Paper 2016/1016
Deterring Certificate Subversion: Efficient Double-Authentication-Preventing Signatures
Mihir Bellare, Bertram Poettering, and Douglas Stebila
Abstract
This paper presents highly efficient designs of double authentication preventing signatures (DAPS). In a DAPS, signing two messages with the same first part and differing second parts reveals the signing key. In the context of PKIs we suggest that CAs who use DAPS to create certificates have a court-convincing argument to deny big-brother requests to create rogue certificates, thus deterring certificate subversion. We give two general methods for obtaining DAPS. Both start from trapdoor identification schemes. We instantiate our transforms to obtain numerous specific DAPS that, in addition to being efficient, are proven with tight security reductions to standard assumptions. We implement our DAPS schemes to show that they are not only several orders of magnitude more efficient than prior DAPS but competitive with in-use signature schemes that lack the double authentication preventing property.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- signaturessubversionmass surveillanceimplementation
- Contact author(s)
- stebilad @ mcmaster ca
- History
- 2016-10-27: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/1016
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/1016,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Bertram Poettering and Douglas Stebila},
title = {Deterring Certificate Subversion: Efficient Double-Authentication-Preventing Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/1016},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1016}
}
