Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/720
A Black-Box Construction of Non-Malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption
Seung Geol Choi and Dana Dachman-Soled and Tal Malkin and Hoeteck Wee
Abstract: We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a
non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear
blow-up in the size of the ciphertext.
This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass,
Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto '06). Our construction also
extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2
attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work
of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt '07).
Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same
message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryption.
Instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message; the encoding is based on an
error-correcting code with certain properties of reconstruction and secrecy
from partial views, satisfied, e.g., by a Reed-Solomon code.
Category / Keywords:
Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-JOC-2017
Date: received 19 Jul 2016, last revised 16 Mar 2017
Contact author: choi at usna edu
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: An extended abstract [CDMW08] appeared in TCC 2008 under the title “Black-Box Construction of a Non-
malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One”
Version: 20170316:140103 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2016/720
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