**Key Derivation for Squared-Friendly Applications: Lower Bounds**

*Maciej Skorski*

**Abstract: **Security of a cryptographic application is typically defined by a security game. The adversary, within certain resources, cannot win with probability much better than $0$ (for unpredictability applications, like one-way functions) or much better than $\frac{1}{2}$ (indistinguishability applications for instance encryption schemes). In so called \emph{squared-friendly applications} the winning probability of the adversary, for different values of the application secret randomness, is not only close to $0$ or $\frac{1}{2}$ on average, but also concentrated in the sense that it's second central moment is small. The class of squared-friendly applications, which contains all unpredictability applications and many indistinguishability applications, is particularly important in the context of key derivation. Barak et al. observed that for square-friendly applications one can beat the ``RT-bound'', extracting secure keys with significantly smaller entropy loss. In turn Dodis and Yu showed that in squared-friendly applications one can directly use a ``weak'' key, which has only high entropy, as a secure key.

In this paper we give sharp lower bounds on square security assuming security for ``weak'' keys. We show that \emph{any} application which is either (a) secure with weak keys or (b) allows for saving entropy in a key derived by hashing, \emph{must} be square-friendly. Quantitatively, our lower bounds match the positive results of Dodis and Yu and Barak et al. (TCC'13, CRYPTO'11) Hence, they can be understood as a general characterization of squared-friendly applications.

Whereas the positive results on squared-friendly applications where derived by one clever application of the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality, for tight lower bounds we need more machinery. In our approach we use convex optimization techniques and some theory of circular matrices.

**Category / Keywords: **foundations / key derivation, suqare-friendly applications

**Date: **received 18 Feb 2016, last revised 26 Nov 2016

**Contact author: **maciej skorski at gmail com

**Available format(s): **PDF | BibTeX Citation

**Note: **Editorial changes.

**Version: **20161126:104751 (All versions of this report)

**Short URL: **ia.cr/2016/157

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