Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and their Sensitivity to Fault Attacks

Nina Bindel; Johannes Buchmann; Juliane Krämer

Paper 2016/415

Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and their Sensitivity to Fault Attacks

Nina Bindel, Johannes Buchmann, and Juliane Krämer

Abstract

Due to their high efficiency and their strong security properties, lattice-based cryptographic schemes seem to be a very promising post-quantum replacement for currently used public key cryptography. The security of lattice-based schemes has been deeply analyzed mathematically, whereas little effort has been spent on the analysis against implementation attacks. In this paper, we start with the fault analysis of one of the most important cryptographic primitives: signature schemes. We investigate the vulnerability and resistance of the currently most efficient lattice-based signature schemes BLISS (CRYPTO 2013), ring-TESLA (AfricaCrypt 2016), and the GLP scheme (CHES 2012) and their implementations. We consider different kinds of (first-order) randomizing, zeroing, and skipping faults. For each of the signature schemes, we found at least six effective attacks. To increase the security of lattice-based signature schemes, we propose countermeasures for each of the respective attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MAJOR revision.
Keywords: lattice-based cryptography signature scheme fault attack side channel analysis
Contact author(s): nbindel @ cdc informatik tu-darmstadt de
History: 2017-02-22: last of 2 revisions; 2016-04-28: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2016/415
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/415,
      author = {Nina Bindel and Johannes Buchmann and Juliane Krämer},
      title = {Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and their Sensitivity to Fault Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/415},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/415}
}