Paper 2016/772
Time-Frequency Analysis for Second-Order Attacks
Pierre BELGARRIC, Shivam BHASIN, Nicolas BRUNEAU, Jean-Luc DANGER, Nicolas DEBANDE, Sylvain GUILLEY, Annelie HEUSER, Zakaria NAJM, and Olivier RIOUL
Abstract
Second-order side-channel attacks are used to break first-order masking protections.
A practical reason which often limits the efficiency of second-order attacks is the temporal localisation of the leaking samples.
Several leakage samples must be combined which means high computational power.
For second-order attacks, the computational complexity is quadratic.
At CHES '04, Waddle and Wagner introduced attacks with complexity
Note: Better explaining the complexity of the 5 new attacks.
Thanks to Jong-Hyeok Lee (Kookmin U., Korea), for pointing the fact the complexity was unclear. Now, we made it very clear that all attacks have complexity
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CARDIS 2013
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-08302-5_8
- Keywords
- Bi-variate attackszero-offset 2O-CPAdiscrete Hartley transformleakage in phase
- Contact author(s)
- sylvain guilley @ telecom-paristech fr
- History
- 2017-01-15: last of 4 revisions
- 2016-08-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/772
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/772, author = {Pierre BELGARRIC and Shivam BHASIN and Nicolas BRUNEAU and Jean-Luc DANGER and Nicolas DEBANDE and Sylvain GUILLEY and Annelie HEUSER and Zakaria NAJM and Olivier RIOUL}, title = {Time-Frequency Analysis for Second-Order Attacks}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/772}, year = {2016}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-08302-5_8}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/772} }