Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/217
Practical backward unlinkable revocation in FIDO, German e-ID, Idemix and U-Prove
Eric R. Verheul
Abstract: FIDO, German e-ID, Idemix and U-Prove constitute privacy-enhanced public-key infrastructures allowing users to authenticate in an anonymous way.
This however hampers timely revocation in a privacy friendly way.
From a legal perspective, revocation typically should be effective within 24 hours after user reporting. It should also be backward unlinkable, i.e. user anonymity cannot be removed after revocation. We describe a new, generic revocation mechanism based on pairing based encryption and apply it to supplement the systems mentioned. This allows for both flexible and privacy friendly revocation. Protocol execution takes less than a quarter of a second on modern smartcards.
An additional property is that usage after revocation is linkable, allowing users to identify fraudulent usage after revocation. Our technique is the first Verifier Local Revocation scheme with backwards unlinkable revocation for the systems mentioned.
This also allows for a setup resembling the well-known Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).
Here the service provider sends a pseudonym to a revocation provider that returns its status.
As the information required for this is not secret the status service can be distributed over many cloud services.
In addition to the status service our technique also supports the publication of a central revocation list.
Category / Keywords: applications / ABCs, electronic authentication backward unlinkable revocation, pairings, Verifier Local Revocation
Date: received 29 Feb 2016
Contact author: Eric Verheul at keycontrols nl
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20160229:213740 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2016/217
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