Abstract

Motivated by the problem of one-time password generation with security against server breaches, we introduce the notion of adjustable signature schemes that allow the length of a signature to be adjusted—at the setup, signing or verification stages, depending on the application. Defining security for such schemes poses several challenges, such as: (i) different signature lengths should provide different levels of security, and (ii) the effort required for forging a very short signature (e.g., 6 bytes) should not be reusable for forging additional signatures. We provide security definitions that concretely capture the trade-off between signature length, number of forgeries and level of security provided by the scheme.

The above requirements rule out all existing solutions for short signatures. In this paper, as a feasibility result, we provide the first instantiation of all variants of adjustable signatures based on indistinguishability obfuscation. Our starting point is the state-of-the-art construction by Ramchen and Waters [ACM CCS 2014]. We observe that their scheme fails to meet our requirements for an adjustable signature scheme, and enhance it to obtain adjustable signatures with shorter signatures, faster signing and strong unforgeability. We also employ new proof techniques in order to obtain the above-mentioned notions of security.

For the simpler case where adversarial effort does not grow with the number of forgeries, we also provide a concrete construction based on the BLS signature scheme, by instantiating it using smaller group sizes that yield shorter signature lengths while providing reasonable security. We implement this scheme for various signature sizes and report on its efficiency.

1 Introduction

One-Time Passwords (OTPs) are widely used in practice to either replace or strengthen traditional password-based authentication mechanisms. Examples include Google Authenticator [Goo] and RSA’s SecureID tokens [RSA78]. In most use cases, a user holds a trusted device (smartphone, security token, etc.) that generates a short, human-readable string (the OTP) that the user presents to a server for authentication. The server generates the OTP on its own and compares it with the string provided by the user. The authentication succeeds if the two match and fails otherwise. OTP-based solutions have two main advantages over traditional passwords: (i) OTPs have higher entropy than human-chosen passwords as they are often generated using cryptographic primitives, and (ii) each OTP is only used once, keeping future sessions protected even if a current OTP is compromised.

To the best of our knowledge, all existing OTP-based authentication solutions are based on a symmetric-key setup where the user and the server agree on a long-term secret key $k$ that is used to generate future OTPs for that user. A common implementation follows the “Time-based One-Time Password” (TOTP) algorithm (IETF RFC 6238 [For]), where HMAC [BCK96] is used as a pseudorandom function to generate time-based OTPs. In particular, the OTP is generated by first computing $\text{HMAC}_k(t)$ for a synchronized time value $t$ (see the RFC for details on how $t$ is chosen) and then truncating the output of HMAC to an appropriate length.

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that is short enough for humans to type, but still reasonably hard for an adversary to guess. Note that there is a natural trade-off between the size of the OTP and the guessing probability of the adversary, which can be easily adjusted by truncating more or fewer bits of the HMAC output.

A major drawback of any symmetric-key based OTP solution is its susceptibility to a user-data breach which nowadays is an all-too-common occurrence. In particular, the server needs to store in a user database, a unique secret key for each user of its service, and use that key to generate OTPs for each authentication session. Furthermore, the server cannot just store a hash of the user’s secret key (as done with passwords—e.g., [PM99]), as the full key is needed in order to generate the OTPs. As a consequence, a breach of the user database implies a breach of all secret keys, which in turn renders the OTP-based solution ineffective. This motivates OTP generation using public-key primitives where the server only needs to store a per-user public-key, and thus security is not compromised in case of a server breach.

**OTP based on short signatures.** A natural candidate is to generate OTPs using a digital signatures scheme, where the server stores the verification key \( vk \) and the user stores the associated signing key \( sk \). The client generates an OTP by computing \( OTP = \text{Sign}(sk, t) \) for a synchronized time \( t \), and the server verifies it by computing \( \text{Verify}(vk, t, OTP) \). The authentication passes if and only if the verification does, with the hardness of guessing the OTP being implied by the unforgeability of the signature.

The problem with this approach is that signatures are too long for humans to type. The state-of-the-art short-signature scheme based on well-studied number-theoretic assumptions is that of [BLS01], generating signatures that are at least 160-bits (20 characters) long. More importantly, and unlike the symmetric-key scenario, the work-around of truncating the signature for a length/security trade-off fails, since a truncated signature cannot be verified by the verification algorithm.

Alternatively, based on the stronger indistinguishability obfuscation assumption (iO) [BGI+01, GGH+13], Sahai and Waters [SW14] and Ramchen and Waters [RW14] show how to design even shorter signatures. For the case of selective security, the scheme of [SW14] lends itself to truncation since the signature only consists of a PRF output. For a fully secure signature scheme, however, even the iO-based schemes fall short of achieving an acceptable solution. In particular, the signature scheme in [RW14] contains a tag \( t \) that is as long as the security parameter, and a string \( s \) of PRF-output length. This almost doubles the signatures length, and it is not clear how to adjust the length by truncating both \( t \) and \( s \) without breaking the functionality of the scheme. This motivates the formulation and study of the notion of adjustability of signature schemes.

**Our contributions.** The first new property we need to capture when defining adjustable signatures is that security of a signature depends on its length. For example, for any signature length \( \ell \), there is a 2\( \ell \)-time adversary that runs the verification algorithm on all possible signatures until it finds a forgery. Our definition for adjustable signature captures this graceful degradation in security by making both the adversary’s running time and winning advantage a function of \( \ell \).

Then, a natural solution would be to obtain shorter signatures by operating in smaller groups (e.g., for both RSA and ECDSA signatures), hence trading signature length for security (see Section 5 for one such instantiation). This approach, however, has two important shortcomings. First, in order to change the signature length, we have to generate new keys for each different size. This is in direct conflict with adjusting the signature length at signing or verification time. A simple fix, of course, would be to generate many keys, one for each desired length and use the appropriate key on-the-fly. The more critical issue with this approach is that an adversary who breaks the scheme for a small group size (e.g., by factoring a relatively small integer), can reuse its work and forge all future signatures of the same length generated using the same key. We want to prevent such attacks by requiring that producing multiple forgeries should be harder than producing one forgery. Our definition for adjustable signatures captures this hardness-increasing property.
by making the running time of the adversary an increasing function of the number of forgeries.

Indeed, we provide the necessary syntax and security definitions that concretely capture the trade-off between signature length, number of forgeries and security level for three variants of adjustable signature schemes. These variants allow the signature length to be adjusted at setup, signing or verification stage, depending on the application scenario. In case of setup-adjustable signatures, the key generation algorithm takes a length parameter $\ell$ as input, and generates the key-pair $(sk, vk)$ accordingly. Any signature generated using $sk$ will be $\ell$-bits long and the scheme provides a level of security that is correlated with $\ell$. A drawback of this variant is that one needs to re-run the setup algorithm in order to increase/decrease the signature length, as mandated for example by the current security needs. In the case of signing-adjustable and verification-adjustable signatures, the length of the signature is decided at signing/verification time and can change from one invocation to the next. These notions provide much higher flexibility as one can decide the level of security on-the-fly, without re-running the setup phase or prior coordination. In the OTP generation scenario, a signing-adjustable scheme allows the user device to change the OTP length spontaneously, with the server still being able to verify its authenticity using the same verification key; a verification-adjustable scheme, on the other hand, allows the user to precompute full length signatures (OTPs) beforehand and only adjust their size during the actual verification (authentication) phase.

We propose the first feasibility results for all variants based on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Our starting point is the state-of-the-art iO-based short signature scheme by Ramchen and Waters [RW14], which itself is an improved variant of the signature construction proposed by Sahai and Waters in [SW14]. In order to achieve a fully secure signature scheme, Ramchen and Waters associate a tag with each signature, which plays an essential role in the security proof. The addition of tags to each signature, however, makes the signatures longer (almost twice as long), and harder to truncate, violating the main goal of adjustable signatures and our motivating application.

We enhance the scheme of [RW14] in order to design a new short and adjustable signature that improves theirs in several ways: (1) our signatures are shorter as they do not include the tag, and can easily be made adjustable since they only contain a PRF output that can be truncated, (2) our signature schemes achieve strong unforgeability, and (3) signing is noticeably faster. We also employ a different proof technique (compared to [RW14]) in order to capture the hardness-increasing property when forging multiple signatures.

At a high level, in our signature schemes, instead of generating the tag at random and including it with the signatures, we generate the tag both at signing and verification, “on the fly” and as a deterministic function of the message being signed and the verification key. We achieve this by including a set of random strings (one pair of strings for each bit of the message) in the verification key, and compute the temporary tag by XOR-ing one random string from each pair based on each bit value of the message. As a result, the tag is no longer sent with the signature. Furthermore, in our scheme each tag value is, with all but negligible probability, unique to a message and as a result the generated signature is also unique, hence achieving strong unforgeability for free. Furthermore, we observe that a obvious extension of the proof techniques of [RW14] to the case of $n$ forgeries incurs an exponential (in $n$) loss in security. We show an alternative proof technique that requires puncturing the PRF in multiple points but does not lead to any security loss when considering multiple forgeries. Finally, we optimize the scheme of [RW14], by reducing the signing cost by almost a factor of two.

We also consider the design of concretely efficient adjustable signature schemes. We show how to instantiate a setup-adjustable scheme concretely on specific curves, based on the BLS signature scheme [BLS01]. Specifically, we explore how to instantiate BLS using smaller-size groups that provide reasonable security given known attacks against discrete log, while yielding short signature lengths. We implement our construction for various signature lengths and report on its efficiency. We note that this instantiation has the drawback that the attacker’s effort for one forgery can be used in future forgeries since the same key is used.
Related work. The design of schemes supporting short signatures has always been an important efficiency goal. In [BLS01], Boneh, Lynn and Shacham proposed a signature scheme based on bilinear maps in the random oracle model whose signature length is half the size of DSA signatures [oST] for a similar level of security. Later, Boneh and Boyen [BB04] described a signature scheme where signatures are almost as short as the BLS signatures, but whose security holds in the standard model.

In these pairing-based constructions, verification is the most time-consuming algorithm, since it is at this stage where the pairing operations are performed. With that motivation, Camenisch et al. [CHP07] proposed the first batch verifier for messages from many signers in the standard model and with a verification complexity where the dominant operation is independent of the number of signatures that are to be verified. Extensions of this batch verifier approach (to identity-based signatures, group signatures, etc.) were presented by Ferrara et al. [FGHP09].

Bellare and Rogaway [BR96] initiated the study of the exact security of digital signatures (RSA and Rabin), making precise reductions from a forger to the algorithm that solves the underlying hard problem. Micali and Reyzin [MR02] adapted the concrete security paradigm to Fiat-Shamir-like signature schemes that yield better concrete security than those based on the original Fiat-Shamir method.

As mentioned above, some of our adjustable schemes are based on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), the first realization of which was proposed by Garg et al. [GGH+13] based on multilinear maps. Since its introduction, indistinguishability obfuscation has enabled the design of numerous cryptographic primitives and protocols. One such primitive is short signatures. Sahai and Waters in [SW14] gave the first construction of a selectively secure short signature scheme based on iO, with follow-up work by Ramchen and Waters [RW14] showing how to extend it to full security.

Finally, as we mentioned earlier, our hardness-increasing property makes the running time of the adversary an increasing function of the number of forgeries. As such, the notion is related to the notion of multi-instance security of Bellare, Ristenpart and Tessaro [BRT12], who show how in settings where it is computationally feasible for instances to be compromised, such as password-based cryptography, security can be amplified linearly in the number of instances in the random oracle model under a proper modeling, and to the more general notion of inversion effort preserving functions of Garay et al. [GJKY13], which, at a high level, postulates a complexity lower bound in various models on the problem of solving (inverting) multiple instances simultaneously as a function of the sum of the complexities of solving those instances individually.

Organization of the paper. The balance of the paper is organized as follows. We present notation and the basic cryptographic notions used in the paper in Section 2. The syntax and security definition of all variants of adjustable signatures are presented in Section 3. The iO-based constructions are given in Section 4, while Section 5 is dedicated to a concrete proposal for setup-adjustable signatures based on bilinear groups. For ease of readability, complementary material and some of the proofs are presented in the appendix.

2 Preliminaries

In this section we present the notation, cryptographic notions and building blocks used throughout the paper. We will use $\lambda$ to denote the security parameter, and $\ell$ to denote the length (in number of bits) of the (adjustable) signatures, and assume it is polynomially related to the security parameter, i.e., $\ell = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. Since the nature of our work requires discussing concrete efficiency and security (cf. [BR96]), we will use the function $t : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ (taking the length of the signature and potentially other inputs) to denote a concrete bound on the running time of an algorithm in a fixed computational model; we call such an algorithm a $t$-time algorithm. We will use a similarly concrete function $\epsilon : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ to denote a bound on the probability of an algorithm (adversary)’s success. We remark that in our analyses there will be asymptotic terms of the
form \(\text{negl}(\lambda)\) and concrete terms; throughout the paper, we will assume that \(\lambda\) is large enough to render the asymptotic terms insignificant compared to the concrete terms.

We will use \(\sigma|_\ell\) to denote the bit string \(\sigma\) truncated to its least significant \(\ell\) bits, and \(m[i]\) to denote the \(i\)-th bit of vector \(m\).

**Indistinguishability obfuscation.** Next, we present the definition of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) as it appeared in [GGH+13].

**Definition 2.1.** A uniform PPT (in \(\lambda\)) machine \(iO\) is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class \(\{C_\lambda\}\) if the following conditions are satisfied:

- For all security parameters \(\lambda\), all circuits \(C \in C_\lambda\), and all inputs \(x\), we have that
  \[\Pr[C'(x) = C(x)|C' \leftarrow iO(\lambda, C)] = 1.\]

- For any PPT adversaries \(\text{Samp, D}\), there exists a negligible function \(\text{negl}(\cdot)\), such that the following holds: if
  \[\Pr[\forall x, C_0(x) = C_1(x)|(C_0, C_1, \sigma) \leftarrow \text{Samp}(1^\lambda)] > 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),\]
  then we have
  \[|\Pr[D(\sigma, iO(\lambda, C_0)) = 1|(C_0, C_1, \sigma) \leftarrow \text{Samp}(1^\lambda)] - \Pr[D(\sigma, iO(\lambda, C_1)) = 1|(C_0, C_1, \sigma) \leftarrow \text{Samp}(1^\lambda)]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).\]

In this paper we will make use of such indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits.

**Definition 2.2** (Indistinguishability obfuscator for \(\mathbb{P}/\text{poly}\)). A uniform PPT machine \(iO\) is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for \(\mathbb{P}/\text{poly}\) if the following holds: Let \(C_\lambda\) be the class of circuits of size at most \(\lambda\). Then \(iO\) is an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class \(\{C_\lambda\}\).

Indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits have been constructed under novel hardness assumptions in [GGH+13, CLT15].

**Puncturable PRFs.** We now recall the notion of puncturable PRFs, a variant of “constrained” PRFs introduced in [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13]. Roughly speaking, puncturable PRFs are PRFs that can be defined on all bit strings of a certain length, except for any polynomial-size set of inputs.

**Definition 2.3** (Puncturable PRFs). A family of puncturable PRFs \(F\) is given by a triple of algorithms \(\text{Key}_F, \text{Puncture}_F, \text{Eval}_F\), and a pair of computable functions \(n(\cdot), m(\cdot)\), satisfying the following conditions:

- For every PPT adversary \(A\), such that \(A(1^\lambda)\) outputs a set \(T \subset \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}\), then for all \(x \in \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}\) where \(x \notin T\), we have that
  \[\Pr[\text{Eval}_F(K, x) = \text{Eval}_F(K_T, x)|K \leftarrow \text{Key}_F(1^\lambda), K_T \leftarrow \text{Puncture}_F(K, T)] = 1.\]

- For every PPT adversary \((A_1, A_2)\) such that \(A_1(1^\lambda)\) outputs a set \(S \subset \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}\) and state \(\sigma\), consider an experiment where \(K \leftarrow \text{Key}_F(1^\lambda)\) and \(K_S \leftarrow \text{Puncture}_F(K, S)\); then we have
  \[|\Pr[A_2(\sigma, K_S, S, \text{Eval}_F(K, S)) = 1] - \Pr[A_2(\sigma, K_S, S, U_{m(\lambda)-|S|}) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda),\]
where $\text{Eval}_F(K, S)$ denotes the concatenation of $\text{Eval}_F(K, x_1), \ldots, \text{Eval}_F(K, x_k)$, where $S = \{x_1, \ldots, x_k\}$ is the enumeration of the elements of $S$ in lexicographic order, and $U_\ell$ denotes the uniform distribution over $\ell$ bits.

For ease of notation, we will use $F(K, x)$ to represent $\text{Eval}_F(K, x)$ and $K(T)$ to represent $\text{Puncture}_F(K, T)$. As recently shown in [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13], puncturable PRFs can be built from one-way functions using the classical GGM tree-based construction of PRFs [GGM84]. Specifically:

**Theorem 2.4 ([BW13]).** If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions $n(\lambda), m(\lambda)$, there exists a puncturable PRF family that maps $n(\lambda)$ bits to $m(\lambda)$ bits.

**Hardness-increasing collections of one-way permutations.** Our constructions and security proof require the existence of a concretely secure family of collections of one-way permutations. In particular, each collection contains a permutation for each length $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$, and we have one such collection for each $n \in \mathcal{N}$. The following definition captures an important property of the family, namely, that the effort needed to break one-wayness of $n$ different instances of the family should increase with $n$ (cf. [GJKY13]). This is captured by requiring that the running time $(t(\ell, n))$ of an adversary has to grow with $n$.

**Definition 2.5** (Hardness-increasing one-way permutations). Let $\mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{N}$ be sets of positive integers. We say a family of collections of permutations $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{N}} = \{\{\pi_{\ell,n}\}_{\ell \in \mathcal{L}}\}_{n \in \mathcal{N}}$, where $\pi_{\ell,n} : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$, is hardness-increasing $(t, \epsilon)$-one-way, if there exists an increasing function $t(\cdot, \cdot)$ (in both arguments) such that for any $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$ and $n \in \mathcal{N}$ and for any $t(\ell, n)$-time adversary $A$,

$$\Pr[A(\{\pi_{\ell,i}(x_i)\}_{i \in [n]}) = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} | \pi_{\ell,i} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_{\ell,n}, x_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell, \forall i \in [n]] < \epsilon(\ell).$$

We note that we only require the existence of such collections, as they are only used in the proofs (Section 4). In Appendix A we present a DL-based instantiation of Definition 2.5 for a specific set $\mathcal{L}$.

## 3 Adjustable Signatures

In this section, we present our new notion—syntax and security model—of adjustable signature schemes. Roughly speaking, in such a scheme, the actual length of the signature can be specified, sometimes “on the fly,” according to a parameter $\ell$. Further, in an adjustable signature scheme $\Sigma = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$, the adjustment can happen in one of three phases, corresponding to the three algorithms. If the adjustment is specified in the setup phase, the setup algorithm would take the length parameter as input, and the signature algorithm would generate $\ell$-bits long signatures. If the adjustment is specified in the signing phase, the length of each signature is given as input to the signing algorithm and can vary from one invocation to the next. Finally, when the adjustment is specified in the verification phase, the signing algorithm outputs a standard signature but the verification algorithm will only process the signature’s $\ell$ least significant bits.\(^1\) Next, we discuss each variant in more detail in turn.

**Setup-adjustable signatures.** In the first variant of adjustable signature schemes, the length parameter $\ell$ is an input to the Setup algorithm, thus fixing the length of all signatures that are to be produced and verified. Sign and Verify remain as in a standard signature definition. The ability to decide the signature length during the setup allows an application to weigh the security/efficiency trade-offs before generating the keys. A drawback of this variant is that one needs to re-run the setup algorithm in order to increase/decrease the

\(^1\)One can envision more general formulations where the verification algorithm can take the $\ell$-bit output of an arbitrary function of the signature; for simplicity, here we just focus on the truncation function.
signature length, as mandated for example by the current security needs. Nevertheless, setup-adjustable
signatures are the simplest notion of adjustability we consider, and the one with the most efficient instantia-
tions.

Setup$(1^\lambda, \ell)$: On input the security parameter $\lambda$ and the length parameter $\ell$, the Setup algorithm outputs a
signing key $sk$ and a verification key $vk$.

Sign$(sk, m)$: On input the signing key $sk$ and a message $m$, the signing algorithm outputs a signature $\sigma$ where $|\sigma| = \ell$.

Verify$(vk, \sigma, m)$: On input the verification key $vk$ and a signature/message pair $(\sigma, m)$, the verification algorithm outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).

**Signing-adjustable signatures.** Here, how long a signature is going to be is specified at signing, and this
can change from one invocation to the next.

Setup$(1^\lambda)$: On input the security parameter $\lambda$, the setup algorithm outputs a signing key $sk$ and a verifica-
tion key $vk$.

Sign$(sk, m, \ell)$: On input a secret key $sk$, a message $m$ and the length parameter $\ell$, the signing algorithm
outputs a signature $\sigma$, where $|\sigma| = \ell$. We assume the length parameter $\ell$ is included in signature.

Verify$(vk, \sigma, m)$: On input the verification key $vk$, a signature/message pair $(\sigma, m)$, the verification algo-
rithm outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).

**Verification-adjustable signatures.** In the third variant of adjustable signature schemes, the verification
algorithm takes the length parameter as input.

Setup$(1^\lambda)$: On input the security parameter $\lambda$, the setup algorithm outputs a signing key $sk$ and a verifica-
tion key $vk$.

Sign$(sk, m)$: On input the signing key $sk$ and a message $m$, the signing algorithm outputs a signature $\sigma$.

Verify$(vk, \ell, \sigma, m)$: On input the verification key $vk$, a length parameter $\ell$, the signature $\sigma$ and the message
$m$, the verification algorithm only reads an adjusted $\ell$-bit function of $\sigma$ (i.e., $f(\sigma) = \sigma|_\ell$, and outputs
1 (accept) or 0 (reject).

**Definition 3.1.** Let $\mathcal{L}$ be a finite set of positive integers. We call a signature scheme $\mathcal{L}$-adjustable, if the
length parameter can be chosen to be any $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$.

**Correctness.** The correctness of an $\mathcal{L}$-adjustable signature scheme $\Sigma$ is defined similarly to standard sig-
nature schemes. A setup-adjustable signature scheme is correct if

$$\forall \lambda, m, \ell \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\text{Verify}(vk, \sigma, m) = 1 | (sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \ell), \sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m)] = 1.$$ 

Similarly, a signing-adjustable signature scheme is correct if

$$\forall \lambda, m, \ell \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\text{Verify}(vk, \sigma, m) = 1 | (sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m, \ell)] = 1.$$ 

Finally, a verification-adjustable signature scheme is correct if

$$\forall \lambda, m, \ell \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\text{Verify}(vk, \ell, \sigma, m) = 1 | (sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m)] = 1.$$
Security. We now define the notion of strong existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks for a $\mathcal{L}$-adjustable signature scheme $\Sigma$. To adjust the security level with the length parameter $\ell$, we let the adversary’s advantage function $\epsilon$ and running time $t$ take $\ell$ as input. As discussed earlier, we also need to capture the property that the adversarial effort needed to produce $n$ forgeries should grow proportionally to $n$. To capture this property, the running time of the adversary $t(\ell, n)$ needs to be an increasing function in $n$.

The experiments $\text{Expt}^{\text{setup-adj}}_A(\ell, n, 1^\lambda)$, $\text{Expt}^{\text{sign-adj}}_A(\ell, n, 1^\lambda)$ and $\text{Expt}^{\text{vfy-adj}}_A(\ell, n, 1^\lambda)$ used to describe the interaction between a challenger and an adversary $A$ are parameterized by the length parameter $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$ and the number $n \geq 1$ of successful forgeries made by the adversary $A$. (See Figure 1.) In the experiments, $O_1(\sk, \cdot)$ returns a signature $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\sk, m)$; $O_2(\sk, \cdot, \cdot)$ returns a signature $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\sk, m, \ell)$ if $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\bot$ otherwise; and $O_3(\sk, \cdot)$ returns a signature $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\sk, m)$.

![Figure 1: Security experiments for adjustable signature schemes](image)

We say the adversary $A$ wins in experiment $\text{Expt}^{\text{setup-adj}}_A$ (respectively, $\text{Expt}^{\text{sign-adj}}_A$, $\text{Expt}^{\text{vfy-adj}}_A$) if the output of $\text{Expt}^{\text{setup-adj}}_A$ (resp., $\text{Expt}^{\text{sign-adj}}_A$, $\text{Expt}^{\text{vfy-adj}}_A$) is 1.

**Definition 3.2.** We say a $\mathcal{L}$-setup-adjustable (respectively, $\mathcal{L}$-signing-adjustable, $\mathcal{L}$-verification-adjustable) signature scheme $\Sigma$ is $(t, q_{\text{sign}}, \epsilon)$-strongly existentially unforgeable against adaptive message queries, if there exists an increasing function $t(\cdot, \cdot)$ (in both arguments), such that for all $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$ and $n \in \mathbb{Z}$, and any $t(\ell, n)$-time adversary $A$ that makes at most $q_{\text{sign}}(\ell)$ queries to the signing oracle, the probability of $A$ winning in $\text{Expt}^{\text{setup-adj}}_A(\ell, n, 1^\lambda)$ ($\text{Expt}^{\text{sign-adj}}_A(\ell, n, 1^\lambda)$, $\text{Expt}^{\text{vfy-adj}}_A(\ell, n, 1^\lambda)$, resp.) is less than $\epsilon(\ell)$.

**Remark 3.3.** Since we consider the strong unforgeability notion for signature schemes, we require that if the challenge message $m^*$ is the same as one of the queried messages, then the output signature $\sigma^*$ in the forgery tuple $(m^*, \sigma^*)$ must be different from the signature obtained from the query.

As mentioned in Section 2, in our analyses below there will be asymptotic terms of the form $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ (from the security of the obfuscation and the puncturable PRF family, for example) and concrete terms (from the concrete security of the hardness-increasing one-way permutations). We will assume that $\lambda$ is large enough to render the asymptotic terms insignificant compared to the concrete terms.

### 4 iO-based Adjustable Signatures

In this section, we present our constructions for adjustable signatures in all three scenarios based on iO. In the following section, we also show how to instantiate a setup-adjustable signature scheme using BLS signatures [BLS01].
Achieving our notions of adjustable signatures appears to be a challenging problem. For example, it is not obvious how to adjust group sizes/security level of a DL-based signature scheme at the signing or verification stages without making any changes to the keys which are decided at setup. Nevertheless, we propose the first feasibility results for signing/verification-adjustable signatures based on $iO$, and leave open the question of a concrete instantiation or constructions based on weaker general assumptions.

Our starting point is the short signature scheme by Ramchen and Waters [RW14], which we now briefly review. There are two main components in that construction. The first signature “piece” is a one-time-like signature. The signatures are thus seeing a signature for a message $M$ that on input $(F_t, i)$ reviews. There are two main components in that construction. The first signature “piece” is a one-time-like signature. The security property is that an adversary, on seeing a signature that uses tags $t_i$, checks that $s_1$ is of the above form. The security property is that an adversary, on seeing a signature for a message $M$ that uses tag $t$, cannot construct a signature on $M^* \neq M$ that uses the same tag $t$.

The second piece is the ability to sign the tag $t$ according to the “prefix-guessing” technique [HW09]. To sign a tag $t$, a puncturable PRF $F_{2,i}(K_2, i, \cdot)$ is evaluated on every prefix. Here $F_{2,i}$, $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$, takes inputs of $i$ bits. The signature piece is thus $s_2 = \oplus_{i=1}^{\ell} F_{2,i}(K_2, i, t_i)$, where $t_i$ denotes the length-$i$ prefix of $t$. A verification key is an obfuscated circuit that on input $(t, s_2)$ checks that $s_2$ is of the above form. The security property is that an adversary, on seeing a signature that uses tags $t_1, \ldots, t_q$, cannot produce a signature with a tag $t^* \neq t_i$ for some $i$. The complete scheme merges these two ideas to generate a concise signature. The signatures $s_1$ and $s_2$ are XOR-ed together yielding a single signature $s$. The complete signature is thus $(i, s)$. The verification circuit on input $(M, (t, s))$ computes $s_1 = \oplus_{i=1}^{\ell} F_i(K_1, t_i) | M(i)$ and $s_2 = \oplus_{i=1}^{\ell} F_{2,i}(K_2, i, t_i)$ and checks that $s = s_1 \oplus s_2$.

We now turn to our constructions.

### 4.1 An iO-based setup-adjustable signature scheme

We let $F_i(K_i, \cdot)$ be a puncturable PRF mapping $i$-bit inputs to $\lambda$-bit outputs, for $i \in [3\lambda]$. We assume our message space is $M = \{0,1\}^\lambda$. (Longer messages can be hashed into this space.) Then the $iO$-based setup-adjustable signature scheme (Setup, Sign, Verify) can be described as follows:

- **Setup($1^\lambda, \ell$):** On input the security parameter $\lambda$ and a length parameter $\ell$, the setup algorithm first randomly chooses puncturable PRF keys $\{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$. Then it selects $2\lambda$ random bit-strings $k_{i,b} \in \{0,1\}^{3\lambda}$, for $i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0,1\}$. The signing key is $sk = \{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$, and the verification key $vk$ is an obfuscation of the program described in Figure 2, plus random bit-strings $\{k_{i,b}\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}, b \in \{0,1\}$. Note that the $k_{i,b}$'s are outside of the obfuscated program and publicly known.

- **Sign($sk, m$):** On input the signing key $sk = \{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$, the signing algorithm first computes a temporary tag $t = \oplus_{i=1}^{\lambda} k_{i,m[i]}$, and then computes $s = \oplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F_i(K_i, t_i)$.

It outputs signature $\sigma = s|\ell$.

- **Verify($vk, \sigma, m$):** The verification algorithm first computes the temporary tag $t = \oplus_{i=1}^{\lambda} k_{i,m[i]}$ for message $m$ and then runs the obfuscated program in Figure 2 on the message/signature pair $(\sigma, m)$ and temporary tag $t$, and outputs the result.
**Theorem 4.1.** Let $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{N}}$ be a hardness-increasing family of collections of $(t, \epsilon)$-one-way permutations (Definition 2.5).\(^2\) If the obfuscation scheme used in Figure 2 is indistinguishably secure and $\{F_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$ are secure puncturable PRFs, then the above $\mathcal{L}$-setup-adjustable signature scheme is $(t, q_{\text{sign}}, \epsilon)$-strongly existentially unforgeable (cf. Definition 3.2).

**Proof.** The proof consists of a sequence of hybrid experiments, where the first hybrid corresponds to the experiment $\text{Expt}^{\text{setup-ad}}_A(t, n, 1^n)$. The hybrids can be described as follows:

- **Hybrid H₀:** In the first hybrid, the following experiment is played between challenger and adversary $A$:
  1. $\{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$ are chosen as keys for the puncturable PRFs $\{F_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$, as well as $2\lambda$ random bit strings $\{k_i, b\} \in \{0, 1\}^{3\lambda}$, for $i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0, 1\}$.
  2. The verification key $vk$ is given out as an obfuscation of the program described in Figure 2, plus the $2\lambda$ random bit strings $\{k_i, b\}_{i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0, 1\}}$.
  3. The adversary makes at most $q_{\text{sign}}$ queries to the signing oracle on messages $m_j$, and obtains $s_i | \ell$ as an answer, where the signing oracle first computes a temporary tag $t = \oplus_{i=1}^{3 \lambda} k_i, m_i$, and then computes $s = \oplus_{i=1}^{3 \lambda} F_i(K_i, t_{i})$.
  4. The adversary outputs $n$ message/forged signature pair $\{(m^*_i, \sigma^*_i)\}_{i=1}^{n}$ and wins if $\land_{i=1}^{n} \text{Verify}(vk, m^*_i, \sigma^*_i) = 1$ holds.

- **Hybrid H₁:** In this hybrid, the challenger requires that the messages $\{(m^*_i, \sigma^*_i)\}_{i=1}^{n}$ in the forgery array have not been queried before. The rest of the hybrid remains unchanged.

- **Hybrid H₂:** In this hybrid, the challenger changes the winning condition by enforcing an additional check. Upon receiving queries $\{m_i\}_{i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]}$ and their derived temporary tags $\{t_i\}_{i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]}$, the challenger first let $P$ be the set of all strings $p$ such that $p$ is not a prefix of any $t_i$, but $p | | p | 1$ (truncate the last bit of $p$) is the prefix of at least one $t_i$, for $i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]$. We note that the size of $P$ is always less than $(3\lambda - 1)q_{\text{sign}}$, i.e., the total number of prefixes of all tags in the received queries. This additional check is to ensure that some prefix of the temporary tag derived for each challenge message generated by the adversary is in set $P$. If the check fails, the game outputs $\perp$. The rest of the hybrid remains unchanged.

- **Hybrid H₃:** Same as hybrid H₂, except that the challenger first categorizes the elements in set $P$ by their length, i.e., $P = \bigcup_{i=1}^{3\lambda} S_i$, where set $S_i = \{p \in P | | p | = i\}$. For $i = 1, \ldots, 3\lambda$, compute $z_{ij} = F_i(K_i, s_j), \forall s_j \in S_i$, and let set $Z_i = \{z_{ij}\}$. Then puncture the PRFs $F_i$ on set $S_i$, i.e., $K_i, S_i = \text{Puncture}_{F_i}(K_i, S_i)$. Finally, the challenger sets $vk$ to be the obfuscation of the program described in Figure 3. The rest of the hybrid remains unchanged.

\(^2\)The existence of such a family is only used in the proof.
Hardcoded: Punctured $K_{i,S_i}$, for $i \in [3\lambda]$, a length parameter $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$, and sets $P$ and $Z_i$, for $i \in [3\lambda]$.

**Input:** A message/signature pair $(m, \sigma)$ and temporary tag $t$.

1. If there does not exist $p \in P$ such that $p$ is a prefix of $t$, then if
   
   $$\sigma = \oplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F(K_{i,S_i}, t_{i|\ell})$$

   output 1, otherwise output 0.

2. Else, initialize three empty sets $S, I, Z$, and for $p \in P$, if $p$ is a prefix of $t$, then update $S = S \cup \{p\}$, $I = I \cup \{|p|\}$, and $Z = Z \cup \{z\}$, where $z = F_i(K_{i,p})$. Then if
   
   $$\sigma = \oplus_{z \in Z} z_{\ell} \oplus_{i \notin I} F(K_{i,S_i}, t_{i|\ell})$$

   output 1, otherwise output 0.

---

**Figure 3:** Program Verify Signature* for the $\mathcal{L}$-setup-adjustable signature scheme

- Hybrid $H_4$: The same as hybrid $H_3$ except that we replace elements $z_j$ in $Z_i$, $i \in [3\lambda]$, with random element $u_j \in \mathcal{U}$, where $u_j$ is chosen uniformly at random from the range of the puncturable PRF $F_i$, for $i \in [3\lambda]$.

- Hybrid $H_5$: The same as hybrid $H_4$ except that, for $i \in [3\lambda]$, we set $z_j = \pi_{\ell,i}(\alpha_j), \forall z_j \in Z_i$, where $\pi_{\ell,i} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_{\ell,N}$, and $\alpha_j$ is a random $\ell$-bit string.

**Claim 4.2.** Suppose the winning probability of adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{setup-adj}}(\ell, n, 1^\lambda)$ is $\epsilon$, then the winning probability of adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in hybrid $H_1$ is also $\epsilon$.

**Proof.** We show that the requirement enforced in this hybrid is a benign one, which does not affect the adversary’s advantage in the forgery experiment. For a message $m$, the signature $\sigma$ for $m$ is deterministically generated by first computing the tag $t = \oplus_{i=1}^{\lambda} k_i, m_{[i]}$, and then evaluating the PRFs based on the tag $t$, i.e., $s = \oplus_{i=1}^{\lambda} F_i(K_i, t_{[i]})$. Therefore, for a pair $(m^*_i, \sigma^*_i)$ in the forgery list, where $m^*_i$ has been queried before, in order to pass the verification algorithm, the forged signature $\sigma^*_i$ must be the same as the signature obtained for the response for query $m^*_i$, which means the adversary’s advantages in hybrids $H_0$ and $H_1$ are the same.

**Claim 4.3.** Suppose the winning probability of adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in hybrid $H_1$ is $\epsilon$, then the winning probability of adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in hybrid $H_2$ is at most negligibly different from $\epsilon$.

**Proof.** The difference between hybrids $H_1$ and $H_2$ is the additional check enforced for the forgeries. In hybrid $H_1$, the additional check is to ensure that no message in the forgeries has been queried before, while in hybrid $H_2$, we construct a set $P$, where each element in $P$ is not the prefix of any temporary tags $t_i$ derived from queried message $m_i$, but $p |_{|p|-1}$ is the prefix of at least one $t_i$, for $i \in [\ell_{\text{sign}}]$. The additional check in hybrid $H_2$ is to ensure that for all $t^*_i$ derived from each challenge message $m^*_i$, some prefix of $t^*_i$ is in set $P$. This check fails if and only if $t^*_j = t_i$ for some $i, j$. We observe that this probability is negligible given that $m^*_i \neq m_i$ for all $i, j$. In particular, given the way the tags are generated, the probability that the tags for any two different messages are the same is less than $2^\lambda \times 2^{3\lambda} = 2^{-\lambda}$.

Therefore, the advantage of adversary in hybrid $H_1$ is only an additive factor of $2^{-\lambda}$ less than that of $H_2$. 

\[\square\]
Claim 4.4. If the obfuscation scheme used in Figure 3 is indistinguishably secure, then the probability of adversary \( A \) distinguishing between hybrids \( H_2 \) and \( H_3 \) is negligible, i.e.,

\[
|\Pr[A(H_2) = 1] - \Pr[A(H_3) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

Proof. We argue the computational indistinguishability of these two hybrids based on the security of indistinguishability obfuscation, by demonstrating the functional equivalence of the programs described in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Consider a message/signature pair \((m, \sigma)\) and a temporary tag \(t\) derived from message \(m\), which is an input to the verification program in Figure 3. The program first checks if there exist element \( p \in P \) as prefix of \( t \). If not, then by the functionality-preserving property of puncturable PRF \( F_i \) for \( i \in [3\lambda] \), we have

\[
\sigma = \oplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F(K_i, S_i, t_i)|\ell|.
\]

Else, there exists some element of set \( P \) which is a prefix of the temporary tag \( t_i \). Initialize three empty sets \( S, I, Z \), and for \( p \in P \), if \( p \) is a prefix of \( t \), update \( S = S \cup \{p\}, I = I \cup \{|p|\}, Z = Z \cup \{z\} \), where \( z = F_i(K_i, p) \), and test whether

\[
\sigma = \oplus_{z \in Z} z|\ell| \oplus_{i \in I} F(K_i, S_i, t_i)|\ell|.
\]

Since the hardcoded elements \( z \) are evaluation of PRFs on corresponding truncation of temporary tags, the output of program Verify Signature* in Figure 3 is the same as program Verify Signature in Figure 2. Therefore, if there exists an advantage difference, we can create an algorithm \( B \) that breaks the indistinguishability of obfuscation by submitting Verify Signature and Verify Signature* to the obfuscation challenger.

\[\square\]

Claim 4.5. Based on the security of puncturable PRFs, the probability of adversary \( A \) distinguishing between hybrids \( H_3 \) and \( H_4 \) is negligible, i.e.,

\[
|\Pr[A(H_3) = 1] - \Pr[A(H_4) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

Proof. We now show that for any polynomial-time (in \( \lambda \)) adversary, the advantage in forging signatures must be negligibly close in hybrids \( H_3 \) and \( H_4 \). Otherwise, we can construct an algorithm \( B \) that breaks the selective security of the puncturable PRF at the punctured points, as follows. \( B \) first constructs the set \( P \) with the property specified in hybrid \( H_2 \), and then categorizes the elements by their length, i.e., \( P = \bigcup_{i=1}^{3\lambda} S_i \), where set \( S_i = \{p \in P | |p| = i\} \). For \( i = 1, ..., 3\lambda \), it then computes \( z_{ij} = F_i(K_i, s_j), \forall s_j \in S_i \), and lets set \( Z_i = \{z_{ij}\} \). \( B \) then runs experiment \( H_2 \) except that it sets \( z_{i,j} = z_{i,j,t} \), for \( z_{i,j} \in Z_i \) and \( i \in [3\lambda] \). If \( z_{i,j,t} \) is the output of the PRF \( F_i, S_i \) at point \( p_{i,j} \), then we are in hybrid \( H_3 \); if \( z_{i,j,t} \) is chosen randomly, then we are in hybrid \( H_4 \). \( B \) will output 1 if the adversary wins. Thus, an adversary with different advantages in the two hybrids leads to an algorithm \( B \) that breaks the security of the puncturable PRF.

\[\square\]

Claim 4.6. Based on the security of indistinguishability obfuscation, the probability of adversary \( A \) distinguishing between hybrids \( H_4 \) and \( H_5 \) is negligible,

\[
|\Pr[A(H_4) = 1] - \Pr[A(H_5) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

Proof. We argue the computational indistinguishability of these two hybrids based on the security of indistinguishability obfuscation. We observe that the input/output behavior of these two programs are identical. The only difference is that in the first verification program, for \( i \in [3\lambda] \) and \( z_j \in Z_i \), we set \( u_j = u_j|\ell| \), where \( u_j \) is chosen uniformly from the range of a puncturable PRF \( F_i \), and in the current verification program in hybrid \( H_5 \), we set \( z_j = \pi_{\ell,i}(\alpha_j), \forall z_j \in Z_i \), where \( \pi_{\ell,i} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_{\ell,N} \) for a hardness-increasing family of one-way permutations as defined in Definition 2.5. Therefore, if there exists a difference in the advantages, we can create an algorithm \( B \) that breaks the indistinguishability of the obfuscation by submitting both programs to the challenger.

\[\square\]
Claim 4.7. Given a hardness-increasing family of collections of \((t, \epsilon)\)-one-way permutations \(F_{\ell,N}\), the probability of a \(t\)-time adversary \(A\) winning in hybrid \(H_5\) is less than \(\epsilon\).

Proof. If there exists a successful attacker in hybrid \(H_5\), we can use it to break the \((t, \epsilon)\)-security of the one-way permutations family. The algorithm \(B\) works as follows: it first receives \(z'_{i,j,\ell} = \pi_{\ell,i}(a_{i,j})\) as an input for \(i \in [3\lambda], j \in [q_{\text{sign}}]\), where \(a_{i,j}\) is a random bit string and \(\pi_{\ell,i} \sim F_{\ell,N}\), for \(i \in [3\lambda]\) and \(j \in [q_{\text{sign}}]\). Then \(B\) computes the set \(P\) from queried temporary tags, and punctures the PRFs as described in hybrid \(H_2\). Next, \(B\) replaces the elements in \(Z_i\) with \(z'_{i,j,\ell}\) correspondingly. Since the \(z'_{i,j,\ell}\)’s are identically distributed to the \(z'_{i,j,\ell}\)’s in hybrid \(H_3\), the view of an attacker \(A\) is identical to the view in hybrid \(H_5\). If an attacker successfully outputs a forgery \((m^*, \sigma^*)\), where \(\sigma^* = s^*|_\ell\), then by definition \(B\) can compute the random string \(z\) as

\[
    z = s^*|_\ell \oplus z \oplus \pi_{i,S_i} F(K_{i,S_i}, t_i)|_\ell.
\]

Therefore, if the one-way permutation is \((t, \epsilon)\)-secure, then no \(t\)-time attacker can forge with probability larger than \(\epsilon\). \qed

Combining the description of hybrids \(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4, H_5\) and the above claims, we conclude that the advantage of a \(t\)-time adversary in the existential unforgability experiment is less than \(\epsilon\). \qed

4.2 An \(i\mathcal{O}\)-based signing-adjustable signature scheme

Next, we present our construction of the signing-adjustable signature scheme based on \(i\mathcal{O}\). We still let \(F_i(K_i, \cdot)\) be a puncturable PRF mapping \(i\)-bit inputs to \(\lambda\)-bit outputs, for \(i \in [3\lambda]\), and assume message space \(M = \{0, 1\}^\lambda\). The description of algorithms \(\Sigma = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})\) for this variant are given below. In a nutshell, the length of signatures are now decided on-the-fly at signing time, and so the length parameter is taken as an input by the \(\text{Sign}\) algorithm; in addition, the obfuscated program (verification key) also takes it as an input (it can actually be derived from the signature itself), in contrast to the setup-adjustable case, where it was hard-coded.

**Setup\((1^\lambda)\):** On input the security parameter \(\lambda\), the setup algorithm first randomly chooses puncturable PRF keys \(\{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}\). Then select \(2n\) random bit strings \(k_{i,b} \in \{0, 1\}^{3\lambda}\), for \(i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0, 1\}\). The signing key is \(sk = \{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}\), and the verification key \(vk\) is an obfuscation of the program described in Figure 4, plus random bit strings \(\{k_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0, 1\}}\).

**Sign\((sk, m, \ell)\):** On input the signing key \(sk\), a message \(m\) and a length parameter \(\ell \in \mathcal{L}\), the signing algorithm first computes the temporary tag \(t = \oplus_{i=1}^{\lambda} k_{i,m[i]}\), and then computes

\[
    s = \oplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F_i(K, t_i)|_\ell.
\]

It outputs signature \(\sigma = s|_\ell\).

**Verify\((vk, m, \sigma)\):** On input the verification key \(vk\), a message \(m\), and a signature \(\sigma\), the verification algorithm first computes the temporary tag \(t = \oplus_{i=1}^{\lambda} k_{i,m[i]}\) for the message \(m\), and runs the obfuscated program in Figure 4 on input \((m, \sigma, \ell, t)\), where \(\ell = |\sigma|\).

| **Hardcoded:** PRF key \(\{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}\). |
| **Input:** A message \(m\), a signature \(\sigma\), a length parameter \(\ell \in \mathcal{L}\), and a temporary tag \(t\). |

- Output 1 if \(\sigma = \oplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F_i(K, t_i)|_\ell\), otherwise output 0.

Figure 4: Program Verify Signature for the \(\mathcal{L}\)-signing-adjustable signature scheme
Theorem 4.8. Let $F_{\mathcal{C},N}$ be a hardness-increasing family of collections of $(t, \epsilon)$-one-way permutations (Definition 2.5). If the obfuscation scheme used in Figure 4 is indistinguishably secure and $\{F_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$ are secure puncturable PRFs, then the above $\mathcal{L}$-signing-adjustable signature scheme is $(t, q_{\text{sign}}, \epsilon)$-strongly existentially unforgeable (Definition 3.2).

The proof is similar in spirit to the proof for setup-adjustable signatures above; a proof sketch is presented in Appendix B.1.

### 4.3 An $iO$-based verification-adjustable signature scheme

We conclude this section by presenting our $iO$-based construction of signatures whose length can be fixed at the verification stage. As such, algorithms Setup and Sign are oblivious to the length parameter, while Verify takes it as an additional argument.

**Setup$(1^\lambda)$**: On input the security parameter $\lambda$, the setup algorithm first randomly chooses puncturable PRF keys $\{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$. Then select $2n$ random bit strings $k_{i,b} \in \{0,1\}^{3\lambda}$, for $i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0,1\}$. The signing key is $sk = \{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$, and the verification key $vk$ is an obfuscation of the program described in following Figure 5, plus random bit strings $\{k_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0,1\}}$.

**Sign$(sk, m)$**: On input the signing key $sk$ and a message $m$, the signing algorithm first computes the temporary tag $t = \oplus_{i=1}^{\lambda} k_{i,m[i]}$, and then outputs signature $\sigma$:

$$\sigma = s = \oplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F_i(K_i, t_i).$$

**Verify$(vk, \ell, m, \sigma)$**: On input the verification key $vk$, a length parameter $\ell$, a message $m$ and a signature $\sigma$, the verification algorithm first computes the temporary tag $t = \oplus_{i=1}^{\lambda} k_{i,m[i]}$ for the message $m$, and runs the obfuscated program in Figure 5 on input $(m, \sigma, \ell, t)$.

| **Hardcoded**: PRF key $\{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$. |
| **Input**: A message $m$, an adjusted signature $\sigma$, a length parameter $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$ and a temporary tag $t$. |
| $\bullet$ Output 1 if $\sigma = \oplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F_i(K_i, t_i)_{|\ell}$, otherwise output 0. |

Figure 5: Program Verify for the $\mathcal{L}$-verification-adjustable signature scheme

Theorem 4.9. Let $F_{\mathcal{L},N}$ be a hardness-increasing family of collections of $(t, \epsilon)$-one-way permutations (Definition 2.5). If the obfuscation scheme used in Figure 5 is indistinguishably secure and $\{F_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$ are secure puncturable PRFs, then the above $\mathcal{L}$-verification-adjustable signature scheme is $(t, q_{\text{sign}}, \epsilon)$-strongly existentially unforgeable (Definition 3.2).

A proof sketch is presented in Appendix B.2.

In the above constructions the adjustment to the signatures was specified using a length parameter $\ell$, and the output of the PRF was simply truncated to $\ell$-bits. We note that if we replace truncation by any other “uniformity preserving” function, the correctness and security proofs would still hold with minor modifications.
5 A Concrete Setup-Adjustable Signature Scheme

In this section we focus on a concrete instantiation of setup-adjustable signatures, based on the BLS signature scheme [BLS01]. Recall that BLS provides the shortest existing signatures for the same level of security as other schemes, and hence provides a good starting point for achieving smaller size signatures, relevant to our OTP motivating application. The basic idea is to instantiate the BLS scheme using smaller size groups. This would yield shorter signatures, but also weaker security guarantees. We show how careful choices of the elliptic curve groups can provide a reasonable trade-off between signature length and security. We also report on our prototype implementation for different values of the length parameter.

5.1 Bilinear maps and BLS signatures

We first present a few facts related to groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps, followed by a specific number-theoretic assumption.

Let $G$ and $G_T$ be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order $q$. Let $g$ be a generator of group $G$ and $e$ be a bilinear map, i.e., $e : G \times G \rightarrow G_T$ satisfying the following properties:

1. Bilinearity: for all $u, v \in G$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, we have $e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab}$.
2. Non-degeneracy: $e(g, g) \neq 1$.

We say that $G$ is a bilinear group if the group operation in $G$ and the bilinear map $e : G \times G \rightarrow G_T$ are both efficiently computable. Notice that the map $e$ is symmetric since $e(g^a, g^b) = e(g, g)^{ab} = e(g^b, g^a)$.

We present the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH) as follows. Choose a group $G$ of prime order $q$ according to the security parameter, and let $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ be chosen at random. The problem is, given $(g, g^a, g^b)$, to compute $g^{ab}$.

**Definition 5.1.** We say that the CDH assumption holds if no polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible advantage in solving the problem above.

**Remark 5.2.** As mentioned above, in this work we use BLS signatures [BLS01] (described below) to construct setup-adjustable signatures. Therefore, we will also use a concrete version of the CDH assumption in the instantiation, and we will say that the CDH assumption is $(t, \epsilon)$-hard (potentially using additional arguments—see below), if for a $t$-time adversary, the advantage of solving the problem above is at most $\epsilon$.

**BLS signatures.** We describe the algorithms (Setup, Sign, Verify) of the BLS signature scheme [BLS01] as follows. We let the group $G$ be a cyclic group of size $q$ generated by the generator $g$, where the CDH assumption is hard in $G$. We also let $G^* = G - \{1\}$. The signature scheme also makes use of a full-domain hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G^*$.

**Setup(1^\lambda):** On input the security parameter $\lambda$, the setup algorithm picks a random $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes $v = g^x$. The verification key is $vk = v$, and the signing key is $x$.

**Sign(sk, m):** On input the signing key $sk = x$ and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, the signing algorithm first computes $h = H(m)$ and $\sigma = h^x$, and outputs $\sigma$.

**Verify(vk, m, $\sigma$):** On input the verification key $vk = v$ and a message/signature pair $(m, \sigma)$, the verification algorithm first computes $h = H(m)$ and outputs 1 if $(g, v, h, \sigma)$ is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, i.e. $e(g, \sigma) \overset?{=} e(h, v)$, and otherwise outputs 0.
It is easy to verify the correctness of the BLS scheme. For security, we resort to the following theorem.

**Theorem 5.3.** Assuming the CDH assumption in group $G$ is $(\tau, t', e')$-hard, the signature scheme is $(t, q_H, q_S, \epsilon)$-secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen-message attacks, where

$$t \leq t' - 2c\log p(q_H + q_S) \quad \text{and} \quad \epsilon \geq 2e \cdot q_S e' ,$$

where $c$ is a small constant, $e$ is the base of natural logarithm, $q_H, q_S$ denote the number of queries to the random oracle $H$ and the signing oracle, respectively, and $\tau$ is equal to twice the time necessary to compute a pairing on group $G$.

### 5.2 Our setup-adjustable variant

In order to instantiate BLS using smaller group sizes, we first need to understand how it affects the security of the resulting signature scheme. In particular, we first map the hardness of CDH in the original group to the hardness of DL in a related finite field. To do so, we need to recall the notion of security multiplier introduced in [BLS01] and the security analysis therein the work as follows:

**Definition 5.4 (Security multiplier [BLS01]).** Let $p$ be a prime number, $k$ be a positive exponent, and $E$ be an elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ with $m$ points. Let $P$ on curve $E$ be a point of prime order $q$ where $q^2 \nmid m$. We say that the subgroup $\langle P \rangle$ has a security multiplier $\alpha$, for some integer $\alpha > 0$, if the order of $p^k$ in $\mathbb{F}_q^*$ is $\alpha$. In other words,

$$q \mid p^k - 1 \quad \text{and} \quad q \nmid p^{kj} - 1, \forall j = 1, \ldots, \alpha - 1.$$  

As we will show below, for the CDH problem to be hard in the subgroup $\langle P \rangle$, the security multiplier for this subgroup cannot be too small. On the other hand, in order for the group operations in $\langle P \rangle$ to be efficient, the security multiplier cannot be too large. Therefore, the challenge in constructing setup-adjustable signatures based on BLS is to find curves with security multipliers that are large enough for security, but small enough for efficiency. We adapt the analysis of [BLS01] to find the right curves for our setup-adjustable scheme.

Let $\langle P \rangle$ be a subgroup of $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ of order $q$ with security multiplier $\alpha$. There are two standard ways of solving the DL (discrete log) problem in $\langle P \rangle$: the “MOV” reduction [MOV+93] and the generic reduction algorithms, such as Baby-Step-Giant-Step and Pollard’s Rho method [MOV96]. The running time of the generic methods is proportional to $\sqrt{q}$. Thus, we must ensure that $q$ is sufficiently large to resist these attacks. The MOV reduction, on the other hand, maps the DL problem in $\langle P \rangle$ to the DL problem in the extension of $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$, say, $\mathbb{F}_{p^{ki}}$ for some $i$, and requires that the image of $\langle P \rangle$ under this mapping be a subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_{p^{ki}}$ of order $q$. This requires that $q|(p^{ki} - 1)$, which implies $i \geq \alpha$ by the definition of security multiplier. Hence, the MOV reduction can at best reduce the DL problem in $\langle P \rangle$ to the DL problem in a subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_{p^{\alpha}}$. Therefore, to ensure that the DL problem in $\langle P \rangle$ is hard in our setting, we need to choose curves with large security multipliers.

Supersingular curves usually have small representations, which in our setting will result in small signature sizes. Due to the perception of the Menezes-Okamoto-Vanstone [MOV+93] reductions as attacks, supersingular curves are widely believed to be weak curves, and thus not desirable for cryptographic applications. However, as argued in [Kob02, FST10], there is no known reason why a nonsupersingular curve with small embedding degree $k$ would have any security advantage over a supersingular curve with the same embedding degree.

As we will show below, the supersingular curves given by $E_{3,2} : y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2$ and $E_{3,1} : y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 1$ have security multiplier 6, which is sufficient for generating short signatures. The MOV reduction described above reduces the DL for these curves to the DL problem in $E_{3,2}/\mathbb{F}_{p^{6k}}$ and $(E_{3,1}/\mathbb{F}_{3^{6k}})$. This means that we can use relatively small values of $k$ to obtain short signatures, but the security depends
on the DL problem in a large finite field. We use the following two lemmas to describe the behavior of these two curves.

**Lemma 5.5** ([Kob98]). The curve $E_{3,2} : y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2$ defined over $\mathbb{F}_{3k}$ satisfies:

$$
\#(E_{3,2}/\mathbb{F}_{3k}) = \begin{cases} 
3^k + 1 + \sqrt{3} \cdot 3^k & \text{when } k = \pm 1 \text{ mod } 12; \\
3^k + 1 - \sqrt{3} \cdot 3^k & \text{when } k = \pm 5 \text{ mod } 12.
\end{cases}
$$

The curve $E_{3,1} : y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 1$ defined over $\mathbb{F}_{3k}$ satisfies:

$$
\#(E_{3,1}/\mathbb{F}_{3k}) = \begin{cases} 
3^k + 1 - \sqrt{3} \cdot 3^k & \text{when } k = \pm 1 \text{ mod } 12; \\
3^k + 1 + \sqrt{3} \cdot 3^k & \text{when } k = \pm 5 \text{ mod } 12.
\end{cases}
$$

**Lemma 5.6** ([BLS01]). Let curves $E_{3,1}, E_{3,2}$ be defined as above over $\mathbb{F}_{3k}$, where $k \text{ mod } 12 = \pm 1$ or $\pm 5$.

Then we have $\#(E/\mathbb{F}_{3k})3^{6k} - 1$.

Combining the above two lemmas, we obtain that for relevant values of $k$, the curves $E_{3,1}$ and $E_{3,2}$ over finite field $\mathbb{F}_{3k}$ will have security multiplier at most 6.

In addition to the supersingular curves described above, we also use a curve proposed in [MNT01], call it “MNT,” for our implementation. Let $\alpha$ be an even number; we choose a polynomial basis for $\mathbb{F}_{p^\alpha}$ over $\mathbb{F}_p$ by an irreducible polynomial with no odd terms, i.e.,

$$F_{p^\alpha} = \mathbb{F}_p[x]/(f(x)), \quad f(x) = x^\alpha + b_{\alpha-2}x^{\alpha-2} + \cdots + b_2x^2 + b_0.$$  

The curve is set to be $E_{\text{MNT}} : y^2 = x^3 - 3x + B$, where $B \in \mathbb{F}_p$, and the group order divisible by a large prime $N$ such that $N$ divides $p^\alpha - 1$ and $N$ does not divide $p^\beta - 1$ for $\beta < \alpha$.

Finally, for hashing onto the elliptic curves in the BLS signature scheme, we follow the same approach as [BLS01], i.e., the MapToGroup hash, to construct the hash function. Suppose we are given a hash function $H' : \{0, 1\}^* \to \mathbb{F}_{p^k} \times \{0, 1\}$, and let the curves be denoted by $y^2 = f(x)$. We note that the failure probability of the MapToGroup hash function can be made arbitrarily small by picking an appropriately large $I$. For self containment, we recall the MapToGroup hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \to G$:

**Input:** $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$

1. Set $i = 0$ and $(x, b) \leftarrow H'(i|m) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^k} \times \{0, 1\}$.

2. If $f(x)$ is a quadratic residue in $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$, then let $y_0, y_1 \in \mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ be the two square roots of $f(x)$. First set $P_m \in E/\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ be the point $(x, y_b)$, where $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Then compute $P_m = (m/q)\tilde{P}_m$. Output $P_m$ as the result if $P_m \in G^*$.

3. Otherwise, increment $i$, and continue from step 1. If $I$ reaches $2^I$, then report failure.

**Figure 6:** Description of the MapToGroup hash function [BLS01]

In the description below, we assume that the length parameter $\ell$ is chosen from one of those in Table 1 (i.e., $\mathcal{L} = \{27, 85, 126, 149, 154\}$). Then, the $\mathcal{L}$-setup-adjustable signature scheme based on BLS signatures can be described as follows:

- **Setup($1^\lambda, \ell$):** Given one of the values $\ell$ in Table 1, let $E/\mathbb{F}_{3k}$ be the corresponding curve and $q$ be the largest prime factor of the curve. We set $P \in E/\mathbb{F}_{3k}$ to be a point of order $q$. Select a random $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ast$ and set $R = x \cdot P$. Set the verification key $vk = (k, q, P, R)$ and secret key $sk = x$.  


• Sign(sk, m): On input a message \( m \in \{0,1\}^* \), first use hash function \( \text{MapToGroup} \) to map \( m \) to a point \( P_m \in \langle P \rangle \). Then set \( S_m = x \cdot P_m \). The signature \( \sigma \) of message \( m \) is the \( x \)-coordinate of \( S_m \).

• Verify(vk, m, \sigma): On input a message/signature pair \((m, \sigma)\) and verification key \( \text{vk} = (k, q, P, R) \), do the following:

  1. Insert the signature \( \sigma \) into the elliptic curve equation to get a valid \( y \)-coordinate \( y \). Set point \( S = (\sigma, y) \). If no valid \( y \) could be found, output \( \perp \).

  2. If \( e(P, S) = e(R, H(m)) \), accept the signature. Otherwise, reject.

We state the security of our setup-adjustable signature scheme below. The proof structure follows the proof of Lemma 5 in [BLS01].

**Theorem 5.7.** Suppose \( E/\mathbb{F}_{3^k} \) is one of the curves described above, \( q \) is the largest prime dividing \( \#E \), \( P \) is a point of order \( q \) on \( E \), and the CDH problem is \((t', \epsilon')\)-hard in group \( G = \langle P \rangle \). Let \( H' : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{F}_{3^\epsilon} \times \{0,1\} \) be a random oracle. Then the setup-adjustable scheme described above is \((t, q_H, q_{\text{sign}}, \epsilon)\)-secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model, with

\[
t \leq t' - 2c(\log q_H + q_{\text{sign}}) - 2\tau \log(\#E/\mathbb{F}) - 2\tau \text{ and } \epsilon \geq 2e \cdot q_{\text{sign}} \epsilon',
\]

where \( c \) is a small constant and \( \tau \) is equal to twice the time necessary to compute a pairing on group \( G \).

We omit a full proof of the theorem here, but note that the BLS signature scheme is \((t_1, q_H, q_{\text{sign}}, \epsilon_1)\)-secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen-message attacks according to Theorem 5.3, with \( t_1 \leq t' - 2c \log p(q_H + q_S) \) and \( \epsilon_1 \geq 2e \cdot q_S \epsilon' \). By adjusting the terms based on the concrete security of the hash function \( H \) and the concrete security over the field \( \mathbb{F}_{3^k} \) instead of the group \( G \) as in [BLS01], we obtain the new bounds on \( t \) and \( \epsilon \).

**Remark 5.8.** For succinctness, we have provided the analysis and experiments (see below) for supersingular curves \( E_{3,2} : y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2 \) and \( E_{3,1} : y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 1 \) over \( \mathbb{F}_{3^k} \) and MNT curve \( E_{\text{MNT}} : y^2 = x^3 - 3x + B \), hence focusing on the length parameters depicted in Table 1. We note that it is possible to accommodate more choices of \( \ell \) by searching for other curves with appropriate security guarantees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Curve</th>
<th>Sig. size (bits)</th>
<th>k</th>
<th>Initialize (s)</th>
<th>Setup (s)</th>
<th>Signing (s)</th>
<th>Verify (s)</th>
<th>DLog security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( E_{3,2}(\mathbb{F}_{3^{17}}) )</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( E_{3,1}(\mathbb{F}_{3^{53}}) )</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11.39</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>152.37</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( E_{3,2}(\mathbb{F}_{3^{79}}) )</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>42.27</td>
<td>21.09</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>504.12</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( E_{3,1}(\mathbb{F}_{3^{97}}) )</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>57.38</td>
<td>39.24</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>989.42</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( E_{\text{MNT}} )</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Timing of setup-adjustable signatures for different values of \( \ell \)

**Implementation details.** We have implemented our signature construction using the elliptic curves discussed above. Our implementation uses the NTL library [Sho]. The most expensive feature of the BLS signature is the verification algorithm as it computes two pairings. The initialization of the bilinear group, setup, signing and verification algorithms are all timed separately in Table 1 using a 1.6GHz dual-core processor machine. The variety of short signatures instantiated using different curves illustrates the practical feasibility of setup-adjustable signatures.
References


A Concrete DL-based One-Way Permutations

In the security proofs of our iO-based adjustable-signature constructions presented in this paper, we make use of a family $F_{\ell,N} = \{\{\pi_{\ell,n}\}_{\ell \in \mathcal{L}}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of collections of one-way permutations (refer to Definition 2.5 for the notion), which here we show how to instantiate assuming the hardness of CDL. We instantiate each one-way permutation $\pi_{\ell,n}$ in family $F_{\ell,N}$ using a family of elliptic curves. We follow the approach of Koblitz and Menezes [KM05] for constructing a family of elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_q$ with embedding degree 2 as follows:

- If $q = 3 \text{ mod } 4$, return $y^2 = x^3 + ax$ for any $a \in \mathbb{F}_q^*$.
- If $q = 5 \text{ mod } 6$, return $y^2 = x^3 + b$ for any $b \in \mathbb{F}_q^*$.
and then we let \( \mathcal{L} = \{27, 85, 126, 149, 154\} \) (similarly to the curves given in Table 7). The construction of a \((t, \epsilon)\)-one-way permutation collection \(\pi_{\ell,n}, \ell \in \mathcal{L}\), based on the DL-problem is given in Figure 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input: ( x \in {0, 1}^\ell )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Given one of the curves generated above, let \( E/\mathbb{F}_q \) be the corresponding curve and \( q \) be the largest prime factor of the curve. Set \( P \in E/\mathbb{F}_q \) be a point of order \( q \).
| 2. Denote \( x = x_1x_2 \cdots x_\ell \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \), and set \( y = \sum_{i=1}^\ell 2^i x_i \). Set point \( S = y \cdot P \). Output the bit representation of \( x \)-coordinate of point \( S \) as \( \pi(x) \).

Figure 7: A DL-based collection of concrete one-way permutations

Based on the hardness of CDH on the curve \( E/\mathbb{F}_q \), we have the following lemma:

**Lemma A.1.** Let \( E/\mathbb{F}_q \) be one of the curves described above, \( q \) the largest prime dividing \#\( E \), \( P \) a point of order \( q \) on \( E \), and assume the CDH problem is \((t, \epsilon)\)-hard on group \( G = \langle P \rangle \). Then the above construction gives a \((t, \epsilon)\)-one-way permutation collection for set \( \mathcal{L} = \{27, 85, 126, 149, 154\} \).

### B Proofs

#### B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.8

**Proof (sketch):** The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, consisting of a sequence of hybrid experiments, where the first hybrid corresponds to the original signature security experiment \( \text{Expt}^{\text{sign-adj}}_A(\ell,n,1^\lambda) \), and similar argument for indistinguishability between two consecutive hybrids.

- **Hybrid \( H_0 \):** In the first hybrid, the following experiment is played:
  
  1. \( \{K_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda} \) are chosen as keys for the puncturable PRFs \( \{F_i\}_{i=1}^{3\lambda} \). Then choose \( 2\lambda \) random bit strings \( \{k_{i,b}\} \in \{0,1\}^{3\lambda}, \) for \( i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0,1\} \).
  2. The verification key \( vk \) given out as an obfuscation of the program described in Figure 4, \( 2\lambda \) random bit strings \( \{k_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0,1\}} \) and a length parameter \( \ell \) chosen from set \( \mathcal{L} \) are sent to the adversary \( A \).
  3. The adversary makes at most \( q_{\text{sign}} \) queries to the signing oracle on messages \( \langle m_i, \ell \rangle \). For query \( \langle m_i, \ell \rangle \), the signing oracle first computes temporary tag \( t_i = \oplus_{j=1}^\lambda k_j \cdot m_{i[j]} \), then outputs signature \( \sigma = (\oplus_{j=1}^\lambda F_j(K_i, t_i))\ell \).
  4. The adversary outputs \( n \) message/forged signature pair \( \{(m_i^*, \sigma_i^*)\}_{i=1}^n \) and wins if \( \land_{i=1}^n (\text{Verify}(vk, m_i^*, \sigma_i^*)\land |\sigma_i^*| = \ell) = 1 \) holds.

- **Hybrid \( H_1 \):** In this hybrid, for \( i \in [n] \), the challenger requires the message \( m_i^* \) in the forgery pair \( (m_i^*, \sigma_i^*) \) is not queried before. The rest of the hybrid remains unchanged.

- **Hybrid \( H_2 \):** In this hybrid, challenger changes the winning condition. Upon receiving queries \( \{m_i\}_{i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]} \) and their derived temporary tags \( \{t_i\}_{i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]} \), the challenge first computes the common unused prefix: Let set \( P \) to be of all strings \( p \) having the property that \( p \) is not a prefix of any \( t_i \), but \( p|p|_{p-1} \) (truncating the last bit of \( p \)) is the prefix of at least one \( t_i \) for \( i \in [q_{\text{sign}}] \). The size of \( P \) should be at most \((3\lambda-1)/q_{\text{sign}} \). The additional check added here is to check the prefix of temporary tags derived from challenge messages are in set \( P \). The rest of the hybrid remains unchanged.
• Hybrid $H_3$: Same as hybrid $H_1$, except that the challenger first categorized the elements in set $P$ by their length, i.e., $P = \bigcup_{i=1}^{3\lambda} S_i$, where set $S_i = \{ p \in P | |p| = i \}$. For $i = 1, \ldots, 3\lambda$ compute the $z_{ij} = F_i(K_i, s_j), \forall s_j \in S_i$, and let set $Z_i = \{ z_{ij} \}$. Then puncture the PRFs $F_i$ on set $S_i$, i.e., $K_{i,S_i} = \text{Puncture}_{F_i}(K_i, S_i)$. Then challenger sets $vk$ to be the obfuscation of the program described in Figure 8. The rest of the hybrid remains unchanged.

Hardcoded: Punctured key $K_{i,S_i}$ for $i \in [3\lambda]$ a length parameter $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$, and strings sets $P$ and $Z_i$ for $i \in [3\lambda]$.

Input: A message/signature pair $(m, \sigma)$ and temporary tag $t$.

1. If these dose not exist $p \in P$ such that $p$ is a prefix of $t$, then if

   \[
   \sigma = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F(K_i, S_i, t_i) | \ell
   \]

   output 1, otherwise output 0.

2. Else initialize three empty sets $S, I, Z$, and for $p \in P$, if $p$ is a prefix of $t$, then update $S = S \cup \{ p \}, I = I \cup \{ |p| \}, Z = Z \cup \{ z \}$, where $z = F_i(K_i, p)$. Then if

   \[
   \sigma = \bigoplus_{z \in Z | \ell} \bigoplus_{i \in I} F(K_i, S_i, t_i) | \ell
   \]

   output 1, otherwise output 0.

Figure 8: Program Verify Signature* for signing-adjustable signature

• Hybrid $H_4$: The same as hybrid $H_3$ except that we replace elements $z_j$ in $Z_i$ for $i \in [3\lambda]$ with random element $u_j$, where $u_j$ is chosen uniformly at random from the range of the puncturable PRF $F_i$ for $i \in [3\lambda]$.

• Hybrid $H_5$: The same as hybrid $H_4$ except for $i \in [3\lambda]$ set $z_j = \pi_{\ell,i}(\alpha_j), \forall z_j \in Z_i$, where $\pi_{\ell,i}, \ell = F_i, F_i, N$, and $\alpha_j$ is a random $\ell$-bit string.

The proof now follows through a series of claims, similarly to Theorem 4.1. Combining the description of hybrids $H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4, H_5$ and the corresponding (omitted) claims, we conclude that the advantage of $t$-time adversary in the existential unforgeability experiment is less than $\epsilon$. \qed

B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.9

Proof (sketch): The proof of the theorem is similar to the previous two. Here we describe the sequence of hybrid experiments.

• Hybrid $H_0$: in the first hybrid, the following experiment is played:

1. $\{ K_i \}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$ are chosen as keys for the puncturable PRFs $\{ F_i \}_{i=1}^{3\lambda}$. Then choose $2\lambda$ random bit strings $\{ k_{i,b} \} \in \{ 0, 1 \}^{3\lambda}$, for $i \in [\lambda], b \in \{ 0, 1 \}$.

2. The verification key $vk$ given out as an obfuscation of the program described in Figure 4, $2\lambda$ random bit strings $\{ k_{i,b} \}_{i \in [\lambda], b \in \{ 0, 1 \}}$ and a length parameter $\ell$ chosen from set $\mathcal{L}$ are sent to the adversary $A$.

3. The adversary makes at most $q_{\text{sign}}$ queries to the signing oracle on messages $m$. For query $m_i$, the signing oracle first computes temporary tag $t_i = \bigoplus_{j=1}^{3\lambda} k_{j,m_i[j]}$, then outputs signature $\sigma = \bigoplus_{j=1}^{3\lambda} F_j(K_i, t_i)$. 

22
4. The adversary outputs $n$ message/forged signature pair $\{(m_i^*, \sigma_i^*, \ell)\}_{i=1}^n$ and wins if $\bigwedge_{i=1}^n \text{Verify}(vk, m_i^*, \sigma_i^*, \ell) = 1$ holds.

- Hybrid $H_1$: In this hybrid, for $i \in [n]$ the challenger requires the message $m_i^*$ in the forgery tuple $(m_i^*, \sigma_i^*, \ell)$ is less than $\epsilon$.

- Hybrid $H_2$: In this hybrid, challenger changes the winning condition. Upon receiving queries $\{m_i\}_{i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]}$ and their derived temporary tags $\{t_i\}_{i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]}$, the challenger lets $P$ be the set of all strings $p$ having the property that $p$ is not a prefix of any $t_i$, but $p|_{|p|-1}$ (truncating the last bit of $p$) is the prefix of at least one $t_i$ for $i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]$. Note that size of $P$ is at most $(3\lambda - 1)q_{\text{sign}}$, i.e. the total number of all prefixes of all received signature queries. The additional check added here is to check that at least one prefix of the temporary tags derived from each challenge message is in set $P$. The rest of the hybrid remains unchanged.

- Hybrid $H_3$: Same as hybrid $H_1$, except that the challenger first categorized the elements in set $P$ by their length, i.e. $P = \bigcup_{i=1}^{3\lambda} S_i$, where set $S_i = \{p \in P\mid |p| = i\}$. For $i = 1, ..., 3\lambda$ compute the $z_{ij} = F_i(K_i, s_j), \forall s_j \in S_i$, and let set $Z_i = \{z_{ij}\}$. Then puncture the PRFs $F_i$ on set $S_i$, i.e. $K_{i,S_i} = \text{Puncture}_{F_i}(K_i, S_i)$. Then challenger sets $vk$ to be the obfuscation of the program described in Figure 9. The rest of the hybrid remains unchanged.

**Figure 9: Program Verify Signature** for the verification-adjustable signature scheme

- Hybrid $H_4$: The same as hybrid $H_3$ except that we replace elements $z_j$ in $Z_i$ for $i \in [3\lambda]$ with random element $u_j|_{\ell}$, where $u_j$ is chosen uniformly at random from the range of the puncturable PRF $F_i$ for $i \in [3\lambda]$.

- Hybrid $H_5$: The same as hybrid $H_4$ except for $i \in [3\lambda]$ set $z_j = \pi_{\ell,i}(\alpha_j), \forall z_j \in Z_i$, where $\pi_{\ell,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}_{\ell,N}$, and $\alpha_j$ is a random $\ell$-bit string.

Combining the description of hybrids $H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4, H_5$ and corresponding (omitted) claims about their indistinguishability/security, we obtain that the advantage of a polynomial $t$-time adversary in the existential unforgeability experiment is less than $\epsilon$. 

---

**Hardcoded:** Punctured key $K_{i,S_i}$ for $i \in [3\lambda]$ a length parameter $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$ and strings sets $P$ and $Z_i$ for $i \in [3\lambda]$.

**Input:** A message/signature pair $(m, \sigma)$ and temporary tag $t$.

1. If these dose not exist $p \in P$ such that $p$ is a prefix of $t$, then if
   \[
   \sigma = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{3\lambda} F(K_{i,S_i}, t|_i)|_{\ell}
   \]
   output 1, otherwise output 0.
2. Else initialize three empty sets $S, I, Z$, and for $p \in P$, if $p$ is a prefix of $t$, then update
   \[
   S = S \cup \{p\}, I = I \cup \{|p|\}, Z = Z \cup \{z\}, \text{ where } z = F_i(K_i, p).
   \]
   Then if
   \[
   \sigma = \bigoplus_{z \in Z} z|_{\ell} \bigoplus_{i \notin I} F(K_{i,S_i}, t|_i)|_{\ell}
   \]
   output 1, otherwise output 0.

---

**Program Verify Signature**

- The same as hybrid $H_3$ except for $i \in [3\lambda]$ set $z_j = \pi_{\ell,i}(\alpha_j), \forall z_j \in Z_i$, where $\pi_{\ell,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}_{\ell,N}$, and $\alpha_j$ is a random $\ell$-bit string.

Combining the description of hybrids $H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4, H_5$ and corresponding (omitted) claims about their indistinguishability/security, we obtain that the advantage of a polynomial $t$-time adversary in the existential unforgeability experiment is less than $\epsilon$. 