Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/256
SE-ORAM: A Storage-Efficient Oblivious RAM for Privacy-Preserving Access to Cloud Storage
Qiumao Ma and Jinsheng Zhang and Wensheng Zhang and Daji Qiao
Abstract: Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a security-provable approach
for protecting clients' access patterns to remote cloud storage.
Recently, numerous ORAM constructions have been proposed
to improve the communication efficiency of the ORAM model,
but little attention has been paid to the storage efficiency.
The state-of-the-art ORAM constructions
have the storage overhead of $O(N)$ or $O(N\log N)$ blocks at the server,
when $N$ data blocks are hosted. To fill the blank,
this paper proposes a
storage-efficient ORAM (SE-ORAM) construction
with configurable security parameter $\lambda$ and zero storage overhead at the server.
Extensive analysis has also been conducted
and the results show that,
SE-ORAM achieves the configured level of security,
introduces zero storage overhead to the storage server
(i.e., the storage server only storages $N$ data blocks),
and incurs $O(\log N)$ blocks storage overhead at the client,
as long as $\lambda\geq 2$ and
each node on the storage tree stores $4\log N$ or more data blocks.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Cloud System, Data Outsourcing, Oblivious RAM, Privacy Preservation, Access Pattern.
Date: received 7 Mar 2016
Contact author: qmma at iastate edu
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20160308:201028 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2016/256
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