ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs

Daniel Genkin; Lev Pachmanov; Itamar Pipman; Eran Tromer

Paper 2016/129

ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs

Daniel Genkin, Lev Pachmanov, Itamar Pipman, and Eran Tromer

Abstract

We present the first physical side-channel attack on elliptic curve cryptography running on a PC. The attack targets the ECDH public-key encryption algorithm, as implemented in the latest version of GnuPG's Libgcrypt. By measuring the target's electromagnetic emanations, the attack extracts the secret decryption key within seconds, from a target located in an adjacent room across a wall. The attack utilizes a single carefully chosen ciphertext, and tailored time-frequency signal analysis techniques, to achieve full key extraction.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CT-RSA 2016
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_13
Keywords: side-channel attack elliptic curve cryptography electromagnetic emanations
Contact author(s): tromer @ cs tau ac il
History: 2016-02-17: revised; 2016-02-14: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2016/129
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/129,
      author = {Daniel Genkin and Lev Pachmanov and Itamar Pipman and Eran Tromer},
      title = {{ECDH} Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on {PCs}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/129},
      year = {2016},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_13},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/129}
}