Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/1083

Constructions Secure against Receiver Selective Opening and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks

Dingding Jia and Xianhui Lu and Bao Li

Abstract: In this paper we study public key encryption schemes of indistinguishability security against receiver selective opening (IND-RSO) attacks, where the attacker can corrupt some receivers and get the corresponding secret keys in the multi-party setting. Concretely:

-We present a general construction of RSO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (RSO-CCA) by combining any RSO secure scheme against chosen plaintext attacks (RSO-CPA) with any regular CCA secure scheme, along with an appropriate non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. -We show that the leakage-resistant construction given by Hazay \emph{et al.} in Eurocrypt 2013 from weak hash proof system (wHPS) is RSO-CPA secure.

-We further show that the CCA secure construction given by Cramer and Shoup in Eurocrypt 2002 based on the universal HPS is RSO-CCA secure, hence obtain a more efficient paradigm for RSO-CCA security.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / receiver selective opening, chosen ciphertext security, hash proof system

Original Publication (with minor differences): CT-RSA 2017

Date: received 18 Nov 2016

Contact author: ddjia at is ac cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20161121:121308 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/1083

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]