Paper 2016/529
Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamper Resilience
Antonio Faonio and Daniele Venturi
Abstract
We revisit the question of constructing public-key encryption and signature schemes with security in the presence of bounded leakage and tampering memory attacks. For signatures we obtain the first construction in the standard model; for public-key encryption we obtain the first construction free of pairing (avoiding non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs). Our constructions are based on generic building blocks, and, as we show, also admit efficient instantiations under fairly standard number-theoretic assumptions. The model of bounded tamper resistance was recently put forward by Damgård {\em et al.} (Asiacrypt 2013) as an attractive path to achieve security against arbitrary memory tampering attacks without making hardware assumptions (such as the existence of a protected self-destruct or key-update mechanism), the only restriction being on the number of allowed tampering attempts (which is a parameter of the scheme). This allows to circumvent known impossibility results for unrestricted tampering (Gennaro {\em et al.}, TCC 2010), while still being able to capture realistic tampering attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2016
- Keywords
- tamper resiliencepublic-key encryptionsignature schemes
- Contact author(s)
-
afaonio @ gmail com
danone83 @ gmail com - History
- 2016-08-23: last of 3 revisions
- 2016-05-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/529
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/529, author = {Antonio Faonio and Daniele Venturi}, title = {Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamper Resilience}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/529}, year = {2016}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/529} }