**T-Proof: Secure Communication via Non-Algorithmic Randomization**

*Gideon Samid*

**Abstract: **shared random strings are either communicated or recreated algorithmically in “pseudo” mode, thereby exhibiting innate vulnerability. Proposing a secure protocol based on unshared randomized data, which therefore can be based on ‘white noise’ or other real-world, non algorithmic randomization. Prospective use of this T-Proof protocol includes proving possession of data to a party in possession of same data. The principle: Alice wishes to prove to Bob that she is in possession of secret data s, known also to Bob. They agree on a parsing algorithm, dependent on the contents of s, resulting in breaking s into t distinct, consecutive sub-strings (letters). Alice then uses unshared randomization procedure to effect a perfectly random transposition of the t substrings, thereby generating a transposed string s’. She communicates s’ to Bob. Bob verifies that s’ is a permutation of s based on his parsing of s to the same t substrings, and he is then persuaded that Alice is in possession of s. Because s’ was generated via a perfectly randomized transposition of s, a cryptanalyst in possession of s’ faces t! s- candidates, each with a probability of 1/t! (what’s more: the value of t, and the identity of the t sub-strings is unknown to the cryptanalyst). Brute force cryptanalysis is the fastest theoretical strategy. T-Proof can be played over s, mixed with some agreed upon nonce to defend against replay options. Unlike the competitive solution of hashing, T-Proof does not stand the risk of algorithmic shortcut. Its intractability is credibly appraised

**Category / Keywords: **cryptographic protocols / identity theft, non-repeat identification dialogue

**Date: **received 15 May 2016

**Contact author: **gideon at BitMint com

**Available format(s): **PDF | BibTeX Citation

**Version: **20160519:150519 (All versions of this report)

**Short URL: **ia.cr/2016/474

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