Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/397

Linear-Time Non-Malleable Codes in the Bit-Wise Independent Tampering Model

Ronald Cramer and Ivan Damgård and Nico Döttling and Irene Giacomelli and Chaoping Xing

Abstract: Non-malleable codes were introduced by Dziembowski et al. (ICS 2010) as coding schemes that protect a message against tampering attacks. Roughly speaking, a code is non-malleable if decoding an adversarially tampered encoding of a message m produces the original message m or a value m' (eventually abort) completely unrelated with m. It is known that non-malleability is possible only for restricted classes of tampering functions. Since their introduction, a long line of works has established feasibility results of non-malleable codes against different families of tampering functions. However, for many interesting families the challenge of finding "good" non-malleable codes remains open. In particular, we would like to have explicit constructions of non-malleable codes with high-rate and efficient encoding/decoding algorithms (i.e. low computational complexity). In this work we present two explicit constructions: the first one is a natural generalization of the work of Dziembowski et al. and gives rise to the first constant-rate non-malleable code with linear-time complexity (in a model including bit-wise indepen- dent tampering). The second construction is inspired by the recent works about non-malleable codes of Agrawal et al. (TCC 2015) and of Cher- aghchi and Guruswami (TCC 2014) and improves the previous result in the bit-wise tampering model: it builds the first non-malleable codes with linear-time complexity and optimal-rate (i.e. rate 1 - o(1)).

Category / Keywords: linear-time non-malleable codes secret-sharing

Date: received 21 Apr 2016, last revised 20 May 2016

Contact author: giacomelli at cs au dk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160520:093933 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/397

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]