Paper 2016/695
Gate-scrambling Revisited - or: The TinyTable protocol for 2-Party Secure Computation
Ivan Damgård, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Michael Nielsen, and Samuel Ranellucci
Abstract
We propose a new protocol, nicknamed TinyTable, for maliciously secure 2-party computation in the preprocessing model. One version of the protocol is useful in practice and allows, for instance, secure AES encryption with latency about 1ms and amortized time about 0.5 $\mu$s per AES block on a fast cloud set-up. Another version is interesting from a theoretical point of view: we achieve a maliciously and unconditionally secure 2-party protocol in the preprocessing model for computing a Boolean circuit, where both the communication complexity and preprocessed data size needed is $O(s)$ where $s$ is the circuit size, while the computational complexity is $O(k^\epsilon s)$ where $k$ is the statistical security parameter and $\epsilon <1$ is a constant. For general circuits with no assumption on their structure, this is the best asymptotic performance achieved so far in this model.
Note: Some typos were fixed.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- secure two-party computation
- Contact author(s)
- jbn @ cs au dk
- History
- 2017-03-28: last of 2 revisions
- 2016-07-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/695
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/695, author = {Ivan Damgård and Jesper Buus Nielsen and Michael Nielsen and Samuel Ranellucci}, title = {Gate-scrambling Revisited - or: The {TinyTable} protocol for 2-Party Secure Computation}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/695}, year = {2016}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/695} }