Paper 2016/530
Generic Semantic Security against a Kleptographic Adversary
Alexander Russell, Qiang Tang, Moti Yung, and Hong-Sheng Zhou
Abstract
Notable recent security incidents have generated intense interest in adversaries which attempt to subvert---perhaps covertly---crypto\-graphic algorithms. In this paper we develop (IND-CPA) Semantically Secure encryption in this challenging setting. This fundamental encryption primitive has been previously studied in the ``kleptographic setting,'' though existing results must relax the model by introducing trusted components or otherwise constraining the subversion power of the adversary: designing a Public Key System that is kletographically semantically secure (with minimal trust) has remained elusive to date. In this work, we finally achieve such systems, even when all relevant cryptographic algorithms are subject to adversarial (kleptographic) subversion. To this end we exploit novel inter-component randomized cryptographic checking techniques (with an offline checking component), combined with common and simple software engineering modular programming techniques (applied to the system's black box specification level). Moreover, our methodology yields a strong generic technique for the preservation of any semantically secure cryptosystem when incorporated into the strong kleptographic adversary setting.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACM CCS 2017
- Contact author(s)
-
acr @ cse uconn edu
qiang @ njit edu
moti @ cs columbia edu
hszhou @ vcu edu - History
- 2018-09-16: last of 4 revisions
- 2016-05-31: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/530
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/530, author = {Alexander Russell and Qiang Tang and Moti Yung and Hong-Sheng Zhou}, title = {Generic Semantic Security against a Kleptographic Adversary}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/530}, year = {2016}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/530} }