v, \ldots, \ell_v, 0, \ldots, 0 \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_v, \ldots, \ell_v, 0, \ldots, 0), pk)$

for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $I$ do

Pick $u_i, \ldots, u_{in} \in R \mathbb{Z}_\ell$

$p_i \leftarrow \text{CRT}(u_i, \ldots, u_{in})$

$ct_i \leftarrow (\sum_{j=1}^{4k} (ct_i^{(j)} - ct_y^{(j)})^2 - ct_{tgt}) \times p_i + ct_{\ell_y}$

end for

Send $(ct_1, \ldots, ct_I)$.

end procedure
replacing the target plaintext with the set $2 \cdot S$ as a vector, repeated sequentially to fill all slots.

**Correctness and Security**

**Lemma 3.** The protocol Fuzzy-Matching for fuzzy matching with labelling is correct if $2^{11} \cdot k \cdot n^{13/2} \cdot \log^4 n \cdot B_{err} < q$ except with $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ probability.

**Proof.** We have that $c_t$ is computed as the sum of $4^k$ terms, where each term has noise exactly equivalent to the product of two freshly encrypted ciphertexts (the subtractions by cleartext terms leave the noise unchanged). Considering the noise contribution in each product, the noise in this sum is thus $4^k \cdot (2 \cdot n^{3/2} \cdot t^2 \cdot n_{\text{fresh}})$. Considering the multiplication by randomiser $p_t$, this term incurs a final multiplicative factor of $t \cdot n^{1/2}$. In all, we have that $16 \cdot k \cdot n^{5/2} \cdot t^4 \cdot B_{err}$ should be bounded by $\frac{q}{2}$. Finally, the Prime Number Theorem implies that $t \sim 2n \log 2n$ to achieve $t \equiv 1 \mod 2n$, completing the proof.

**Lemma 4.** The protocol Fuzzy-Matching achieves security against statically chosen semi-honest adversaries if the Decision-LWE_{2n,q,\chi} and Decision-SPR_{2n,q,\chi} assumptions hold.

**Proof.** Simulator $S$ proceeds as follows. Generate $\frac{16k^2|X|}{n}$ random ciphertexts and forwards them to $P_2$. On receipt of the ciphertexts by $P_2$, $S$ generates $\frac{4k|Y|}{n}$ random ciphertexts and forwards them to $P_1$. By a hybrid argument for any PPT adversary $A$ with advantage $\epsilon$ distinguishing the real protocol from the simulation, we can construct a PPT adversary $A'$ with advantage at least $\frac{\epsilon}{16k^2|X|/n + 4k|Y|/n}$ in breaking either the Decision-LWE_{2n,q,\chi} assumption or the Decision-SPR_{2n,q,\chi} assumption. Since $|X|$ and $|Y|$ are constants, the claim follows.

## 5 Minimum Matching

One possible approach to solving this problem is to modify the protocol for fuzzy matching in the previous section to transfer $k$-mers from the provider set, rather than their labels (this is readily achieved by the remarks in the bottom paragraph of the preceding section). One then iterates this protocol with increasing threshold distance, until a match is found. Although this approach has the advantage of following from our protocol, or indeed any other protocol for private fuzzy matching, it does not meet our goal of low overall round complexity corresponding to the online/offline paradigm described in the introduction. Consequently we abandon it in favor of other approaches.

For our second attempt, we observe that finding a minimum match is equivalent to computing Hamming weights of xor-ed client/provider $k$-mers, and then comparing these weights until a minimum is found. Unfortunately it is far from clear either a) how to compute these weights b) how to compare them in encrypted form. For the second problem, we turn to encoding integer weights as indicator vectors. The advantage of this representation is that it allows comparison to be computed homomorphically in constant depth rather than
the linear depth that would be required by such comparison on binary strings. Specifically, given indicator vectors \( W_1, W_2 \) encoding integer weights \( w_1, w_2 \) in the interval \([0, 2k + 1]\), one first enumerates all pairs \((W_1[i], W_2[j])\) where \( i \) and \( j \) are indices in \([2k + 1]\) and where \( i > j \). It can be seen that the sum \( \Sigma_{i>j} W_1[i] \cdot W_2[j] \), evaluates the function \( w_1 > w_2 \), i.e., the comparison operation.

With this format, let’s see how the approach of Alperin-Sherrif et al. \([AP14]\) for computing addition by rotation matrices can be adapted to solve the first problem of determining Hamming weights of the xor-ed \( k \)-mers. Let the bits of the client \( k \)-mer be \( b_1, \ldots, b_{4k} \). In that case, the client can send permutation matrices \((P_{j,b_j}, P_{j,b_j^*})\) corresponding to \( msk + 1 \). The list of encrypted weights corresponding to each chunk is sent to the server. For each \( k \)-mer \( y \), the server splits it into chunks \( y^{(1)}, \ldots, y^{(O(\sqrt{k}))} \) and searches pair-wise \( x \oplus y \) by retrieving the weight corresponding to \( x^{(j)} \) xor-ed with \( y^{(j)} \) for each \( j \) and summing these weights using the usual expand-and-multiply procedure. This entails multiplying only \( O(\sqrt{k}) \) permutation matrices, thus the noise is reduced to \( O(\sqrt{k}) \) aggregate multiplications.

### Protocol Description – Scenario 3

The client begins by splitting their query \( k \)-mer into \( M = \sqrt{4k} \) chunks, \( x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(M)} \) each of \( \frac{4k}{M} \) bits. Now for every possible provider mask of \( M \) bits, \( msk \), the client computes the Hamming weight of \( x^{(j)} \oplus msk \) and stores the result as an encrypted indicator vector of length \( M + 1 \). The list of encrypted weights corresponding to each chunk is sent to the server.

The server, for every \( k \)-mer \( y_i \) in their set, retrieves the encrypted indicator vectors corresponding to \( msk_1 = y_i^{(1)}, \ldots, msk_M = y_i^{(M)} \). These vectors are expanded into rotation matrices \( P_1, \ldots, P_M \) of dimension \( 2k + 1 \). The product of these matrices yields a single rotation matrix \( P_i \) corresponding to the Hamming weight of \( y_i \oplus x \). The first column, of this matrix, \( W_1 \) contains this weight in indicator vector format. Associated to this vector is the encryption of the corresponding \( k \)-mer, encrypted in batch format for efficiency, which we denote \( ct_i \).

To find the minimum match we need a comparison function between different weight vectors. For inputs \( W \) and \( W' \) this is effected by summing over the products \( W[a] \cdot W'[b] : a > b, a, b \in \{0, 2, \ldots, 2k\} \).

Given this homomorphic comparison function, finding the minimum match is possible simply by imposing a binary tree on the array of pairs \((ct_i, W_i)\) and searching pair-wise
from leaves to root using this procedure. This entails an overhead of $\log_2 |Y|$ aggregate multiplication operations.

**Minimum Matching**

```plaintext
procedure EXPAND($W, 2k + 1$) 

$$P \leftarrow \begin{bmatrix} W^T & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\ 0 & W^T & \ldots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \ldots & W^T \end{bmatrix}^{2k+1}$$

end procedure
```

In general one can efficiently tradeoff space/time by changing the number of chunks $M$ to $(4k)^c$ for a constant $0 < c < 1$. A larger value of $c$ requires a larger data transfer but results in less time to find the match and accommodates an encryption scheme with lower noise tolerance.

**Correctness and Security**

**Lemma 5.** Take $M = (4k)^c$. The protocol Minimum-Matching correctly computes minimum matching if $8 \cdot (4k)^{(1-c)(4k)^c} \cdot (k + 1)^{2 \log_2 |Y|} \cdot (4 \cdot n^{3/2})^{(4k)^c} + 2 \log_2 |Y| + 1 \cdot B_{err} < q$ except with $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ probability.

**Proof.** We analyze the cumulative noise in the weight vector $W_1$, associated to the minimum matching ciphertext $ct_1$, in two phases. In the first phase we compute the noise incurred by multiplying the $M$ rotation matrices (recall that $W_1$ is taken as the first column of $P_1$). In the second phase, we compute the additional noise on $W_1$ incurred by the tree search. Let $n_t$ be the maximum noise in any ciphertext in the partial product $P_t =: \prod_{j=1}^l P_{t_j}$. Since $P_{t+1}$ is computed as the dot product of up to $\frac{4k}{M}$ ciphertexts of noise level $n_t$ and $\frac{4k}{M}$ ciphertexts of noise level $n_{\text{fresh}}$, we have that $n_{t+1} = a \cdot (n_t + n_{\text{fresh}})$ where $a = \frac{4k}{M} \cdot n^{3/2} \cdot t^2$. Solving this recurrence yields $n_M = a^{M-1} \cdot n_t + \sum_{l=1}^{M-1} a^l \cdot n_{\text{fresh}}$. As $n_t = n_{\text{fresh}}$, we have $n_M < 2 \cdot a^M \cdot n_{\text{fresh}}$. For the second phase, we let $n'_h$ be the maximum noise in any ciphertext in $W_1$ at level $h$ of the search tree. We have that $W_1$ at level $h$ is computed as the sum of $(k + 1)^2$ sums of products of noise level $n'_{h-1} \cdot (n^{3/2} \cdot t^2)^2$ (i.e., each sum is a product of two ciphertexts of noise level $n'_{h-1}$). Thus $n'_{\log_2 |Y| - 1} = ((k + 1) \cdot (n^{3/2} \cdot t^2)^{2 \log_2 |Y|} \cdot n'_0$. Taking $n'_0 = n_M$, yields $n'_{\log_2 |Y| - 1} < (k + 1)^2 \log_2 |Y| \cdot (4 \cdot n^{3/2})^{2 \log_2 |Y|} \cdot 2 \cdot (4 \cdot (4k)^{1-c} \cdot n^{3/2})^{(4k)^c} \cdot 2 \cdot (4 \cdot n^{1/2} \cdot B_{err} < q$, yielding the result.

**Lemma 6.** The protocol Minimum-Matching achieves security against statically chosen semi-honest adversaries if the Decision-LWE_{2n,q,\chi} and Decision-SPR_{2n,q,\chi} assumptions hold.
procedure Minimum-Matching\((x, Y)\)

\(P_1, P_2 \colon M \leftarrow \sqrt{4k}, t \leftarrow 2\)

\(P_1:\)

Write \(x = x^{(1)} \| \ldots \| x^{(M)}\) with \(|x^{(j)}| = \frac{4k}{M}\)

for \(j \leftarrow 1\) to \(M\) do

for \(msk \in \{0, 1\}^\frac{4k}{M}\) do

\(I \leftarrow \mathbb{1}_{\text{Hamm-weight}(x^{(j)} \oplus msk)}\)

\(W_{j, msk} \leftarrow (\text{Enc}(I[0], pk), \ldots, \text{Enc}(I[4k], pk))\)

end for

end for

Send \((W_{j, msk})_{j \in 1+ [M], msk \in \{0, 1\}^\frac{4k}{M}}\).

\(P_2:\)

Enumerate \(Y\) as \(\{y_1, \ldots, y_{|Y|}\}\)

for \(i \leftarrow 1\) to \(|Y|\) do

Write \(y_i = y_i^{(1)} \| \ldots \| y_i^{(M)}\)

for \(j \leftarrow 1\) to \(M\) do

\(P_{ij} \leftarrow \text{EXPAND}(W_{j, y_i^{(j)}}, 2k + 1)\)

end for

\(P_i \leftarrow \prod_{j=1}^{M} P_{ij}\)

\(W_i \leftarrow P_i[1]\)

\(ct_i \leftarrow \text{Enc(CRT}(y_i[1], \ldots, y_i[4k]), pk)\)

end for

\(N \leftarrow \frac{|Y|}{2}\)

for \(h \leftarrow 0\) to \(\log_2 \frac{|Y|}{2} - 1\) do

for \(i \leftarrow 1\) to \(N\) do

\(ct_{(<)} \leftarrow \sum_{(a,b) : b > a} W_i[a] \cdot W_{i+2^h}[b]\)

\(ct_i \leftarrow ct_{i+2^h} + ct_{(<)} \cdot (ct_i - ct_{i+2^h})\)

\(W_i \leftarrow W_{i+2^h} + ct_{(<)} \cdot (W_i - W_{i+2^h})\)

\(N \leftarrow \frac{N}{2}\)

end for

end for

Send \(ct_1\).

end procedure
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Encryption cost</th>
<th>Evaluation cost</th>
<th>Transfer size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Set Intersection with labelling I</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>\alpha$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set Intersection with labelling II</td>
<td>$\frac{4k</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>\alpha}{n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuzzy Matching with labelling</td>
<td>$\frac{16k^2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>\alpha}{n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Matching</td>
<td>$(4k)^c \cdot 2^{(4k)^{1-c}}\alpha$</td>
<td>$k^2(</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Time and space costs for the three protocols for fixed parameters $t, n$ and $q$. Labels assumed to be $\theta(k)$ bits.

**Proof.** Simulator $S$ proceeds as follows. Generate $(4k)^{1/2} \cdot 2^{(4k)^{1/2}}$ random ciphertexts and forwards them to $P_2$. On receipt of the ciphertexts by $P_2$, $S$ generates $O(1)$ random ciphertexts and forwards them to $P_1$. By a hybrid argument for any PPT adversary $A$ with advantage $\epsilon$ distinguishing the real protocol from the simulation, we can construct a PPT adversary $A'$ with advantage at least $\epsilon \frac{(4k)^{1/2} \cdot 2^{(4k)^{1/2}} + O(1)}{(4k)^{1/2} \cdot 2^{(4k)^{1/2}}}$ in breaking either the Decision-LWE$_{2n,q,\chi}$ assumption or the Decision-SPR$_{2n,q,\chi}$ assumption. Since $k$ is a constant, the claim follows. 

## 6 Performance

In this section, we evaluate the theoretical resource costs of the protocols described in the previous three sections. Since key generation and decryption are one-time procedures and substantially less expensive than homomorphic evaluation, we omit them from our analysis. We also omit composition by CRT from our analysis because it can performed independently of encryption. We note that Lemmas 1, 3 and 5 enable selection of suitable parameters to guarantee correctness of the protocols with all but negligible probability for corresponding input sizes, while our analysis assumes a fixed set of such parameters.

**Comparison of Protocols**

Table 1 shows the time measured in aggregate atomic homomorphic operations and space measured in number of ciphertexts. For encryption parameters $t, n$ and $q$ let $\alpha_{(t,n,q)}, \beta_{(t,n,q)}, \gamma_{(t,n,q)}$ and $\delta_{(t,n,q)}$ be the time taken for encryption, ciphertext addition, ciphertext multiplication by a plaintext polynomial and ciphertext multiplication without relinearization respectively. Let $\sigma_{(t,n,q)}$ be the associated ciphertext size.
References


Frank Stajano, Lucia Bianchi, Pietro Liò, and Douwe Korff. Forensic genomics: Kin privacy, driftnets and other open questions. In *Proceedings of the 7th ACM...*
According to the protocol described by Kissner and Song [KS05], let $s$ be the maximum of $|X|$ and $|Y|$. In this protocol, the client and server proceed by constructing polynomials $\alpha$ and $\beta$ which vanish on their respective input sets. The coefficients of these polynomials are encrypted under a threshold cryptosystem with an additive homomorphism. Additionally, the client and server generate random polynomials $\mu$ and $\nu$ of degree $s$. Using the additive homomorphism, the client and server compute the polynomial $q = \alpha \cdot \mu + \beta \cdot \nu$. Both players then decrypt to recover $q$. Lemma 2 [KS05] establishes that $q = \gcd(\alpha, \beta) \cdot u$ where $u$ is a random polynomial of degree $m$ with overwhelming probability. Thus both parties learn the zeroes in common of their polynomials, i.e., the intersection of their sets – and nothing else.

Starting with this framework, we construct a non-interactive private set intersection scheme with quasilinear complexity as follows. First, the client encodes the coefficients of the polynomial $\alpha$ as individual ciphertexts. The list is padded with dummy encryptions of zero to form an array of length $2s$. They send this list to the server. The server then chooses random polynomials $\mu$ and $\nu$ of degree $s$ and computes the product polynomials $\alpha \cdot \mu$ and $\beta \cdot \nu$. Crucially, this step can be performed in sub-quadratic time, for example using a fast number-theoretic transform. These products, still in coefficient form, are then homomorphically added, yielding their sum $\alpha \cdot \mu + \beta \cdot \nu$, which is then returned to the client.
Having adapted [KS05] to the non-interactive case, our solution to the problem of transferring labels uses a bit-by-bit approach. Let \( k' \) be the maximum length of diagnostic labels. The client uses their private set \( X \) to generate the expanded set \( X^* = \{x|i||0, x||i||1 : x \in X, i \in [k'] \} \). The server on the other hand generates the set \( Y^* = \{y||i||\ell(y) : y \in Y, i \in [k'] \} \). Given the intersection of the sets \( X^* \) and \( Y^* \), the client can reconstruct the \( k \)-mers in common and their corresponding labels, by extracting the latter one bit at a time. The overhead to the original protocol is only a multiplicative factor \( k' \).

**Batching** Noting that all operations described so far are linear, we may efficiently batch this protocol as follows. The client splits their expanded set \( X^* \) into \( n \) equal size sets, constructing interpolating polynomials for each sets. These polynomials, say \( \alpha^{(1)}, \ldots, \alpha^{(n)} \) are stored in batch co-efficient representation in \( \frac{|X^*|}{n} \) ciphertexts. The server generates corresponding random polynomials \( \mu^{(1)}, \ldots, \mu^{(n)} \) and \( \nu^{(1)}, \ldots, \nu^{(n)} \). The server then computes \( \alpha^{(j)} \mu^{(j)} + \beta \nu^{(j)} \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, n \). In this way the client obtains \( (\gcd(\alpha^{(j)}, \beta)) \), thus deducing the total intersection as a union of \( n \) smaller intersections.

**Protocol Description – Scenario 1**

The client and server begin by constructing their expanded sets \( X^* \) and \( Y^* \). Let \( I = \frac{|X^*|}{n} \). The server splits \( X^* \) into \( n \) batches, constructing the polynomials \( \alpha^{(j)} = \sum_{i=0}^{I-1} a_i^{(j)} x^i \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, n \). These polynomials are encrypted in batch form in \( I \) ciphertexts. The server then constructs \( \beta \) for their expanded set \( |Y^*| \), as well as random polynomials \( \mu^{(j)} \) and \( \nu^{(j)} \) of degree \( s = \max\{ \frac{|X^*|}{n}, |Y^*| \} \). The client sends the encrypted coefficients of their polynomials to the server. The server uses a fast number theoretic transform to homomorphically compute \( \alpha^{(j)} \mu^{(j)} \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, n \) in a quasilinear number of homomorphic SIMD operations. The server also encrypts the individual coefficients of the polynomials \( (\beta \nu^{(j)}))_{j=1}^{n} \) as an array of ciphertexts. In linear time they batch homomorphically add the polynomials \( \alpha^{(j)} \mu^{(j)} \) and \( \beta \nu^{(j)} \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, n \) together and return the resulting encrypted coefficients of the polynomials to the client.

For the fast polynomial multiplication step, we use a modified form of the in-place, bottom-up version of the Fast Fourier Transform described on page 436, Chapter 12 [Sto02]. In the bit-reversal phase of the modified algorithm, we will use \( t^R \) to denote the integer corresponding to the reversed bit representation of index \( i \in [2s] \).

**Set Intersection with Labelling II**

**Correctness and Security**

**Lemma 7.** Let \( k' = \max_{y \in Y} |\ell(y)| \). The protocol Set-Intersection-II for set intersection with labelling is correct if \( 4 \cdot 2^{2k + \log_2 k' + 1}(2 \log_2 (k|X|) + 5) \cdot n^{\log_2 (k|X|) + 2} \cdot B_{err} < q \) except with \( \text{negl}(\lambda) \) probability.
procedure Set-Intersection($X, Y, \ell(\cdot)$)

$P_1, P_2 : k' = \max_{y \in Y} |\ell(y)|, s \leftarrow \max\{\lfloor \frac{|X^*|}{n}, |Y^*| \rfloor\}, t \leftarrow p_{\geq 2^{k+\log_2 k'+1}} : t \equiv 1 \mod 2s$

$P_1 :$

- Let $X^* = \bigcup_{x \in X, i \in [k'], b \in \{0, 1\}} x^i b$
- Enumerate $X^*$ as \{\(x_1, \ldots, x_{|X^*|}\)}

for $j \leftarrow 1$ to $n$

\[I \leftarrow \frac{|X^*|}{n}\]

Construct $\alpha^{(j)} = \sum_{i=0}^{l-1} a_i^{(j)} x^i$ such that $\alpha^{(j)}(x_i) = 0$ for $l = 1, \ldots, I$.

end for

$A \leftarrow (\text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(a_0^{(1)}, \ldots, a_0^{(n)}), pk), \ldots, \text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(a_j^{(1)}, \ldots, a_j^{(n)}), pk), \ldots, \text{Enc}^*(0, pk), \ldots, \text{Enc}^*(0, pk))$

Send $A$.

$P_2 :$

- Let $Y^* = \bigcup_{y \in Y, i \in [k'], b \in \{0, 1\}} y^i b \ell(y)_i$
- Enumerate $Y^*$ as \{\(y_1, \ldots, y_{|Y^*|}\)}

Choose $w \in \mathbb{Z}_t^*$ such that $\text{ord}_t(w) = 2s$

Construct $\beta = \sum_{i=0}^{|Y^*| - 1} b_i x^i$ such that $\beta(y_i) = 0$ for $i = 1, \ldots, |Y^*|$.

for $j \leftarrow 1$ to $n$

- Let $\mu^{(j)}(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{s} m_i^{(j)} x^i$ where $m_i^{(j)} \in_R \mathbb{Z}_t$ for $i = 1, \ldots, s$ and $j = 1, \ldots, n$
- Let $\nu^{(j)}(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{s} n_i^{(j)} x^i$ where $n_i^{(j)} \in_R \mathbb{Z}_t$ for $i = 1, \ldots, s$ and $j = 1, \ldots, n$

Compute $v^{(j)}(x) = \beta(x) v^{(j)}(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{2s-1} u_i^{(j)} x^i$, for $j = 1, \ldots, n$.

end for

$A' \leftarrow \text{HOM-TRANSFORM}(A, 2s, \text{false})$

for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $2s$

\[T'_i \leftarrow A'_i \times \text{CRT}(\mu^{(1)}(w^{i-1}), \ldots, \mu^{(n)}(w^{i-1}))\]

end for

$T \leftarrow \text{HOM-TRANSFORM}(T', 2s, \text{true})$

$U \leftarrow (\text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(u_0^{(1)}, \ldots, u_0^{(n)}), pk), \ldots, \text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(u_{2s-1}^{(1)}, \ldots, u_{2s-1}^{(n)}), pk))$

for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $2s$

\[\text{ct}_i \leftarrow T_i + U_i\]

end for

Send $(\text{ct}_1, \ldots, \text{ct}_{2s})$.

end procedure
procedure Hom-Transform($A, n_A, \text{inv}$)
  for $i \leftarrow 0$ to $n_A - 1$ do
    if $i < i^R$ then
      $A_{i+1} \leftrightarrow A_{i^n+1}$
    end if
  end for
  if inv then
    $z \leftarrow w^{n_A-1}$
  else
    $z \leftarrow w$
  end if
  for $h \leftarrow 0$ to $\log_2(n_A) - 1$ do
    for $i \leftarrow 0$ to $n_A - 2^{h+1}$ step $2^{h+1}$ do
      for $j \leftarrow 1$ to $2^{h+1}$ do
        $\text{ct}_\kappa \leftarrow A_{i+j+2^h} \times \text{CRT}((z^{(n_A/2^{h+1})j^{-1}}), \ldots, (z^{(n_A/2^{h+1})j^{-1}}))$
        $A_{i+j+2^h} \leftarrow A_{i+j} - \text{ct}_\kappa$
        $A_{i+j} \leftarrow A_{i+j} + \text{ct}_\kappa$
      end for
    end for
  end for
  if inv then
    for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $n_A$ do
      $A_i \leftarrow A_i \times \text{CRT}(n_A^{-1}, \ldots, n_A^{-1})$
    end for
  end if
end procedure
Proof. We consider the noise contribution to the output ciphertexts \((ct_1, \ldots, ct_{2s})\) corresponding to each of the calls to the homomorphic Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) procedure. In the first call the FFT circuit is batch evaluated homomorphically on the array \(A\), which contains input ciphertexts of noise level \(n_{\text{fresh}}\). The ciphertexts produced at the output of this circuit, are then batch multiplied by plaintext evaluations of the polynomials \(\mu^{(j)}\) at the \(2s\) powers of the \(2^{th}\) root of unity \(w\), yielding the batch transforms of \(\alpha^{(j)}\mu^{(j)}\) as an array of ciphertexts \(T'\). In the second stage the inverse FFT is evaluated homomorphically on \(T'\), yielding \(T\). Clearly the noise contribution from this stage is identical to the that of the first stage. Let \(L = \log_2(2s)\) and let \(n_1, \ldots, n_{L+1}, n'_1, \ldots, n'_{L+1}\) be the maximum noise level of the ciphertexts at each level of the forward and inverse homomorphic FFT stages, respectively. We have that
\[
n_{L+1} \leq n_1 + n_1 \cdot z_{l,j} \cdot n^{1/2} + t\text{ where } z_{l,j} = w^{2^{(j-1)}}.\]
Since \(z_{l,j}\) is simply a scalar in \(\mathbb{Z}_q\), it holds that, regardless of the values of \(l\) and \(j\), \(z_{l,j} \leq t\). Then
\[
n_{L+1} \leq n_1(1 + t)^L n^{L/2} + t \sum_{j=1}^{L-1} (1 + t)^j n^{L/2} \leq n_1(1 + t)^L n^{L/2} + t(1 + t)^L n^{L/2}.\]
Thus
\[
n_{L+1} \leq (n_1 + t)(1 + t)^L n^{L/2}.\]
Also \(n'_1 \leq (1 + t)n_{L+1} + n^{1/2}\), corresponding to a simple multiplication by the plaintexts \((\mu(w^{j}))_{j=1}^{2s}\). Finally, by symmetry, \(n'_{L+1} \leq (n'_1 + t)(1 + t)^L n^{L/2}\). It follows that \(n'_{L+1} \leq (1 + t)^{2L+1} n^{L}(n_1 + t)\). Now, since \(n_1 = n_{\text{fresh}}\), we have \(n'_{L+1} \leq (1 + t)^{2L+1} n^{L}(1 + 2n^{1/2} B_{err}).\)
Thus \(n'_{L+1} \leq 2(1 + t)^{2L+2} n^{L/(1/2)} B_{err} \leq 2(2^{L+3} B_{err} \leq 2 \cdot 2^{(2k+\log_2k+1)(2L+3) \cdot n^{-L+1} B_{err} < \frac{q}{2},\text{ yielding the result.}}

Lemma 8. The protocol Set-Intersection-II achieves security against statically chosen semi-honest adversaries if the Decision-LWE_{2n,q,x} and Decision-SPR_{2n,q,x} assumptions hold.

Proof. Simulator \(\mathcal{S}\) proceeds as follows. Generate \(\frac{2k|X|}{n}\) random ciphertexts and forward them to \(P_2\). On receipt of the ciphertexts by \(P_2\), \(\mathcal{S}\) generates \(4k'\max\{|X|,|Y|\}\) random ciphertexts and forwards them to \(P_1\). By a hybrid argument for any PPT adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) with advantage \(\epsilon\) distinguishing the real protocol from the simulation, we can construct a PPT adversary \(\mathcal{A}'\) with advantage at least \(\frac{2k|X|}{n} + 4k'\max\{|X|,|Y|\}\) in breaking either the Decision-LWE_{2n,q,x} assumption or the Decision-SPR_{2n,q,x} assumption. Since \(|X|,|Y|\) and \(k'\) are constants, the claim follows.

B Protocols Secure against Malicious Adversaries

B.1 Set Intersection with Labelling

In this section, we describe a protocol for set intersection with labelling secure against malicious adversaries, following a similar protocol to the modifications to the semi-honest protocols in Section 4, [FNP04] described in Section 5.3 of the same work.

Our protocol works as follows. The client generates \(N\) copies of their input for use in a cut-and-choose protocol with the server. Each copy is constructed by the client first mapping their input to pseudonyms via a random oracle applied to a seed concatenated with the input \(k\)-mer. Each copy of the input set utilises a different seed. To achieve the challenge phase in our offline/online setting, we exploit the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87]. Specifically
...the client applies a strong hash function to the entire set of copies to produce the subset that will be opened. Along the with openings of this subset of encrypted pseudonyms, the client also sends the corresponding seeds. Together, this enables the server to verify that the majority of the input sets are correctly constructed, with overwhelming probability. To achieve security against a malicious server, the server transfers in place of a matching k-mer a short seed to third hash function. The output of this hash function is used to de-randomize the rest of the computation. Specifically let t be a random λ-bit value and \( H(t) = u'' \| u'' \) and let \( (\text{Enc}(a_i))_{i=0}^{X-1} \) be an encryption of client polynomial \( P(\cdot) \). For k-mer \( y \), the server homomorphically computes \( \text{Enc}(u' \cdot P(y) + t) \) as well as the value \( z = H(u'', y) \). In the event that \( y \) is also a client k-mer, the seed \( t \) is recoverable by decryption, from which \( y \) is determined to be matching k-mer by brute-force testing of \( H \) on every k-mer in the client set against \( z \). Security against a malicious server thus follows from the improbability that random oracle \( H \) produces the same output on two different \( 2k \)-bit suffixes. We require the following notation.

**Notation** Let \( N \) be a security parameter dictating the number of cut-and-choose copies. Let \( H_1 : \{0,1\}^{2k+\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2k+\lambda}, H_2 : \{0,1\}^{|X| |X| |ct|} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^N, H_3 : \{0,1\}^{\lambda + \log_2 |Y|} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2k+\lambda}, H_4 : \{0,1\}^{2k+\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2k+\lambda} \) be random oracles. Let \( \mathcal{F}_{L\text{-Set-Int}} \) be the functionality corresponding to Task 1, as it is defined in Section 2. Let \( \mathcal{F}_{RO} \) be the functionality corresponding to the random oracle \( H_i \), for \( i = 1, \ldots, 4 \).

Security of our protocol follows from Theorem 9, assuming the Decision-LWE\(_{2n,q,\lambda} \) and Decision-\( \text{SPR}_{2n,q,\lambda} \) assumptions hold.

**Theorem 9.** Assume that \( H_1 - H_4 \) are random oracles and that \( \text{Enc} \) is a message encryption function of a semantically secure cryptosystem. Then the protocol Set-Intersection-I* achieves security against statically chosen malicious adversaries.

**Proof.** We analyse security of the protocol in the hybrid world where a trusted third party computes the functionalities \( \mathcal{F}_{RO}^1 - \mathcal{F}_{RO}^4 \) for both client and server.

**Security against malicious P_1:** Simulator \( B \) in the ideal world proceeds as follows.

1. In each call to the hash function \( H_1 \), \( B \) learns the input of \( A \), namely \((s_i, x_i)\) for \( i \in 1 + |X|, \ell \in [N] \). It sends \( A \) the value \( h_{i,\ell}^{\|X|} = \mathcal{F}_{RO}^1(s_i, x_i) \) and stores \((s_i, x_i, h_{i,\ell})\) locally.
2. Let \( X^{(\ell)} = (h_{(i,\ell)}^{\|X|})_{i=1}^{\|X|} \). \( B \) sends \( X^{(\ell)} \) to \( \mathcal{F}_{L\text{-Set-Int}} \) and receives \( L^{(\ell)} = (l_{i,\ell}^{(\ell)})_{i=1}^{\|X| \|Y|} \).
3. In the call to hash function \( H_2 \), \( B \) learns ciphertext set \( C \), sends \( A \) the value \( J = \mathcal{F}_{RO}^2(C) \) and stores \( C \) locally.
4. \( B \) receives from \( A \) the set \((s_i)_{i \in [N] \setminus J'} \) and openings of \((ct_i^{(\ell)})_{i \in 1 + |X|, \ell \in J'} \) for some set \( J' \subset [N] \). It verifies that \( J' = J \) and that the received seeds are consistent with those received in Step 1 and that the opened ciphertexts are consistent with \( C \setminus J \). Output \( \perp \) if any of these checks fail.
\[\textbf{procedure} \text{Set-Intersection-I}^*(X, Y, \ell(\cdot))\]
\[P_1, P_2 : I \leftarrow \frac{|Y|}{n}, t \leftarrow p_{\geq 2^{2k+3}}\]

\[P_1:\]
Enumerate \(X\) as \(\{x_1, \ldots, x_{|X|}\}\)
Choose \(s_0, \ldots, s_{N-1} \in R \{0, 1\}^\lambda\)
\[\text{for } i \leftarrow 0 \text{ to } N - 1 \text{ do}\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{Construct } P^i(\cdot) = \sum_{x=0}^{|X|-1} a^i(x) : P^i(H_1(s_i, x_i)) = 0 \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, |X|.
&\text{for } i \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } |X| \text{ do}\]
&\text{\(ct^i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(a^i_{i-1}, \ldots, a^i_{i-1}), \text{pk})\)}
\[\text{end for}\]
\[\text{Send } (\text{ct}^i_{1}, \ldots, \text{ct}^i_{|X|})_{i=0}^{N-1}.
\]
\[J \leftarrow H_2((\text{ct}^i_{1}, \ldots, \text{ct}^i_{|X|})_{i=0}^{N-1}).
\]
\[\text{Send } (s_i)_{i \in [N] \setminus J}.
\]
\[\text{Send openings of } (\text{ct}^i_{i})_{i \in 1+[|X|], \ i \in J}.
\]

\[P_2:\]
Enumerate \(Y\) as \(\{y_1, \ldots, y_{|Y|}\}\)
Verify openings and correctness of \(J\). Output \(\perp\) if verification fails.
\[\text{for } t \in [N] \setminus J \text{ do}\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{Pick } t^{(i)} \in R \{0, 1\}^\lambda
&\text{for } i \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } |I| \text{ do}\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{\(p^i_{1,(j)} \leftarrow \text{CRT}(H_1(s_i, y_{i(i-1)n+1})^{j-1}, \ldots, H_1(s_i, y_{in})^{j-1})\)}
&\text{end for}\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{Write } H_3(t^{(i)} || i || 1) = u^i_{11}(t^{(i)}), \ldots, H_4(t^{(i)} || i || n) = u^i_{n1}(t^{(i)}), u^i_{n2}(t^{(i)}), u^i_{n3}(t^{(i)})
&\text{end for}\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{\(p^i_{1} \leftarrow \text{CRT}(u^i_{11}, \ldots, u^i_{n3})\)}
&\text{end for}\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{\(z^i_{1} \leftarrow \text{CRT}(H_4(u^i_{11}, y_{i(i-1)n+1}), \ldots, H_4(u^i_{n1}, y_{in}))\)}
&\text{end for}\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{\(g^i_{1} \leftarrow \text{CRT}(\ell(y_{i(i-1)n+1}) || f^{(i)}), \ldots, \ell(y_{in}) || f^{(i)})\)}
&\text{end for}\]
\[\text{\(ct^i_{1} \leftarrow (\sum_{j=1}^{|X|} \text{ct}^i_{j} \times p^i_{1,(j)}) \times p^i_{1} + q^i_{1}\)}
\[\text{end for}\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{Send } (\text{ct}^i_{1}, \ldots, \text{ct}^i_{|I|})_{i \in [N] \setminus J} \text{ and } (z^i_{1}, \ldots, z^i_{|I|})_{i \in [N] \setminus J}.
&\text{P_1:}
\]
Decrypt \((\text{ct}^i_{1})_{i \in 1+[|I|, i \in [N] \setminus J} \text{ and verify correctness w.r.t } (z^i_{1})_{i \in 1+[|I|, i \in [N] \setminus J}.
\]
end procedure
5. Let \( a = \frac{n \cdot |X \cap Y|}{|Y|} \). Perform the following for \( i \in [N] \) and \( i = 1, \ldots, I \). Construct \( q_i^{(i)} \) as a batch encryption of \( a \) values from \( L^{(i)} \) and \( n - a \) random 2\( k \) + \( \lambda \) bit strings. Generate \( p_i^{(i,j)} \) and \( q_i^{(i)} \) as the honest server would. Compute \( \text{ct}_i^{(i)} \) using \( p_i^{(i,j)} \), \( p_i^{(i)} \) and \( q_i^{(i)} \). Compute \( z_i^{(i)} \) honestly. Send (\( \text{ct}_i^{(i)} \))_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in [N]} \) and (\( z_i^{(i)} \))_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in [N]} \) to \( \mathcal{A} \).

6. Output whatever \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs.

That the above simulation against a malicious client in the ideal world is indistinguishable from the real-world execution in the hybrid model, follows from the fact that the only place where the simulation differs from the real world is in Step 5. Here the input ciphertext \( \text{ct}_i^{(i)} \), where \( i \in 1+[I] \) and \( i \in [N] \), is constructed directly using \( q_i^{(i)} \) constructed from the output of the trusted party computing \( \mathcal{F}_{L-\text{set}-\text{int}} \) in Step 2. This is possible without \( \mathcal{A} \) noticing, because in the \((\mathcal{F}_{RO}^{3}, \mathcal{F}_{RO}^{4})\)-hybrid model, the output of \( H_3 \) and \( H_4 \) is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on \( \{0,1\}^{2k+2\lambda} \) and \( \{0,1\}^{2k+\lambda} \), respectively.

**Security against malicious \( P_2 \):** Simulator \( \mathcal{B} \) in the ideal world proceeds as follows.

1. Generate random strings \( h_{(i, l)}^{1} \) in \( \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda + k} \) for each \( (i, l) \in (1 + [|X|]) \times [N] \times (1 + [n]) \).
   Compute \( (\text{ct}_i^{(i)})_{i \in 1 + |X|, i \in [N]} \) using inputs \( h_{(i, l)}^{1} \) and compute \( J \) as the honest client would. Send \( (s_{(i)})_{i \in [N] \setminus J} \) and openings of \( (\text{ct}_i^{(i)})_{i \in 1 + |X|, i \in J} \) to \( \mathcal{A} \).

2. In each call to hash function \( H_1 \), \( \mathcal{B} \) replaces the output of \( \mathcal{F}_{RO}^{3} \) with the string \( h_{(i, l)}^{1} \) for input \( (s_i, y(i-1)n+l) \) if \( y(i-1)n+l = x(i-1)n+l \).

3. In each call to hash function \( H_3 \), \( \mathcal{B} \) learns \( (t^{(i)}||i||l)_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in 1+[n]} \). It sends \( \mathcal{A} \) the values \( u_i = \mathcal{F}_{RO}^{3}(t^{(i)}||i||l)_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in 1+[n]} \). It stores, for \( i = 1, \ldots, I \) and \( l = 1, \ldots, n \), the values \( (t^{(i)}, (u_{i1}, \ldots, u_{in})) \) locally.

4. In each call to hash function \( H_4 \), \( \mathcal{B} \) learns the values \( (u'''_{il}, y(i-1)n+l) \). It sends \( \mathcal{A} \) the values \( h_{(i, l)}^{4} = \mathcal{F}_{RO}^{4}(u'''_{il}, y(i-1)n+l) \). It stores \( ((u'''_{il}, y(i-1)n+l), \ldots, (u'''_{in}, y_{in})) \) and \( (h_{(i, l)}^{4})_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in [N], i \in 1+[n]} \) locally.

5. Let \( Y^{(i)} = \{h_{(i, l)}^{4}\}_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in [N], i \in [n]} \). For \( i \in [N] \) it forwards the set of inputs \( Y^{(i)} \) to \( \mathcal{F}_{L-\text{set}-\text{int}} \) and receives \( L^{(i)} = (t^{(i)}_{i})_{i \in 1+|X|} \).

6. \( \mathcal{B} \) receives \( (\text{ct}_i^{(i)})_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in [N] \setminus J} \) and \( (z_i^{(i)})_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in [N] \setminus J} \). It verifies the \( i^{th} \) batch of ciphertexts corresponds to label set \( L^{(i)} \) and outputs 1 if \( (z_i^{(i)})_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in [N] \setminus J} \) are formed correctly.

We argue the real world and ideal world executions are indistinguishable in \( \mathcal{F}_{RO}^{4} \)-hybrid model as follows. The only place where the simulation differs from the protocol in Step 1, where the ciphertexts are computed using plaintext polynomial \( P^{(i)} \) interpolated over the strings \( \{h_{(i, l)}^{4}\}_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in [N], i \in 1+[n]} \) rather than as \( \{H_1(s_i, x(i-1)+i)\}_{i \in 1+[|X|], i \in 1+[n]} \). This is possible because the semantic security of the homomorphic cryptosystem implies that the output of \( \text{Enc} \) is indistinguishable to \( \mathcal{A} \) on polynomials of degree \( n \).
B.2 Set Intersection with Labelling II

In this section we describe a similar set of modifications for our second protocol for set intersection with labelling to achieve security against malicious adversaries. In the following description let \( H_1 : \{0,1\}^{2k+\lambda+\log_2(k'+\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2k+\log_2(k'+\lambda)} \), \( H_3 : \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\log_2 |Y^*|+n+2k+\log_2(k'+\lambda)} \) be random oracles.

**Theorem 10.** Assume that \( H_1 - H_3 \) are random oracles and that \( \text{Enc} \) is a message encryption function of a semantically secure cryptosystem. Then the protocol Set-Intersection-II\(^*\) achieves security against statically chosen malicious adversaries.

**Proof.** The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 9.

B.3 Fuzzy matching with Labelling

In this section we describe a protocol for fuzzy matching with labelling secure against malicious adversaries, using a similar strategy to that outlined in the previous sections. Let \( H_1 : \{0,1\}^{\lambda+4k} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+4k} \), \( H_2 : \{0,1\}^{\frac{16k^2+4k\lambda+4k|X||ct|}{n}} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{N} \), \( H_3 : \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\log_2((4k+\lambda)|X|)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n\cdot(\log_2 n+\log \log_2 n)} \) be random oracles.

**Theorem 11.** Assume that \( H_1 - H_3 \) are random oracles and that \( \text{Enc} \) is a message encryption function of a semantically secure cryptosystem. Then the protocol Fuzzy-Matching\(^*\) achieves security against statically chosen malicious adversaries.

**Proof.** The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 9.

B.4 Minimum Matching

In this section we describe a protocol for minimum matching secure against malicious adversaries, using a similar strategy to that outlined in the previous sections. In the following description let \( H_1 : \{0,1\}^{4k+\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{4k} \), \( H_2 : \{0,1\}^\sqrt{4k\cdot N\cdot |ct|} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{N} \) be random oracles.

**Theorem 12.** Assume that \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \) are random oracles and that \( \text{Enc} \) is a message encryption function of a semantically secure cryptosystem. Then the protocol Minimum-Matching\(^*\) achieves security against statically chosen malicious adversaries.

**Proof.** The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 9.
procedure Set-Intersection-II*(X, Y, ℓ(·))
\[
P_1, P_2 : k' = \max_{y \in Y} |\ell(y)|, s \leftarrow \max_i \{\frac{|X^{(i)}|}{n}, |Y^{(i)}|\}, t \leftarrow p_{2^{2s+\log_2(k' + 1)} + 1} : t \equiv 1 \text{ mod } 2s
\]

\[\text{P}_1:\]
\[
\text{for } t \leftarrow 0 \text{ to } N - 1 \text{ do }
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Let } X^{(i)} &= \bigcup_{x \in X, i \in [k'+\lambda], b \in \{0,1\}} x||i||b \\
\text{Enumerate } X^{(i)} &\text{ as } \{x_1, \ldots, x_{|X^{(i)}|}\} \\
\text{for } j \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } n \text{ do }
\end{align*}
\]
\[
I^{(i)} \leftarrow \frac{|X^{(i)}|}{n}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Construct } \alpha^{(i,j)} &= \sum_{i=0}^{I^{(i)}-1} a_i^{(i,j)} x^i \text{ such that } \alpha^{(i,j)}(H_1(s_i, x_i)) = 0 \text{ for } i \in 1 + [I]. \\
\text{end for}
\end{align*}
\]
\[
A^{(i)} \leftarrow (\text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(u_0^{(i,1)}, \ldots, u_0^{(i,n)}), \text{pk}), \ldots, \text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(u_{I^{(i)-1}}^{(i,1)}, \ldots, u_{I^{(i)-1}}^{(i,n)}), \text{pk}), \\
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Enc}^*(0, \text{pk}), \ldots, \text{Enc}^*(0, \text{pk})
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]
\[
2s - I^{(i)}
\]
\]
\[
\text{end for}
\]
\[
\text{Send } (A^{(i)})_{i \in [N]}.
\]
\[
J \leftarrow H_2((A^{(i)})_{i \in [N]}).
\]
\[
\text{Send } (s_i)_{i \in [N]}; J.
\]
\[
\text{Send openings of } (A^{(i)})_{i \in J}.
\]
\[
\text{P}_2:\]
\[
\text{Verify openings and correctness of } J. \text{ Output } \bot \text{ if verification fails.}
\]
\[
\text{Choose } w \in \mathbb{Z}_t^* : \text{ord}_t(w) = 2s
\]
\[
\text{for } t \in [N] \setminus J \text{ do }
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Pick } t^{(i)} &\in_R \{0, 1\}^λ. \\
\text{Let } Y^{(i)} &= \cup_{y \in Y, i \in [k'+\lambda]} y||\ell(y)||t^{(i)}_i \\
\text{Enumerate } Y^{(i)} &\text{ as } \{y_1, \ldots, y_{|Y^{(i)}|}\} \\
\text{Construct } \beta^{(i)} &= \sum_{i=0}^{|Y^{(i)}|-1} b_i^{(i,j)} x^i \text{ such that } \beta^{(i)}(H_1(s_i, y_i)) = 0 \text{ for } i \in 1 + |Y^{(i)}|.
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\text{for } j \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } n \text{ do }
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Let } u^{(i,j)}(x) &= \sum_{i=0}^s n_i^{(i,j)} x^i \text{ where } n_i^{(i,j)} \in_R \mathbb{Z}_t \text{ for } i \in 1 + [s] \text{ and } j \in 1 + [n] \\
\text{Compute } v^{(i,j)}(x) &= \beta^{(i)}(x) u^{(i,j)}(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{2s-1} u_i^{(i,j)} x^i, \text{ for } j \in 1 + [n].
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\text{end for}
\]
\[
A^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{HOM-TRANSFORM}(A^{(i)}, 2s, \text{false})
\]
\[
\text{for } i \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } 2s \text{ do }
\]
\[
T_i^{(i)} \leftarrow A_i^{(i)} \times \text{CRT}(\mu^{(i,1)}(w^{-1}), \ldots, \mu^{(i,n)}(w^{-1}))
\]
\[
\text{end for}
\]
\[
T^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{HOM-TRANSFORM}(T^{(i)}, 2s, \text{true})
\]
\[
U^{(i)} \leftarrow (\text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(u_0^{(i,1)}, \ldots, u_0^{(i,n)}), \text{pk}), \ldots, \text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(u_{2s-1}^{(i,1)}, \ldots, u_{2s-1}^{(i,n)}), \text{pk}))
\]
\[
\text{for } i \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } 2s \text{ do }
\]
\[
\texttt{c}_i^{(i)} \leftarrow T_i^{(i)} + U_i^{(i)}
\]
\[
\text{end for}
\]
\[
\text{Send } (\text{ct}_i^{(i)})_{i \in [N] \setminus J}.
\]
\[
\text{end for}
\]
\[
\text{P}_1:\]
\[
\text{Decrypt and verify correctness of } (\text{ct}_i^{(i)})_{i \in 1 + [2s], i \in [N] \setminus J}.
\]
\[
\text{end procedure}
procedure Fuzzy-Matching*(X, Y, ℓ(·), D)
    \[ P_2 \]: Enumerate \( Y \) as \( \{y_1, \ldots, y_{|Y|}\} \)
    \textbf{for} \( i \leftarrow 1 \) to \( |Y| \) \textbf{do}
    \hspace{1em} \[ P_2 \]: Fuzzy-Membership*(X, \( y_i \), \( ℓ(y_i) \), D)
    \textbf{end for}
end procedure
procedure \textsc{Fuzzy-Membership}(X, y, \ell_y, D \in [k + 1])
\begin{align*}
P_1, P_2 &: n' \leftarrow \frac{n}{4k + \lambda}, I \leftarrow \frac{|X|}{n'}, t \sim 2n \log 2n \\
P_1 &: \\
&\text{Enumerate } X \text{ as } \{x_1, \ldots, x_{|X|}\} \\
&\text{Choose } s_0, \ldots, s_{N-1} \in_R \{0, 1\}^\lambda \\
&\text{for } t \leftarrow 0 \text{ to } N - 1 \text{ do} \\
&\quad \text{for } i \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } I \text{ do} \\
&\quad\quad \text{for } j \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } 4k \text{ do} \\
&\quad\quad\quad \text{ct}_i^{(i,j)} \leftarrow \text{Enc} (\text{CRT}(H_1(s_i, x_{(i-1)n'+1})^{(j)} \ldots \| H_1(s_i, x_{n'})^{(j)}), pk) \\
&\quad\quad \text{end for} \\
&\quad \text{Send } (\text{ct}_i^{(1,1)}, \ldots, \text{ct}_i^{(4k)}) \\
&\quad \text{end for} \\
&\text{end for} \\
&J \leftarrow H_2((\text{ct}_i^{(i,j)})_{i \in 1+I, j \in [4k], t \in [N]}). \\
&\text{Send } ((s_i)_{i \in [N]\setminus J}. \\
&\text{Send openings of } (\text{ct}_i^{(i,j)})_{i \in 1+I, j \in [4k], t \in J}. \\
P_2 &: \\
&\text{Verify openings and correctness of } J. \text{ Output } \perp \text{ if verification fails.} \\
&\text{ct}_{tgt} \leftarrow \text{Enc} (\text{CRT}(0, 2(D - 1), 0, \ldots, 2(D - 1), 0, \ldots, 2(D - 1), 0, 2, \ldots), pk) \\
&\text{for } t \in [N]\setminus J \text{ do} \\
&\quad \text{for } j \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } 4k \text{ do} \\
&\quad\quad \text{ct}_y^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{Enc} (\text{CRT}(H_1(s_i, y)^{(j)} \ldots \| H_1(s_i, y)^{(j)}), pk) \\
&\quad \text{end for} \\
&\text{Pick } t^{(i)} \in_R \{0, 1\}^\lambda. \\
&\text{Write } \ell_y^{t^{(i)}} \leftarrow \ell_1^{t^{(i)}} \ldots \| \ell_v^{t^{(i)}} \text{ where } v = \lfloor \frac{4k + \lambda}{D} \rfloor \\
&\text{ct}_y^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{Enc} (\text{CRT}(\ell_1^{t^{(i)}}, \ldots, \ell_1^{t^{(i)}}, \ell_1^{t^{(i)}}, \ldots, \ell_1^{t^{(i)}}, \ell_1^{t^{(i)}}, \ldots, \ell_v^{t^{(i)}}, \ldots, \ell_v^{t^{(i)}}, \ldots, 0, \ldots, 0), pk) \\
&\text{for } i \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } I \text{ do} \\
&\quad \text{Write } H_3(t^{(i)}, i) = u_1^{(i)} \ldots \| u_m^{(i)}. \\
&\quad p_i^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{CRT}(u_1^{(i)}, \ldots, u_m^{(i)}) \\
&\quad \text{ct}_y^{(i)} \leftarrow (\sum_{j=1}^{4k} (\text{ct}_i^{(u,j)} - \text{ct}_y^{(i)})^2 - \text{ct}_{tgt}) \times p_i^{(i)} + \text{ct}_y^{(i)} \\
&\quad \text{end for} \\
&\text{end for} \\
&\text{Send } (\text{ct}_1^{(i)}, \ldots, \text{ct}_I^{(i)})_{i \in [N]\setminus J}. \\
P_1 &: \\
&\text{Decrypt and verify correctness of } (\text{ct}_i^{(i)})_{i \in 1+I, t \in [N]\setminus J}. \\
\end{align*}
procedure MINIMUM-MATCHING*(x, Y)
    P_1, P_2 : \( M \leftarrow \sqrt{4k} \), \( t \leftarrow 2 \)
    P_1 :
    Choose \( s_0, \ldots, s_{N-1} \in_R \{0, 1\}^\lambda \)
    for \( t \leftarrow 0 \) to \( N - 1 \) do
        Write \( H_1(s_i, x) = x^{(i, 1)} \| \ldots \| x^{(i, M)} \) with \( |x^{(i, j)}| = \frac{4k}{M} \)
    for \( j \leftarrow 1 \) to \( M \) do
        for \( \text{msk} \in \{0, 1\}^{\frac{4k}{M}} \) do
            \( I^{(i)} \leftarrow 1\) \( \text{Hamm-weight}(x^{(i, j)} \equiv \text{msk}) \)
            \( W_j^{(i)} \leftarrow (\text{Enc}(I^{(i)}[0], \text{pk}), \ldots, \text{Enc}(I^{(i)}[\frac{4k}{M}], \text{pk})) \)
        end for
    end for
    end for
    Send \((W_j^{(i)})_{j \in 1+[M], \text{msk} \in \{0, 1\}^{\frac{4k}{M}}, \text{ct} \in [N]}\).
    \( J \leftarrow H_2((W_j^{(i)})_{j \in 1+[M], \text{msk} \in \{0, 1\}^{\frac{4k}{M}}, \text{ct} \in [N]})) \).
    Send \((s_i)_{i \in [N]} \setminus J\).
    Send openings of \((W_j^{(i)})_{j \in 1+[M], \text{msk} \in \{0, 1\}^{\frac{4k}{M}}, \text{ct} \in J}\).
    P_2 :
    Enumerate \( Y \) as \( \{y_1, \ldots, y_N\} \)
    Verify openings and correctness of \( J \). Output \( \perp \) if verification fails.
    for \( i \leftarrow 1 \) to \( |Y| \) do
        Write \( H_1(s_i, y_i) = y_i^{(i, 1)} \| \ldots \| y_i^{(i, M)} \)
        for \( j \leftarrow 1 \) to \( M \) do
            \( P^{(i)}_{ij} \leftarrow \text{EXPAND}(W_j^{(i)}[y_i^{(i, j)}], 2k + 1) \)
        end for
        \( P_i^{(i)} \leftarrow \prod_{j=1}^M P^{(i)}_{ij} \)
        \( W_i^{(i)} \leftarrow P_i^{(i)}[1] \)
        \( \text{ct}_i^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{CRT}(y_i[1], \ldots, y_i[4k]), \text{pk}) \)
    end for
    \( N \leftarrow \frac{|Y|}{2} \)
    for \( h \leftarrow 0 \) to \( \log_2|Y| - 1 \) do
        for \( i \leftarrow 1 \) to \( N \) do
            \( \text{ct}_i^{(i)} \leftarrow \sum_{(a,b):b>a} W_i^{(i)}[a] \cdot W_i^{(i)}[b] \)
            \( \text{ct}_i^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{ct}_i^{(i)} + \text{ct}_i^{(i)} \cdot (\text{ct}_i^{(i)} - \text{ct}_{i+2h}^{(i)}) \)
            \( W_i^{(i)} \leftarrow W_i^{(i)} + \text{ct}_i^{(i)} \cdot (W_i^{(i)} - W_i^{(i)}) \)
        end for
    end for
    Send \((\text{ct}_i^{(i)})_{i \in [N] \setminus J}\).
    P_1 :
    Decrypt and verify correctness of \((\text{ct}_i^{(i)})_{i \in [N] \setminus J}\).
end procedure