Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/129
ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs
Daniel Genkin and Lev Pachmanov and Itamar Pipman and Eran Tromer
Abstract: We present the first physical side-channel attack on elliptic curve cryptography running on a PC. The attack targets the ECDH public-key encryption algorithm, as implemented in the latest version of GnuPG's Libgcrypt.
By measuring the target's electromagnetic emanations, the attack extracts the secret decryption key within seconds, from a target located in an adjacent room across a wall. The attack utilizes a single carefully chosen ciphertext, and tailored time-frequency signal analysis techniques, to achieve full key extraction.
Category / Keywords: implementation / side-channel attack, elliptic curve cryptography, electromagnetic emanations
Original Publication (with minor differences): CT-RSA 2016
Date: received 12 Feb 2016, last revised 17 Feb 2016
Contact author: tromer at cs tau ac il
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20160217:213703 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2016/129
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