Constructions Secure against Receiver Selective Opening and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks

Dingding Jia; Xianhui Lu; Bao Li

Paper 2016/1083

Constructions Secure against Receiver Selective Opening and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks

Dingding Jia, Xianhui Lu, and Bao Li

Abstract

In this paper we study public key encryption schemes of indistinguishability security against receiver selective opening (IND-RSO) attacks, where the attacker can corrupt some receivers and get the corresponding secret keys in the multi-party setting. Concretely: -We present a general construction of RSO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (RSO-CCA) by combining any RSO secure scheme against chosen plaintext attacks (RSO-CPA) with any regular CCA secure scheme, along with an appropriate non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. -We show that the leakage-resistant construction given by Hazay \emph{et al.} in Eurocrypt 2013 from weak hash proof system (wHPS) is RSO-CPA secure. -We further show that the CCA secure construction given by Cramer and Shoup in Eurocrypt 2002 based on the universal HPS is RSO-CCA secure, hence obtain a more efficient paradigm for RSO-CCA security.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CT-RSA 2017
Keywords: receiver selective opening chosen ciphertext security hash proof system
Contact author(s): ddjia @ is ac cn
History: 2016-11-21: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2016/1083
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/1083,
      author = {Dingding Jia and Xianhui Lu and Bao Li},
      title = {Constructions Secure against Receiver Selective Opening and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/1083},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1083}
}