Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/187

Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation with Identifiable Abort

Carsten Baum and Emmanuela Orsini and Peter Scholl

Abstract: We study secure multiparty computation (MPC) in the dishonest majority setting providing security with identifiable abort, where if the protocol aborts, the honest parties can agree upon the identity of a corrupt party. All known constructions that achieve this notion require expensive zero-knowledge techniques to obtain active security, so are not practical.

In this work, we present the first efficient MPC protocol with identifiable abort. Our protocol has an information-theoretic online phase with message complexity $O(n^2)$ for each secure multiplication (where $n$ is the number of parties), similar to the BDOZ protocol (Bendlin et al., Eurocrypt 2011), and a factor in the security parameter lower than the identifiable abort protocol of Ishai et al. (Crypto 2014). A key component of our protocol is a linearly homomorphic information-theoretic signature scheme, for which we provide the first definitions and construction based on a previous non-homomorphic scheme. We then show how to implement the preprocessing for our protocol using somewhat homomorphic encryption, similarly to the SPDZ protocol (Damgård et al., Crypto 2012) and other recent works with applicable efficiency improvements.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Secure Multiparty Computation, Identifiable Abort

Date: received 23 Feb 2016, last revised 24 May 2016

Contact author: peter scholl at bristol ac uk, cbaum@cs au dk, Emmanuela Orsini@bristol ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160524:130926 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/187

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