To address this gap, we introduce annihilation attacks, which attack multilinear maps using non-linear polynomials. Annihilation attacks can work in situations where there are no low-level encodings of zero. Using annihilation attacks, we give the first polynomial-time cryptanalysis of candidate iO schemes over GGH13. More specifically, we exhibit two simple programs that are functionally equivalent, and show how to efficiently distinguish between the obfuscations of these two programs.
Given the enormous applicability of iO, it is important to devise iO schemes that can avoid attack. We discuss some initial directions for safeguarding against annihilating attacks.Category / Keywords: Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-CRYPTO-2016 Date: received 16 Feb 2016, last revised 7 Jun 2016 Contact author: amitsahai at gmail com Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20160607:192003 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2016/147 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion