We propose a seeded variant of Bertoni et al.'s PRNG with input which we prove secure in the sense of robustness, delivering in particular concrete security bounds. On the way, we make what we believe to be an important conceptual contribution, developing a variant of the security framework of Dodis et al. tailored at the ideal permutation model that captures PRNG security in settings where the weakly random inputs are provided from a large class of possible adversarial samplers which are also allowed to query the random permutation.
As a further application of our techniques, we also present a simple and very efficient key-derivation function based on sponges (which can hence be instantiated from SHA-3 in a black-box fashion), which we also prove secure when fed with samples from permutation-dependent distributions.Category / Keywords: PRNGs, sponges, SHA-3, key derivation, weak randomness Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-EUROCRYPT-2016 Date: received 19 Feb 2016, last revised 19 Feb 2016 Contact author: peter gazi at ist ac at Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20160219:201940 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2016/169 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion