However, currently considered protocols based on tamper-proof hardware require a protocol-specific functionality of the hardware which cannot be reused for other protocols. For this to become possible, in addition to a versatile functionality, the hardware has to be modeled as a global setup.
We propose the first formalization of tamper-proof hardware as an untrusted global setup assumption. Based on this setup, we construct protocols for both UC-secure two-party computation and UC-secure non-interactive secure computation. The token functionality that we choose is a simple signature functionality, i.e. our protocols can be realized with currently available signature cards.Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / universal composability, tamper-proof hardware, signatures Date: received 13 Jun 2016 Contact author: tobias nilges at cs au dk Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20160616:192814 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2016/615 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion