Paper 2016/1190

Equivocating Yao: Constant-Round Adaptively Secure Multiparty Computation in the Plain Model

Ran Canetti, Oxana Poburinnaya, and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam

Abstract

Yao's garbling scheme is one of the basic building blocks of cryptographic protocol design. Originally designed to enable two-message, two-party secure computation, the scheme has been extended in many ways and has innumerable applications. Still, a basic question has remained open throughout the years: Can the scheme be extended to guarantee security in the face of an adversary that corrupts both parties, adaptively, as the computation proceeds? We answer this question in the affirmative. We define a new type of encryption, called {\sf functionally equivocal encryption (FEE),} and show that when Yao's scheme is implemented with an FEE as the underlying encryption mechanism, it becomes secure against such adaptive adversaries. We then show how to implement FEE from any one way function. Combining our scheme with non-committing encryption, we obtain the first two-message, two-party computation protocol, and the first constant-round multiparty computation protocol, in the plain model, that are secure against semi-honest adversaries who can adaptively corrupt all parties. A number of extensions and applications are described within.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
adaptive securityYao garbled circuitssecure computation
Contact author(s)
oxanapob @ bu edu
canetti @ bu edu
muthuv @ cs rochester edu
History
2017-01-01: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/1190
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/1190,
      author = {Ran Canetti and Oxana Poburinnaya and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam},
      title = {Equivocating Yao: Constant-Round Adaptively Secure Multiparty Computation in the Plain Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/1190},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1190}
}
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