Paper 2016/709
Differential Fault Analysis of SHA3-224 and SHA3-256
Pei Luo, Yunsi Fei, Liwei Zhang, and A. Adam Ding
Abstract
The security of SHA-3 against different kinds of attacks are of vital importance for crypto systems with SHA-3 as the security engine. In this paper, we look into the differential fault analysis of SHA-3, and this is the first work to conquer SHA3-224 and SHA3-256 using differential fault analysis. Comparing with one existing related work, we relax the fault models and make them realistic for different implementation architectures. We analyze fault propagation in SHA-3 under such single-byte fault models, and propose to use fault signatures at the observed output for analysis and secret retrieval. Results show that the proposed method can effectively identify the injected single-byte faults, and then recover the whole internal state of the input of last round $\chi$ operation ($\chi^{22}_i$) for both SHA3-224 and SHA3-256.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. The Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) workshop, 2016
- Keywords
- SHA-3KeccakFault attacks
- Contact author(s)
- silenceluo @ gmail com
- History
- 2016-07-18: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/709
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/709,
author = {Pei Luo and Yunsi Fei and Liwei Zhang and A. Adam Ding},
title = {Differential Fault Analysis of {SHA3}-224 and {SHA3}-256},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/709},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/709}
}
