Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/284

Co-location detection on the Cloud

Mehmet Sinan Inci and Berk Gulmezoglu and Thomas Eisenbarth and Berk Sunar

Abstract: In this work we focus on the problem of co-location as a first step of conducting Cross-VM attacks such as Prime and Probe or Flush+Reload in commercial clouds. We demonstrate and compare three co-location detection methods namely, cooperative Last-Level Cache (LLC) covert channel, software profiling on the LLC and memory bus locking. We conduct our experiments on three commercial clouds, Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure. Finally, we show that both cooperative and non-cooperative co-location to specific targets on cloud is still possible on major cloud services.

Category / Keywords: Co-location in Cloud, Software Profiling, Cache Covert Channel, Performance Degradation Attacks, Memory Bus Locking

Original Publication (with minor differences): COSADE 2016 pre-procedings version

Date: received 14 Mar 2016

Contact author: teisenbarth at wpi edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160315:091232 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/284

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