Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/244

Cryptanalysis of Simpira v1

Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Florian Mendel

Abstract: Simpira v1 is a recently proposed family of permutations, based on the AES round function. The design includes recommendations for using the Simpira permutations in block ciphers, hash functions, or authenticated ciphers. The designers' security analysis is based on computer-aided bounds for the minimum number of active S-boxes. We show that the underlying assumptions of independence, and thus the derived bounds, are incorrect. For family member Simpira-4, we provide differential trails with only 40 (instead of 75) active S-boxes for the recommended 15 rounds. Based on these trails, we propose full-round collision attacks on the proposed Simpira-4 Davies-Meyer hash construction, with complexity $2^{82.62}$ for the recommended full 15 rounds and a truncated 256-bit hash value, and complexity $2^{110.16}$ for 16 rounds and the full 512-bit hash value. These attacks violate the designers' security claims that there are no structural distinguishers with complexity below $2^{128}$.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Simpira, permutation-based cryptography, cryptanalysis, hash functions, collisions

Original Publication (in the same form): SAC 2016

Date: received 4 Mar 2016, last revised 25 Aug 2016

Contact author: maria eichlseder at iaik tugraz at

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Accepted to SAC 2016; updated to pre-proceedings version; reference Simpira v2

Version: 20160825:131420 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/244

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