Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/322

On the Security of PUF Protocols under Bad PUFs and PUFs-inside-PUFs Attacks

Ulrich Rührmair

Abstract: We continue investigations on the use of so-called Strong PUFs as a cryptographic primitive in realistic attack models, in particular in the “Bad/Malicious PUF Model”. We obtain the following results:

– Bad PUFs and Simplification: As a minor contribution, we simplify a recent OT-protocol for malicious PUFs by Dachman-Soled et al. [4] from CRYPTO 2014. We can achieve the same security properties under the same assumptions, but use only one PUF instead of two.

– PUFs-inside-PUFs, Part I: We propose the new, realistic adversarial models of PUF modifications and PUFs-inside-PUF attacks, and show that the earlier protocol of Dachman-Soled et al. [4] is vulnerable against PUFs-inside-PUFs attacks (which lie outside the original framework of [4]).

– PUFs-inside-PUFs, Part II: We construct a new PUF-based OT-protocol, which is secure against PUFs-inside-PUFs attacks if the used bad PUFs are stateless. Our protocol introduces the technique of interleaved challenges.

– PUFs-inside-PUFs, Part III: In this context, we illustrate why the use of interactive hashing in our new protocol appears necessary, and why a first protocol attempt without interactive hashing fails.

Category / Keywords: Strong PUFs, PUF Protocols, Bad PUFs, Malicious PUFs, PUFs-inside-PUFs Attacks

Date: received 22 Mar 2016, last revised 30 Mar 2016

Contact author: ruehrmair at ilo de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160330:135832 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/322

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